JED PERL, ANNE HOLLANDER: THE IMPRESSIVE IMPRESSIONISTS

MARCH 9, 1998 • $3.50

THE NEW REPUBLIC

David Grann on Southern Black Republicans • Heilbrunn vs. Steel on Iraq

AFTER THE TSUNAMI

Will Economic Crisis Bring Democracy to Asia?

Daniel A. Bell

Sebastian Mallaby

Robert Kagan

Margot Cohen

James Tobin and Gustav Ranis



#BXBKDML***5-DIGIT 94301
#TNR0000068171/5#78 24SEP01

009
RON K UNZ
555 BRYANT ST #371 SB
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

0 787446 8

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Her science teacher taught her about discovery. Now she's discovering ways to fight cancer.

Pam Hunt
pharmaceutical company researcher

"When I was eight, my mother died. Fortunately, a biology teacher took me under his wing. He taught me a lot about science. But mostly he made me feel 'Hey, I can do this.'



Cancer cells invade healthy cells.

"Today, I'm a pharmaceutical company researcher. At my company we're developing a new drug that may help cancer patients get their blood platelet numbers back up to normal after chemotherapy. Restoring blood platelet counts is critical for the effective treatment of the disease. The idea that the drug I'm working on could one day help cancer victims makes me feel very proud."

What else is new in cancer treatment?

Research is shedding new light on the treatment of cancer. Photodynamic therapy is just one of over 316 new treatments now in development. By shining special low-power light on cancer cells treated with light-sensitive drugs, affected cells could be destroyed without harming the surrounding healthy tissue. New treatments such as photodynamic therapy are providing real hope for cancer patients.

To find out more about research, prevention and treatment of cancer, call 800-862-5110. We offer FREE booklets including Cancer, HIV/AIDS and Alzheimer's. Or visit us on the internet at http://www.phrma.org.

America's Pharmaceutical Companies
Leading the way in the search for cures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Weekly Journal of Opinion

MARCH 9, 1998

FOUNDED 1914
WASHINGTON, D.C.
ISSUE 4,338

Editor-in-Chief and Chairman
MARTIN PERETZ

Editor
CHARLES LANE
Literary Editor
LEON WIESELTIER
Executive Editor
JONATHAN COHN
Senior Editors
PETER BEINART, DAVID GRANN, JACOB HEILBRUNN, JOHN B. JUDIS, HANNA ROSIN, ANDREW SULLIVAN, MARGARET TALBOT, JAMES WOOD
Legal Affairs
JEFFREY ROSEN
Managing Editor
NURITH C. AIZENMAN
Assistant Managing Editor
JOSEPH LANDAU
Films
STANLEY KAUFFMANN
Theater
ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Poetry
MARK STRAND
Dance
MINDY ALOFF
Art
JED PERL
New Republic Online (Electronic Newsstand)
BRIAN HECHT
Contributing Editors
FOUAD AJAMI, ELIOT A. COHEN, STANLEY CROUCH, JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, NATHAN GLAZER, ANN HULBERT, MICKEY KAUS, MICHAEL KINSLEY, CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, VINT LAWRENCE, MICHAEL LEWIS, GLENN C. LOURY, DOUGLAS G. McGRATH, LOUIS MENAND, DAVID RIEFF, ROGER ROSENBLATT, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, MAGGIE SCARF, RONALD STEEL, MICHAEL WALZER, JACOB WEISBERG, SEAN WILENTZ, ALAN WOLFE, C. VANN WOODWARD, ROBERT WRIGHT
Special Correspondent
ANNA HUSARSKA
Associate Editors
JONATHAN CHAIT, STEPHEN GLASS, RUTH SHALIT
Design Consultant
ERIC BAKER
Editorial-Corporate Coordinator
LAURA E. OBOLENSKY
Production Director
BRUCE STEINKE
Production Manager
HENRY RIGGS
Assistant Editors
KATHERINE PFLEGER
JASON ZENGERLE
Literary Assistant
ADAM KIRSCH
Reporter-Researchers
RYAN LIZZA, MARK STRICHERZ

Publisher
WILL LIPPINCOTT
Associate Publisher-Advertising
JENNIFER BARRETT
Associate Publisher-Circulation
JAMES J. SMITH
Director of National Advertising
JOAN M. STAPLETON
Controller
CHRISTINA R. BONIFER
Circulation Director
CECELIA M. STEPHENS
Marketing Manager
SHABNAM K. SHARMA
Advertising Manager
ASHLEY H. COOPER
Accounting Assistants
JACQUELYN M. McCULLOUGH
KIMBERLY HUSTAD
Circulation Assistant
HEATHER HARMON
Advertising Assistant
KATHLEEN WILEY
Back Issues and Reception
NEMAT A. BILAL

Cover by Eric Baker for THE NEW REPUBLIC. Illustration by Anthony Russo with apologies to Katsushika Hokusai. Articles on pages 16, 18, 20, 22, and 38.

4 **CORRESPONDENCE** Religion in Iran, equality in America, &c.

6 **JACOB HEILBRUNN** TRB: MISSION POSSIBLE Enough dithering about Iraq. Get on with the bombing.

7 **THE EDITORS** DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL Why the Secret Service shouldn't be subpoenaed. NOTEBOOK Berger's blooper, census samplers, &c.

9 **RONALD STEEL** THE HARD QUESTIONS: DUMB BOMBS The futility of our coming campaign against Iraq.

10 **JESSE WALKER** REBEL RADIO The FCC's pointless crusade against unlicensed broadcasters.

11 **DAVID GRANN** GEORGIA DISPATCH: CLOSE RACES In the heart of Dixie, the ban on racially drawn congressional districts has produced a most surprising result: black Republicans challenging black Democrats.

14 **PETER SCHRAG** LANGUAGE BARRIER Bilingual education may be a disaster in California, but a ballot initiative to reform it will only create new problems.

16 **JAMES TOBIN AND GUSTAV RANIS** FLAWED FUND The case against IMF austerity.

18 **MARGOT COHEN** NO CONTEST Indonesia's economic crisis has stoked middle-class anger. So why is President Suharto's reign so secure?

20 **SEBASTIAN MALLABY** SETTING SUN What's more disquieting than Japan on the rise? Japan in decline.

22 **DANIEL A. BELL** AFTER THE TSUNAMI It's a staple of political theory that prosperity leads to democratization. But, in a few Asian countries, where economic crisis has focused public scrutiny on the failure of authoritarian rule, the opposite may be true.

28 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ON FILMS: ONE DAY IN 1923 *Mrs. Dalloway* is reassuringly unfilmable.

29 **JED PERL** ON ART: BRING IN THE *AMATEURS* The Impressionists expose the poverty of the contemporary art world.

33 **ANNE HOLLANDER** THE ART IN THE AIR *Impressionism: Reflections and Perceptions* by Meyer Schapiro

38 **ROBERT KAGAN** WHAT KOREA TEACHES Models, principles, and the future of democracy in Asia.

47 **HENRY ROSOVSKY** MAKING THE GRADE *Jefferson's Children: Education and the Promise of American Culture* by Leon Botstein

48 **CARL PHILLIPS** POEM *The Gods Leaving*

50 **ANNA HUSARSKA** SARAJEVO DIARIST: IF PIGS COULD FLY

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Vol. 218, Number 10, Issue 4,338, March 9, 1998. (Printed in the U.S. on February 18, 1998.) Published weekly (except for combined issues dated Jan. 5 & 12, July 20 & 27, Aug. 17 & 24, and Sept. 14 & 21, 1998) at 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Telephone (202) 331-7494. The New Republic Advertising Sales Office (212) 702-4882. Yearly subscriptions, $59.94; foreign, $99.94 (U.S. funds); Canada, $79.94 (U.S. funds). Back issues, $3.50 (includes postage & handling).

© 1998 by The New Republic, Inc.

(ISSN 0028-6583). Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC, and additional mailing offices. Rights and permissions: fax 202-331-0275. Indexed in Readers' Guide, Media Review Digest, Microform, Canadian Periodical Index, CD-ROM, issue and article copies are available through University Microfilms Intnl., 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Telephone 1-800-521-0600. Internet mail address: tnr@aol.com Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. Unsolicited manuscripts can be returned only if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. Subscribers: Please send all remittances, changes of address, and subscription inquiries to Subscription Service Dept., The New Republic, P.O. Box 37298, Boone, IA 50037-0298. For subscription problems call 1-800-827-1289.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

Iranarama

To the editors:

Your February 2 editorial commenting on Iranian President Mohammed Khatami's CNN interview ("Tocqueville and the Mullah") underestimates the subtlety of this anti-xenophobic Muslim cleric. Ayatollah Khatami undoubtedly feels that twentieth-century America has moved too far away from God, and most Americans would probably agree. Khatami seems to know enough about American history to realize that a secular state, if not an anti-religious one, did no harm to the spread of orthodox, revelation-based religion, along with other understandings of religion, in the United States. Perhaps he is suggesting a possibility for an evolved democracy in Iran which does not betray "true religion."

NOEL HARRISON
Greenlawn, New York

Equalizers

To the editors:

Michael Walzer ("The Big Shrug," February 2) finds it outrageous that the spread in life expectancies among U.S. counties is wider than the spread "if you took in all of Europe" (apparently he means among national averages for European countries) and, quoting *The New York Times*, of "the sort found between poverty-ridden Sierra Leone and wealthy Japan."

Regardless of how one feels about inequality, isn't it an elementary apples-and-oranges fallacy to compare national averages with county extremes? Wouldn't we find similar extremes in whatever geographical unit is similar to our counties in Europe—or in Japan, or even in Sierra Leone?

A.E. ROACH
Alexandria, Virginia

To the editors:

If $100,000 is the maximum income recorded for the statistical analysis, and the ratio of top-fifth income to bottom-fifth income is 20 to one, then Michael Walzer is saying that 20 percent of New York families make $5,000 or less per year.

I know that the bottom fifth has been losing ground, but I don't think it's *that* bad. What am I missing?

ALAN COLLINS
Havertown, Pennsylvania

Michael Walzer replies:

Alan Collins is right to be surprised but wrong to think it's not that bad. The average family income of the top fifth of New Yorkers is $132,390 ($100,000 is the highest income recorded for individuals, not families); the average for the lowest fifth is $6,787; the ratio is 19.5 to one.

A.E. Roach is also both right and wrong. According to the report I cited, disparities in life expectancy among counties in the United States are greater than among similar local units in any European country or among local units across Europe: apples to apples. I assume that a similar claim can be made for Japan; I don't know about Sierra Leone. The reference to disparities between Japan and Sierra Leone, countries not counties, definitely oranges, was intended


BUSH & HILL: WHAT NOW?
WHERE HAVE YOU GONE, JACKIE ROBINSON?
Jonathan Chait on Spinning the Surplus • Hanna Rosin on Healing Texaco
Does This Man Belong in Prison?
Michael Espy, the Special Prosecutor, and the Criminalization of American Politics.
by David Grann

by the author of the report for dramatic effect. I thought it was quite effective.

Citizenry

To the editors:

Jeffrey Rosen's review of my book *Civic Ideals* ("America in Thick and Thin," January 5 & 12) is evidence that the ugly patterns I describe in America's past remain present today.

Rosen finds my account of ascriptive citizenship confusing because he wrongly thinks I depict illiberal and liberal versions of such citizenship. I view all civic statuses ascribed on the basis of unchosen traits, like race or gender, as illiberal. And I show that the "liberal" U.S. long structured its citizenship as a vast system of ascriptive racial and gender hierarchies.

Rosen concedes that claim but minimizes it. He contrasts a classical model of citizenship that was "thin" (providing few rights) and "particularistic" (available to few) with a modern one that is "thick" (offering many rights) and "universalistic" (widely available). He wants us to make citizenship thick but particularistic.

To defend particularism, he insists that classical judicial rulings against blacks, Chinese immigrants, and women were constitutional. But I attack those decisions as illiberal, not as unconstitutional. The Constitution was a set of compromises with illiberalism.

Rosen also ignores the reasons why Americans made citizenship particularistic. Leaders often advance stories claiming that their core constituents form a special political "people" from which others are rightly excluded. Stories of racial and gender superiority have served this purpose well, with highly unjust results. Rosen thinks we're past that nasty stuff. Anyway, he says, exclusion and discrimination are logically distinct. Perhaps, but they are politically joined at the hip.

And, though we have ended many past discriminations, we are hardly incapable of new ones. My book ends with a period like today: The era when reactions against Reconstruction led to new racial and gender injustices. Now the reactions are against the reforms of the 1960s. And, when Rosen urges us to allow more particularistic immigration exclusions if they are not *too* racist and sexist, echoes of the nineteenth century ring loudly.

Rosen replies that American citizenship is just a "particular status in a particular place, not a method of mending the world." This citizenship anchors the constitutional anti-discrimination principle, so discrimination against noncitizens is not worrisome.

He omits the fact that the equal protection and due process clauses refer to persons, not citizens. They express a great American tradition: the aim to craft a nation that will indeed help the world and not just ourselves. George Washington was right, I think, to caution Americans to remember that the Revolution was fought not only for themselves but for the "rights of man." And, if Paine and Lincoln overstated it when they said that the cause of America was "the cause of all mankind," I see no reason to abandon our historical efforts to make it more so.

ROGERS M. SMITH
New Haven, Connecticut

THE NEW REPUBLIC welcomes unsolicited manuscripts and article proposals. Because of the volume of submissions, we regret that we cannot acknowledge an article or return it unless it is accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. If articles are accepted for publication, authors will be notified within two weeks. Submissions may also be sent electronically to: TNR@aol.com. **No fax or phone queries, please.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States is the most exceptional nation in the world

Learn why at a distinguished British university

The Institute of United States Studies in the University of London offers postgraduate research programs leading to the University of London MPhil and PhD in United States Studies and the MA in United States Studies covering all aspects of American studies.

The MA is available through taught courses in a challenging interdisciplinary program over one year full time or two years part time. Course offerings for 1998-99 include American political thought, economic history, music, literature, film studies, constitutional history, politics, history, international relations and foreign policy.

Applications for the 1998-99 academic year are now being accepted.
For further information, please contact:

Institute of United States Studies, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU, UK.
Telephone 44 171 636 8000 extension 5100; Fax 44 171 580 7352; e-mail iuss@sas.ac.uk

American Advisory Board: Saul Bellow, Raoul Berger, Charles Blitzer, Ambassador Henry Catto, Ambassador William Crowe, Roger Ebert, John Kenneth Galbraith, Mary Ann Glendon, Robert A Goldwin, Hanna Holborn Gray, A E Dick Howard, Ambassador Philip Lader (Chairman), Harvey C Mansfield, Jr, Roger Mudd, Martin Peretz, Ambassador Charles H Price II, Ambassador Elliot Richardson, Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr, Ambassador Raymond G H Seitz, Judge William H Webster and George F Will.

Professor Gary L McDowell
Director

The Rt Hon the Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven
Chairman of the Board

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB®

FROM WASHINGTON

Mission possible

[Clinton administration] discussions continued to meander like graduate-student bull sessions....
—Colin Powell, *My American Journey*

When will the Clinton administration quit dithering about attacking Saddam? The latest manifestation was the dispatching of leading officials on information-gathering field trips around the globe. Our secretary of defense has been sent to Russia to receive a dressing-down, while Boris Yeltsin rants about a new world war. Our ambassador to the United Nations has been sent to China to receive warnings against military action. And our secretary of state has been sent to the Middle East to receive the message that our Middle East allies are not allied with us after all. The talkfest continued at a televised town-hall meeting among Madeleine Albright, William Cohen, Sandy Berger, and the people of Columbus, Ohio.

Whatever happened to the spirit of Dayton, Ohio? After air power stopped the Serbs in their tracks in Bosnia, the Clintonites seemed to appreciate the efficacy of American military might. The skeptics, after all, had said that we had to cater to Russian sensitivities, that bombing would accomplish nothing, that American ground troops would become bogged down in a new Vietnam, that Americans would rise in indignation. But the skeptics were wrong. The use of force produced a negotiated settlement to the war, American and Russian ground troops (the latter under U.S. command) were stationed in Bosnia, and the American public never rose in indignation.



Now, the very same set of arguments deployed against intervention in Bosnia is being redeployed against the use of American military power in Iraq. We must cater to Russian sensitivities, skeptics cry. Bombing will accomplish nothing. The American public will rebel. A new Vietnam looms. Instead of recognizing these sentiments for what they are—threadbare isolationism dressed up as foreign policy realism—the administration has lapsed back into endless rounds of discussion. Rather than pressuring Saddam, its main goal seems to be persuading the American electorate of the wisdom of a bombing campaign whose objectives are scaled back every day. Meanwhile, polls show the public hardly needs more persuasion.

Despite the myth that the Vietnam War proved that America must have an exit strategy before it enters conflicts, the U.S. does not need to have a carefully defined goal in order to bomb Iraq. On the contrary, there should be an arbitrary element about the U.S. approach to handling Saddam. To be effective psychologically as well as strategically, warfare must have an unpredictable element. Since when do you warn a foe you're about to attack him? The U.S. has been behaving as though Saddam's contumacy toward U.N. inspectors were the behavior of a recalcitrant child. But the Gulf war is not over. The terms of the armistice have been violated. The U.S. has every right to strike, whenever and wherever it wishes.

The U.S. should have bombed months ago. By delaying its military response to Saddam's truculence, the administration has unwittingly magnified the perils of bombing out of all proportion. By giving Saddam advance notice, the Clintonites have allowed him to set the rules of the game. Not only does Saddam get to prepare for bombing, but the administration's attempt to get the Arab and Western European countries on board gives them, in effect, veto power over American action.

The truth is that Saddam Hussein's regime is in terrible shape. The economic embargo appears to be working, and the Iraqi army is no menace. Saddam's reliance on chemical weapons is actually a sign of weakness. As Ken Pollack, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has recently written, "Iraqi armed forces today are a pale shadow of even their 1991 form." Their weapons are mostly obsolete, and U.N. sanctions have prevented Iraq from procuring spare parts, lubricants, and other vital supplies. Further, Iraqi air defenses are far weaker than they were in 1991 and are incapable of striking planes flying above 10,000 feet. Pollack noted that material shortages have forced Baghdad

continued on page 49

"The clearest and most comprehensive discussion available of the most fateful foreign policy issue that the United States will confront in the late 1990s."

–Michael Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins University

NATO has been an alliance without a mission since the end of the Cold War. Even as plans for expansion go forward, the post–Cold War mission of the alliance remains unclear.



What is clear, however, is that NATO enlargement will create several problems. By including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland while excluding other nations, NATO expansion threatens to create a new division of Europe and provoke Russia. Even worse, expansion would saddle the United States with unrealistic security obligations.

NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality
edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry
284 pages, $21.95 cloth/$11.95 paper

At bookstores, or call: 1-800-767-1241
(noon-9 p.m. eastern time, Monday-Friday)

CATO INSTITUTE
1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

MARCH 9, 1998

DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL

Imagine living in a house equipped with a secret camera that records your every movement and follows you into every room. Federal law prohibits you from turning the camera off at any time on the grounds that your life would be threatened without it. Suddenly, a prosecutor tries to subpoena tapes from the secret camera to make out a case that you lied about your private sexual behavior. How would you feel?

Very much like President Clinton, whose personal Secret Service detail now faces the prospect of subpoenas from Kenneth Starr. (One current agent and one former uniformed officer, in fact, have already been called to testify before Starr's grand jury.) Legally, Starr is forging into uncharted territory: Secret Service agents have historically kept mum about private conduct they see and hear while guarding the president—for the agents, this primarily is a matter of professional tradition and honor, not statutory requirement. But there are sound grounds for quashing Starr's subpoenas, arguments that have to do not only with national security and the president's privacy, but also, ultimately, with democracy. These reasons are persuasive regardless of the merits of the allegations of sexual indiscretion and perjury currently hanging over Clinton. The concern here is with the impact of Starr's subpoenas on the office of the president, not on this particular president.

President Clinton's Justice and Treasury departments are resisting Starr's subpoena to the active Secret Service agent on the grounds of national security. (Justice and Treasury officials worked out an agreement with Starr for the retired officer to give limited testimony.) Their constitutional arguments derive from *United States* v. *Nixon*, the 1974 Supreme Court decision which suggested that "absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets," the confidentiality of presidential communications wasn't "significantly diminished" by forcing the president to turn over tapes of his conversations with his aides. Citing *Nixon*, Justice and Treasury can argue that, because Secret Service agents are privy to military and diplomatic secrets such as the whereabouts of the president's advisers and the comings and goings of diplomats, they shouldn't be required to testify in court. The Justice and Treasury departments can also argue that, unlike any other public official, the president is on duty 24 hours a day, and his protective agents are required to be seconds away from him at all times. If the president fears that they may be forced to betray his confidence in court, he may be far more inclined to avoid their protection, with potentially fatal results.

But Justice and Treasury should also buttress their case about national security with an argument about presidential privacy. In an age when the boundary between public and private life has been eroded to the vanishing point, the White House residence is the only place where the president and his family can take refuge from the public's gaze. There are all sorts of legal but embarrassing activities that families perform in the privacy of their own homes—ranging from Hillary's singing in the shower to Chelsea's going out on dates—that should be scrupulously protected from involuntary disclosure. No human being can function without a zone of privacy, and, for this reason alone, a court could quash Starr's subpoenas of the Secret Service as "unreasonable and oppressive."

There's a third reason for quashing the subpoenas, and it has to do with democracy. A professional, scrupulously apolitical presidential security force is one of the features that distinguishes the elected office of president of the United States from a personalistic dictator protected by a palace guard. It is vitally important that the president's bodyguards remain loyal only to their profession and to the government itself, rather than to a particular incumbent. Yet, if Secret Service agents can be compelled to testify about the private conduct of presidents, however questionable, presidents will come to fear that their most intimate secrets may be betrayed by their agents. (If the president committed a truly egregious crime, agent testimony would either be redundant or voluntarily forthcoming anyway.) The result, inevitably, will be an attempt to install personal loyalists as bodyguards. And at the bottom of that slippery slope lies a situation like that in the Kremlin, where Boris Yeltsin's bodyguards jockey for influence and control over everything from access to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

president to Russia's foreign policy.

Like grand jurors, Secret Service agents are entrusted with secrets on the condition they won't betray them, and judges should hesitate to deny presidents the same confidentiality they rely on in their own courts. It will be ironic if courts prove insensitive to the triple concerns of national security, personal privacy, and democratic legitimacy and refuse to quash the Secret Service subpoenas. Alas, it would not be surprising. The record of executive-privilege decisions, from *U.S.* v. *Nixon* to *Clinton* v. *Jones,* is not encouraging; ill-informed and sheltered judges have repeatedly made overconfident predictions that subjecting presidents to the rule of law won't unduly burden the presidency. As Bimbroglio grinds inexorably forward, the Secret Service subpoenas provide an opportunity for the courts to carve out at least a modest zone of privacy for the president and his family. The courts should take it. •

NOTEBOOK

STAR STRUCK: Not long ago, John Travolta got President Clinton to intervene against the purported persecution of his fellow Scientologists in Germany. Clinton deputized no less a personage than his national security adviser, Sandy Berger, to meet with Travolta, jazzist Chick Corea, and others and to generally keep tabs on Scientology's beef with the German government—which includes the ludicrous and offensive claim, officially rejected by the U.S. government itself, that Scientologists are being treated today the same way that Jews were treated under Hitler. Now, *George* magazine implies that Travolta will repay this favor with a sympathetic portrayal of the Clinton character in the soon-to-be-released film version of *Primary Colors.* Whether that's literally true or not, we are not impressed with the factuality of Berger's Travoltified version of the situation in Germany. On the February 15 edition of "Meet the Press," Berger claimed that "the State Department, which every year does human rights reports in a meticulous manner, reached the conclusion that the German government was, for example, denying membership in political parties on the basis of one's belief"—i.e., one's belief in Scientology. The State Department, Berger added, was "critical of that." This casual but nationally televised remark about one of America's staunchest democratic allies, a country that has recently offered the use of bases on its soil to support American air attacks on Iraq, was both highly prejudicial and completely spurious. For one thing, the State Department report did not say what Berger claimed it said. The German government, like the governments of all democracies, exercises no control over the membership of political parties; the State Department merely reported that leading parties had banned Scientologists on their own. Far from being "critical of that," the State Department report duly noted that the ban had been upheld by Germany's independent courts and that there was only *one* known instance of the ban ever having been enforced anyway. And since when is it necessarily so bad to make "belief" a litmus test for membership in a political party—which is by definition an organization of ideologically compatible citizens? (The leading party in Germany, and other European states, is the *Christian* Democratic Union.) Berger's sloppy animadversions showed how little the sensibilities of a friendly foreign country matter to this administration when something really important—the sensibilities of Hollywood movie stars—is at stake. Well, maybe it also depends on the friendly foreign country involved. In contrast to the red-carpet treatment for Travolta, Richard Gere, the Buddhist star of *Pretty Woman,* had to air his concerns about China's genuinely scandalous suffocation of Buddhist Tibet at a protest dinner held the same night Clinton was toasting Chinese leader Jiang Zemin at the White House.

TWO TIMES OVER SAMPLING: In the increasingly acrimonious fight over how to conduct the 2000 census, the Republican congressional leadership has maintained that its opposition to sampling—statistical population estimates that would compensate for the undercounting of many minorities and low-income Americans—has nothing to do with partisanship and everything to do with principle. Unfortunately, their own experts seem to disagree. Last week, Max Williams, a demographer from Mississippi, stepped down from the board charged with overseeing the 2000 census. Williams claims he simply wanted to spend more time with his family. But, according to *Roll Call,* Williams, who had been appointed to the board by his home-state senator, Majority Leader Trent Lott, resigned because he could not bring himself to endorse the Republican efforts to suppress sampling. As one of Williams's colleagues told the newspaper, "He understands the value of a good, accurate census, and he also understands the potential for sampling." Apparently, others do too. Last week, House Speaker Newt Gingrich was set to appoint Albert Zapanta, who is head of the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, to the board. But then word leaked that Zapanta had told Democrats (gasp!) that he would have nothing against sampling if it improved census accuracy. Suddenly, Zapanta was off the list. As argued in these pages several weeks ago (see "Non-Census," by Matthew M. Hoffman, February 9), the case against sampling is weak on both scientific and constitutional grounds. But it seems that the Republican leadership is determined to think otherwise, no matter how many of its own hand-picked experts disagree.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: The photograph of Bill Clinton that appeared on the cover of our February 16 issue should have been credited to Harry Hamburg/*New York Daily News* (KRT). •

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HARD QUESTIONS

DUMB BOMBS

By Ronald Steel

Since Vietnam, the U.S. government has engaged in no small number of quixotic military adventures, including those in Grenada, Somalia, and the desert sands of Iran. But it is hard to think of an enterprise with less chance of achieving its political and even its military objectives than the one currently in the works for Iraq.

Here is an operation that even its advocates agree is doomed to fail. The projected American air strikes will not "take care of" (to use one of the numerous euphemisms) Saddam Hussein or remove him from power. He moves around too much to be targeted from 30,000 feet. And, if months of U.S. bombing in 1991 and the total defeat of his army did not dislodge him, a few days of air strikes against his palaces and movable "installations" are unlikely to do so. Indeed, the U.S. does not expect it to. As President Clinton said in a recent press conference, there is "no need to get into a direct war with Iraq over the leadership of the country."



Nor will bombing seriously cripple Iraq's capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons. They are very easy to conceal and in any case can be rebuilt by scientists working in factories no bigger than your kitchen. Again Clinton's aims are exceedingly modest: simply to "substantially reduce or delay" Saddam's ability to develop and deliver such weapons. In other words, to put some speed bumps in his path.

This is an immense fuss over a remarkably narrow objective. But getting rid of Saddam and opening up the sites would require a full-scale invasion by American troops that neither the public nor the Pentagon would support. Thus, the administration, having painted itself into a corner, has had to whittle back its objectives.

And even these may be too ambitious. So-called "surgical" air strikes against urban targets could cause thousands of civilian casualties, provoke condemnations by Arab populations, weaken the conservative Arab governments we support, transform Saddam from outlaw to martyr, dramatize that the coalition we marshalled in 1991 has fallen apart and left us with virtually no allies supporting this operation, and in the end do nothing to resolve the problem of Saddam and his nasty weapons.

This is a frustrating state of affairs for a nation with such overwhelming military power. But some victories cost more than they are worth, and this may be one of them. So welcome to the post-cold war world, where military might does not always translate into political gains and where an untempered pursuit of the desirable gets in the way of the appreciation of the feasible. What is unfortunate is that this lesson has to involve such an odious character as Saddam Hussein.

But a major reason for the problem is that, as *The Wall Street Journal* observed, hardly anyone really wants to get rid of him. Not the Turks, who fear that his successor might not be so cooperative in controlling the rebellious Kurds along their common border. Not the Syrians, who joined the 1991 Gulf war coalition but now see Saddam as a buffer against a Turkey that has become cuddly with Israel. Not the Palestinians, who consider Saddam their champion against the U.S. and Israel. Not the Jordanians, who value Iraq as a key trading partner and regard Saddam more as victim than villain. Not the Egyptians, who, though once key members of the Gulf war coalition and of the Arab–Israeli peace process, now refuse to support the U.S. effort to punish Saddam. Not the Saudis, who, despite their distaste for the Iraqi dictator, fear that any successor might be less likely to contain the Iranians, whom they fear much more.

And not even the Kuwaitis, over whose fate Washington's love affair with Saddam went sour. After all, a weak government in Baghdad, particularly the kind of pro-Western, reasonably democratic government that U.S. officials dream about, would likely mean a flood of impoverished refugees into rich Kuwait. Furthermore, even a post-Saddam regime would revive claims to disputed lands along the border. Money too is involved: the Kuwaitis, like the Saudis, benefit from the limitations on Iraqi oil exports that allow them to ship millions of additional barrels of oil per day.

Unlike the last time, the U.S. stands virtually alone. Not a single European ally—except for Britain, which is eager to collect credit points for loyalty to Washington and remains unreconciled to its loss of influence in the Middle East—has been willing to join the U.S. in a show of force. Saudi Arabia, whose ruling regime depends upon U.S. protection, refuses to offer its bases for use in an attack on Saddam. The one diplomatic beneficiary of the whole imbroglio has been Russia. Once Saddam's protectors and now his creditors with billions of dollars of unpaid bills due them, the Russians have gotten back into the region again as mediators. Saddam is the key not only to money owed them and to promised contracts once the embargo is lifted, but also to regaining influence on the world stage.

Even U.S. officials, if the truth be told, have mixed feelings about Saddam. If they did not, George Bush and Colin Powell would have marched their forces into Baghdad seven years ago and would have installed a government more to their liking. Instead, they let him keep his palaces, his weapons, his Republican Guard, and even his helicopter gunships, which he used to decimate the Kurds, Shiites, and other opposition groups. The Bush administration figured Saddam was useful for keeping

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Iranians in check. A better policy would have been to make up with the Iranian mullahs and let them contain Saddam. That's called divide and rule. Instead, we follow a strategy of unify and bomb.

Beyond politics, there is an economic reason why the anti-Saddam coalition is so feeble. The major Western powers have a financial interest in Saddam's periodic stirring of the Gulf cauldron. Fearful allies make good customers. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, bulging with cash from oil sales to energy-hungry industrialized nations, are currently contemplating multibillion-dollar weapons purchases from the United States, Britain, and France.

Thus, there is something surreal about this entire affair. If Saddam is politically useful as leverage in the region, and if neither he nor his weapons can be removed by air strikes, why are we preparing to go to war rather than give the U.N., the French, and the Russians sufficient leeway to negotiate a face-saving settlement? Because there is a determination in Washington to show that there is a price to be paid for making the U.S. government appear both inept and powerless. Unfortunately, that price will be paid not by Saddam Hussein, but by Iraqi civilians who may suffer even more at our hands than they already have at his. •

The FCC's absurd new crusade.

REBEL RADIO

By Jesse Walker

On the morning of November 19, 1997, a harsh pounding woke Doug Brewer, the hairy owner of a Tampa electronics store. A SWAT team was outside his house, along with a column of local cops, customs agents, and federal marshals. Upon letting the police in, Brewer and his wife were ordered to the floor, guns pointed at their heads, as the screaming invaders handcuffed them. Some cops even trained their weapons on the family cat. Brewer's offense: broadcasting without a license.

Brewer is part of a burgeoning pirate-radio scene, the micro-radio movement. Ever since 1980, when regulators virtually banned low-watt stations, micro-casters have been bypassing the license process altogether and taking to the air with simple transmitter kits that cost only a few hundred dollars. They are a varied lot: anarchists and evangelists, teenagers and retirees, migrant workers and small businessmen. And while some are fly-by-night operators, transmitting an occasional rock record or political rant to anyone passing by an otherwise unused frequency, others have established a permanent, aboveground presence, daring the Federal Communications Commission to shut them down.

There is, for example, Free Radio 1055, just north of Cincinnati, which runs ads from local businesses who can't afford time on the high-powered, absentee-owned stations that dominate local airwaves. There is Radio Free Allston in Massachusetts, which last July earned a referendum of support from the Boston City Council. Excellent Radio, based in a storefront studio in the seaside California town of Grover Beach, has even done live broadcasts of city council meetings. Yes, they have the council's consent.

Although licensed broadcasters have long seen their unlicensed competition as a scourge, until recently the FCC didn't put a lot of effort into shutting down the pirates. If there was a complaint about an unlicensed operator, the commission would quietly send a few agents to the illicit station's studio, armed not with guns but with a simple cease-and-desist order. If the pirates persisted, the commission would send them a letter. Only then, if the pirates kept transmitting, would the FCC call in the cops. There were few big raids in the last couple of years, and there weren't even many warnings—about 20 or 30, according to *Radio World.*

That changed last September. First came a high-profile bust in Howell Township, New Jersey, followed by a steady effort to tell micro-casters that if they didn't close their doors, they'd be next. The FCC's Florida division has been particularly active. The same day Brewer's home was raided, police shut down two more Tampa-area stations, seizing equipment and tossing two people in jail.

The FCC denies any change in policy. "There has been no recent increase" in enforcement, asserts John Winston of the FCC's Compliance and Information Bureau. "We've always taken the same approach to pirate broadcasting since the 1930s. We're doing no more than what we would ordinarily do." The crackdown, he claims, is a mirage: in the wake of an article about Brewer in *The Wall Street Journal,* normal enforcement efforts have simply attracted more attention.

But the pirate-radio world was abuzz with word of a crackdown months before the *Journal* piece appeared. Stations that had operated with impunity for ages suddenly found themselves targeted. Vincent Kajunski, the FCC's New England district director, has conceded as much: The commission, he told me last December, *does* have a new set of priorities regarding pirate radio.

According to the National Association of Broadcasters, such action is long overdue. "The NAB radio board in June asked for the FCC to focus more attention on the growing number of unlicensed stations," NAB President Edward Fritts announced in September. "We commend the commission for sending a strong message to broadcast bandits that their illegal activities will not be tolerated." Last April, in Las Vegas, the association sponsored a special panel on the micro-radio threat during its regular convention. Beverly Baker, at that point the FCC's chief of compliance and information, muttered darkly that "some of them are connected to the militia movement" and hinted of connections between "some of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ones in Florida" and the drug trade. Jack Goodman, introduced as "the NAB's point man on pirate radio," denounced the whole movement as a bunch of "crooks."

But are they really so evil? The recent burst in unlicensed activity is primarily the product of regulations that make it prohibitively expensive for small operators to get on the air. Before 1980, the FCC had allowed students and nonprofit groups to acquire Class D licenses, giving them the right to broadcast at ten watts. Then, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting intervened, arguing that the ten-watters were cluttering frequencies that might otherwise bring "All Things Considered" to the benighted masses. The FCC stopped issuing Class D permits and ordered all stations of less than 100 watts to leave the noncommercial band.

With that avenue for legal broadcasting cut off, and with the cost of transmitters dropping radically, more pirates began to appear. A few received widespread attention—most notably Stephen Dunifer, anarchist founder of Free Radio Berkeley, and M'banna Kantako, a blind black nationalist who broadcasts from the housing projects of Springfield, Illinois. Since 1994 or so, the movement has mushroomed, with new stations presenting everything from Spanish-language sermons to thrash rock.

Micro-casters argue that they have a right to a piece of the spectrum. Local commercial stations are being swallowed by corporate empires; public radio is increasingly centralized and middlebrow. Cheap transmitters offer a rare opportunity for ordinary people to get on the air, for bohemians to experiment with the medium, and for radical political views—left, right, and non-Euclidian—to be heard. Many micro-casters even object to being called pirates, arguing that the true corsairs are the giant corporations and federal bureaucracies that have seized the ether for themselves.

They make a strong case. It's hard to read the NAB's campaign against micro-casters as anything but an effort to shut out small-time competition. "When you're a broadcaster," says NAB spokesman Dennis Wharton, "and you go through all the hurdles to get a license, [it's tough] to see others operating illegally." Exactly. Those expensive licenses are a barrier to market entry; the NAB has become a protected cartel.

And while few would argue that anyone has a right to interfere with legal radio signals, it's pretty hard to find many clear-cut cases where a pirate has actually disrupted licensed broadcasts. In October, the FCC shut down two Miami pirates who had apparently been interfering with a nearby air-traffic-control system. Good for the FCC. But how many other cases like that have there been? "Several," says the FCC's Winston. Where? "In Virginia. And other places." Well, when was the Virginia case? "About four years ago." Further inquiry reveals that this incident involved not a micro station, but deliberate, malicious interference. Winston would not say more than that because the case is "still under investigation," even though it's already gone to trial.

Are there any other reasons to restrict micro radio? None worth taking seriously. Winston argues that the worst problem with the pirates is that they aren't part of the Emergency Alert System; thus, listeners would not quickly hear about a natural disaster or a war. Of course, if micro radio were legal, it could easily plug into the EAS. More to the point: By Winston's logic, the government should ban *anything* that doesn't involve listening to an EAS-linked radio station, from canoeing to violin-playing to sex.

Yes, the micro-casters are breaking the law. But it is a bad law, one that restricts free speech, free enterprise, and, above all, radio's potential as a medium. Other nations—Italy, Japan, Ireland, Haiti, Argentina—have tolerated different forms of unlicensed broadcasting, and the heavens did not fall. Why not allow stations to broadcast at less than 100 watts? Why not make it easier to get a license? Heck, why not let people take over unused parts of the spectrum without a license at all? You don't have to let them interfere with other signals, and you still can reserve the right to grant that frequency to someone else. It sure makes more sense than breaking into a man's home and pointing a gun at his cat.

JESSE WALKER, a fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, is writing a book about the micro-radio movement and its historical predecessors.

GEORGIA DISPATCH

CLOSE RACES

By David Grann

In the summer of 1995, Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney was sure the South would rise again—this time against her. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled several majority-black districts, including McKinney's, unconstitutional, the first African American woman elected to the House from Georgia warned that the good old boys were going to "get rid of black folks in the political process." Several months later, after some of those same good old boys had reelected her and all of her black colleagues in the new, predominantly white districts, McKinney insisted it was a fluke, a tribute merely to "the power of incumbency."



Now, two years later, she is struggling to explain the latest threat to both her seat and to the logic of racial gerrymandering: a Republican opponent who is also black and female. "I don't think it tells us anything about the Court's decision," McKinney maintains, "or about changing racial attitudes."

But it may tell us a lot. If McKinney's opponent Sunny

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warren wins the GOP primary—and so far she is the only Republican in the race—it would likely be the first time in history that two black women from opposing parties in the Deep South squared off in a congressional election. And, no matter what the outcome, a McKinney–Warren contest would offer the most compelling evidence yet that there has been no great "ethnic cleansing," as Jesse Jackson predicted, since the Court deemed Georgia's serpentine, majority-black districts unconstitutional three years ago. "I hope the color of my skin can finally neutralize race as an issue," says Warren, as she listens to Rush Limbaugh on her car radio.

Amazingly, unnoticed by the press and even party officials, this electoral pattern is being repeated across the South. In four of the five former "majority–minority" districts that were compacted under recent court orders and that are now majority-white, all of the leading congressional candidates are black. Only 200 miles away from McKinney's turf, amid the peanut and pecan fields of Cusseta, Georgia, Dylan Glenn, a 28-year-old black Republican and former aide to President Bush, is trying to upset Sanford Bishop, a popular black conservative Democrat, in the now 65-percent white Second District. And in Jacksonville, Florida, where Representative Corrine Brown once claimed that a truckload of bubbas was trying to seize her seat through the courts and where the voting population is now more than half white, Brown faces only one Republican challenger so far: a fiery black preacher and former head of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. "This shows," concedes Democratic Representative John Lewis, who still has a dent in his forehead from where he was hit with a billy club during a 1960s civil rights march, "that the South is even closer to laying down the burden of race."

Indeed, now that black Democrats have proved that they can win in majority-white districts, only one crucial question remains: Can black *Republicans* win in majority-white districts with significant black voting populations? "A black conservative is like a man without a country," says Pam Pryor, deputy chief of staff to Representative J.C. Watts, the only black Republican in Congress. "He gets it from both sides." Historically, the cruelest side has been white, which is why federal courts first began ordering states to create majority-black districts back in the 1970s. Even now, many believe those habits will hold. "I don't think a black Republican can get the redneck vote," says Bill Shipp, publisher of a weekly newsletter on Georgia politics. In fact, no African American Republican has won a seat in Congress from the Deep South since Reconstruction. In the last election, according to political scientist David Bositis, the average vote for 15 of the 16 black GOP nominees for Congress was only 23 percent.

Of course, rednecks are not the only obstacle. Ever since President Nixon established his infamous Southern Strategy of wooing Dixiecrats by exploiting wedge issues like busing, GOP officials have, at best, ignored black candidates and, at worst, discouraged them. In a private memo prepared for the National Republican Congressional Committee after interviewing all black GOP candidates in the 1996 election, Dana Covington, an African American Republican who himself ran in Mississippi, complained that "if the party was serious about garnering African American support, it should . . . not write off their candidacies." Despite such pleas, local Republican officials have already tried to quash Warren's campaign, fearing a competitive election would only draw out more liberal voters and bolster other statewide Democratic candidates on the ticket. "Some people in our party," says the socially conservative Warren, "prefer to talk about minority candidates rather than walk with them." In fact, many Republicans, despite their opposition to race-based policies, supported racial gerrymandering because it isolated black Democrats into a handful of districts while allowing Republicans to capture the rest.

Yet there are signs at least on the national level that Republicans are ready to reach out to those blacks who share their ideology. With polls showing that some 30 percent of blacks consider themselves conservative, GOP officials believe that if they can peel away from Democrats even 20 percent of the black population, they can cement a lasting majority. As a result, GOP leaders have self-consciously adopted Colin Powell and Watts as party spokesmen and quietly impeded efforts to revoke affirmative action. Even the Christian Coalition has launched an aggressive urban outreach program. "If we remain a party of all white Southerners," says one former Republican National Committee aide, "we'll be a dead party by 2010."

This helps explain why a steady stream of prominent Republicans has already endorsed Glenn, a former D.C.-based consultant, despite his youth and the fact that he faces a strong primary challenge from a local party chairman who is white. In December, Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran, a powerful agriculture subcommittee chairman, toured southern Georgia, promising local farmers that, as a member of the majority, Glenn "would be in a better position to influence the legislative process"—that is, to bring home more federal peanut butter. And, though McKinney's opponent Warren, a virtual unknown, has struggled to raise money, Glenn has raked in more than $200,000. "The party has been totally behind us," says Glenn.

Ironically, the biggest obstacle to black Republicans may be blacks themselves. On Martin Luther King Day, as Glenn stumped outside the Albany Civic Center, many African American voters were already denouncing him. "He's an Uncle Tom," said Eva Jones, a mother from Albany. Eschewing the sensitivity that even rednecks now show when talking to reporters about race, a local art-gallery owner snapped: "You can't be genuinely black and be a Republican." The antipathy runs so deep among some blacks that Warren, whose husband is white, says, "I know some people will call me an oreo." Covington says he was branded by many African Americans "the whitest black man in America" and that his opponent charged that a black voting for a Republican

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Message from Negative Population Growth, Inc.

Immigration Fuels U.S. Population Growth

We at Negative Population Growth, Inc. (NPG) believe that our country is already vastly overpopulated in terms of the long range carrying capacity of its resources and environment.

We believe, therefore, that U.S. population growth should be halted as soon as possible, and eventually reversed.

But, unless our present massive immigration is drastically reduced, we will never be able to stabilize our population at a sustainable level.

In the decade of the 80s we grew by some 25 million. Immigration, both legal and illegal, accounted for about 40 percent of that huge increase in our numbers. Projections are that we will grow by at least as much in the 90s.

If present rates of fertility and immigration continue, our population, now over 269 million, will pass 400 million shortly after 2050, with no end to growth in sight! Such growth would be catastrophic both for our environment, and for our standard of living.

Immigration is the driving force behind our catastrophic population growth. Contrary to our own national interest we now allow more than 800,000 legal immigrants to come here each year. Their numbers are swelled by over 300,000 illegal immigrants.

We need to halt illegal immigration and reduce legal immigration to not more than 100,000 a year, including all relatives and refugees. Then, immigration would no longer contribute significantly to our population growth, as it does now.

Advocates of Massive Immigration are Wrong!

There are powerful forces that fight not only to keep immigration at the present high level, but to increase it. Among them are employers who want low-wage labor, ethnic groups whose leaders seek greater political power, and some humanitarians who believe in virtually open borders.

They also include pro-growth advocates who believe that an ever-growing labor force, fueled by immigration, is necessary to achieve their goal of an ever-increasing GNP. That goal, in the real world of environmental and resource limits, is a recipe for disaster.

How Can We Best Help Others?

Beyond any question, the United States should maintain the humane policies toward immigrants and refugees that have characterized its past.

But we need to express our compassion in an intelligent way. Our priority should be to improve living conditions in the developing countries, rather than to allow vast numbers of their citizens to settle here.

World population is growing by some 90 million a year, and almost all of that growth occurs in the developing countries. We cannot possibly allow more than a tiny fraction of those millions to come here. What can we do to help all those who have no choice but to remain at home?

One thing is crystal clear. The problems of the underdeveloped countries are beyond solution by emigration. To pretend otherwise is simply self-delusion.

Nothing can permanently improve living conditions in these countries unless they first halt their population growth, the root cause of their poverty and environmental degradation.

Those who assert that eradicating poverty is a prerequisite for halting population growth have the process just backwards. Only after halting their population growth can developing countries even begin to bring their standard of living up to an adequate level.

We should spare no effort or expense to help those nations that are prepared to make a determined effort to halt, and eventually to reverse, their population growth.

We Need A Sensible U.S. Immigration Policy

We cannot continue to allow our national immigration policy to be dictated by special interest groups who pursue their own agendas without regard for the broad national interest.

Our immigration policy should be an integral part of a national population policy aimed at halting, and then reversing, our population growth, so that U.S. population can eventually be stabilized at a lower, more sustainable level.

As Americans, our first obligation, to ourselves and to our children and grandchildren, is to restore and preserve the land we have inherited. In shaping our immigration policy, our top priority must be our own national interest, and the welfare of present and future generations of Americans.

If you agree that we need to reduce legal immigration, and halt illegal immigration, once and for all, we need your support. NPG is a nonprofit, public interest organization founded in 1972. To become a member, please send us your check today.

Yes! I want to become a member of NPG, and help reduce U.S. immigration to a level compatible with our national interest. I am enclosing my check for annual membership dues:

___ $30 ___ $50 ___ $100 ___ Other

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip ___

Please mail to: NR-141

Negative Population Growth, Inc.
P.O. Box 53271, Washington, DC 20009

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"is like a chicken voting for Colonel Sanders."

The segregation of the parties along racial lines has become so extreme that it has begun to resemble a photo negative of the Reconstruction era, when all whites were Democrats and all newly freed former slaves voted for the party of Lincoln. "It's dangerous," says Shipp. Not only has the split contributed to the polarization of blacks and whites and to a kind of reverse racism among African Americans, but it has also allowed the Democratic Party to neglect its most devoted constituency. "Blacks are ... being taken for granted by Democrats, especially at the state level," says Tyrone Brooks, a Democratic state representative and president of the Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials.

Which is why the campaigns of Republicans Glenn and Warren are as important to the civil rights movement as the campaigns of their opponents McKinney and Bishop. Just as the latter were forced to court white voters in the last election, Glenn and Warren must now reach out to black voters in addition to white ones. The result is not black politics or white politics but coalition politics in its purest sense. On a recent visit to Georgia districts, I observed Glenn attend a dinner with white and black businessmen, while Warren campaigned outside a restaurant in a suburb that straddles black and white neighborhoods. "I grew up in a family where race was not an issue," says Glenn, "and I'm proud of that." Adds his Democratic opponent Bishop: "Cotton, peanuts, and soybeans are all more important than my race." Indeed, beneath all the subtext about race, there is emerging here in the heart of Dixie an old-fashioned election featuring four traditional candidates: a conservative Democrat, a liberal populist, a social conservative, and a mainstream Republican. And, since all four are black, says Warren, "how can we do anything but debate the issues?" •

California's bilingualism mess.

LANGUAGE BARRIER

By Peter Schrag

For the better part of a generation, bilingual education, variously defined and often misunderstood, has been fought over by true believers often more interested in ideology than pedagogy. But rarely has there been a more significant confrontation than the one shaping up over California's Proposition 227, the so-called "English for the Children" initiative. Prop 227 wouldn't prohibit bilingual education for the state's 1.3 million students who are classified as "limited English proficient" and who make up roughly a quarter of the state's public school population. But it makes it so hard for parents to enroll children in bilingual classes that it would drastically reduce instruction in any language but English.

Like many other California ballot initiatives, Prop 227, largely funded by a conservative Silicon Valley entrepreneur named Ron Unz, has already left ripples in state and national politics. Last fall, before California Republicans convened for their state convention, some of their leaders issued loud warnings that GOP support of the Unz measure would further alienate Hispanics, who were already disaffected by the GOP's support of recent ballot measures aimed against affirmative action and illegal immigration. But the warnings didn't keep the party's rank and file from endorsing it, nor did they stop House Speaker Newt Gingrich from making anti-bilingualism a part of the GOP's national agenda.

In fact, the partisan political fallout may be limited because, as Unz correctly divined, most Hispanic parents want their children to learn English as rapidly as possible. Some Latino leaders have tried to describe Unz's measure as immigrant bashing, but their case is weak. Indeed, all the polls show that Prop 227 has strong support even among Hispanics. If it passes, Prop 227 is almost certain to spark similar efforts elsewhere, which will be seen by both sides as major events in defining the larger cultural parameters of American public education. Too bad the coming controversy probably won't do much to clarify the issue, much less help us get beyond the either/or debate over bilingual education that we've been mired in for 20 years.

In most places, bilingual education means that limited English proficient (LEP) students learn English as a second language while they learn other subjects (math, geography, science) at least partly in their native language so that, in theory, they can keep up with their English-speaking peers. But often the objectives of the classes are confused, the quality of instruction is poor, and the criteria used to determine who gets put into a bilingual class and when students are ready to "transition" into regular classes are murky. Is the purpose only to get students into regular classes as rapidly as possible, or is the purpose also some form of (Hispanic) "cultural preservation"? In addition, since bilingual education brings in state and federal dollars for every student enrolled in it, school districts that once had no incentive to pay attention to non-English-speaking kids now have a motive for stuffing them into bilingual ed and keeping them there. Predictably, bilingual ed has given rise to a powerful lobby of consultants and bureaucrats with a vested interest in maintaining and expanding the program.

Two years ago in Los Angeles, some 200 Latino parents, many of them minimum-wage garment workers, became so angry at the unwillingness of administrators at the Ninth Street Elementary School to teach their children in English that they boycotted the school. Some of those students had been in bilingual classes for six years and couldn't write a simple English sentence, which was not surprising since for some LEP students

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

English instruction consisted largely of three hours on the playground and in the lunchroom "mixing" with English-speaking children. And, since it's virtually impossible to find enough qualified teachers for the scores of languages that California's students bring to school, it's not unusual to find Korean or Hmong students being instructed in Spanish—and it's even more commonplace to find hundreds of classes taught by people who have only the barest command of their students' language. Even the bilingual lobby acknowledges that many so-called bilingual classes are educationally deficient.

Unz calls this "a failed system," and he's right. But his remedy is almost as rigid as the Kafkaesque system it would replace. In place of today's common presumption—that any foreign-born student who doesn't test well in English should be in a bilingual class even if she speaks English better than her native language—Prop 227 makes a year in English immersion automatic for children who don't speak English well enough to attend a regular class. Bilingual education would be available only if parents, most of whom speak no English and are intimidated by official bureaucracy, appeared personally at their child's school each year and petitioned for a waiver to allow the child to be placed in a bilingual class. But, since no waiver may be granted until the child has been failing in a regular class for at least 30 days, the waiver system is a prescription for academic defeat (and a powerful argument in the federal equal protection suit which will almost surely be filed if the measure passes).

To be sure, the nation's bilingual programs have been a morass of contradictory purposes, varying practices, and uncertain standards. The failure and dropout rates for Hispanic students, who constitute 70 percent of those defined as LEP, are also disproportionately high. But only about 30 percent of those students are in bilingual classes, and there's no evidence that the success rate for those who are not is any higher. And, since the training and competence of the teachers, the techniques, the funding, the classroom setting, and the backgrounds of the children being taught all vary immensely, the picture is even more complex. What works with one group in one language may not work with another, and so systematic, up-or-down comparisons are virtually impossible. There is not even any good research on what percentage of those classified as LEP really belong in that category.

The most comprehensive recent review of what research there is, conducted by a panel appointed by the National Research Council and released last year, concluded that native-language instruction can be "helpful." But the NRC panel cautions against any across-the-board generalizations about any approach. And, since there is very little good data on how LEP students learn math or science or history, the problems become even more complicated. Most obviously, in the words of Stanford Professor Kenji Hakuta, who chaired the NRC panel, "studies quickly have become politicized by advocacy groups selectively promoting research findings to support their positions.... Rather than choosing a one-size-fits-all program, the key issue should be identifying those components, backed by solid research findings, that will work in a specific community."

Prop 227, which many California education groups condemn as interfering with local school control, will settle neither the political nor the pedagogical argument. Nor will it be the Armageddon of the culture wars that English-first militants would like it to be. But it will almost certainly intensify a debate that bears directly on the fortunes of a large minority of American students. Nearly six percent of the nation's public school enrollment—some 3.2 million students—are classified as LEP, and their numbers are growing.

The California debate could also have national implications for America's self-perception as a single nation with a single culture. The prevailing American belief is that immigrant children have always been pushed into—and assimilated through—mainstream classes taught entirely in English. But, during much of the nineteenth century, both public and parochial schools often taught in both English and German—or French, or Dutch, or whatever the dominant local immigrant language was. Those choices were based not on pedagogical theory but on ethnic politics. All that ended with the jingoism of World War I, when some states passed laws banning German speech, and mobs raided schools and burned German textbooks.

Nevertheless, in states like Texas and Florida, where business and political leaders understand their regions' interdependence with Latin America, and where Hispanic voters are much more influential than they have been in California, there is considerably more tolerance for, and interest in, bilingual assets. The first major bilingual program of the post-World War II period was established (in 1961) not for disadvantaged Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans, but in response to pressure from Miami's middle-class Cuban refugees, who wanted their children to learn English *and* to preserve their language and culture.

That fragment of history underlines the major point of the NRC panel: There is no all-purpose approach, and schools and researchers should concentrate on finding what works for particular individuals and groups, issues that are often subject to bitter dispute in many other areas of American education. Indeed, it seems that one of the biggest problems with much bilingual education in U.S. schools is that it has sacrificed instruction in phonics and other basics to a whole-language ideology built around woolly notions of self-esteem.

Unfortunately, neither the ongoing debate over bilingual education nor the California initiative process lends itself to fine distinctions or even to the crude demarcations that the country draws in its debates over educational issues. It would be nice if this time there were a little more understanding of the nuances. But we have long been stuck in a binary argument that Prop 227 will perpetuate rather than settle.

PETER SCHRAG's book, *Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future* (New Press), will be released in April.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The IMF's misplaced priorities.

FLAWED FUND

By James Tobin and Gustav Ranis

They did it in the 1930s, and now they're threatening to do it again. "They" are the lords of world finance—international bankers, central bankers, finance ministers, and, since 1945, the International Monetary Fund. Faced with currency crises that endanger both financial systems and whole economies, they invariably give priority to finance. Their standard remedies, fiscal stringency and punitive interest rates, are devastating to economic life. They destroy jobs and bankrupt enterprises. But their authors assure the world that restoring the confidence of lenders and investors worldwide in the soundness of governments' financial policies is essential for prosperity and growth. Prime ministers and presidents have to go along.

The trouble is that the resulting recessions themselves undermine the credit-worthiness of businesses and governments. During the 1930s, financial soundness meant sticking stubbornly to the established gold values of currencies. The attempt led to the Great Depression, and the gold standard ultimately collapsed anyway. The recent IMF bailout packages for Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, true to form, demand austere fiscal and monetary policies along with drastic structural reforms. But the announcement of these packages did not inspire the hoped-for confidence in financial markets. The runs on the countries' reserves continued, and their currencies and stock markets continued to slide. This episode will not end in world depression, but it will doom Asian tigers, accustomed to six to eight percent growth, to severe slowdowns.

In the 1930s, Weimar Germany's Chancellor Bruening ignored his country's 20 percent unemployment rate and succeeded only in paving the way for Hitler's accession. Britain, having endured depression since returning to the gold standard in 1925, was finally forced off in September 1931 to the immediate benefit of its economy. In 1932, as the depression worsened, the Hoover administration and the Federal Reserve were desperately defending the gold value of the dollar. Roosevelt let the dollar depreciate in 1933, and recovery began at last.

An important purpose of the IMF was to tide countries over during temporary shortages of international liquidity, giving them time to make adjustments to their policies and exchange rates. The architects of the IMF, unlike their latter-day successors, did not presume that currency difficulties were the victims' fault.

Originally, the IMF reestablished a sort of gold standard. Each member made its currency convertible into dollars at a fixed rate, and the dollar was convertible into gold. This system lasted until 1971, when the United States ceased to guarantee conversion of dollars into gold. Since 1973, exchange rates among the dollar, the mark, and the yen have floated freely with no official parities, though central banks occasionally buy or sell in the currency markets. This system has the great virtue that exchange rates can adjust without precipitating financial and political crises. For example, there was no crisis from 1995 to 1997 when the yen gradually lost about 40 percent of its dollar value.

Other countries generally adhere to semifixed exchange rates. They promise to keep their currencies within a band relative to one of the three "hard" currencies or to a mixture of them. The band itself usually is nudged up or down in response to persistent market trends. Crises occur when a currency's dollar value gets stuck at the lower limit of the band and speculators become sure it will fall further. They sell, and the hapless central bank has to buy, using up its reserves. A pretty obvious lesson of the recent crises is that most countries would do better to abandon fixed or semifixed exchange rates in favor of freely floating rates.

The IMF's Asian packages are based on its experiences with Latin America, in particular with Mexico in 1994. Mexico had appeared to be in fair shape by IMF standards. Its budget was close to being balanced; its inflation was single-digit; wages were stabilized with the help of a pact with organized labor; and Mexico was deregulating its economy and opening itself further to foreign trade and investment. Nevertheless, from 1993 to 1994, Mexico allowed the peso to become overvalued. Dollars poured into Mexican financial markets, bidding up the peso on the way. At the same time, commodity prices were rising faster than they were in the United States. Consequently, Mexico ran a trade deficit that was financing a consumption binge rather than productive investment. The government itself was borrowing dollars short term, but the inevitable lowering of the exchange-rate band was too little and too late. Lenders took flight.

At that point, the IMF and the U.S. arranged a $50 billion bailout. The familiar prescription was to float the peso, tighten the budget, restrain the money supply, and raise interest rates. Mexico's real GDP fell six percent in 1995, but growth resumed the following year. The 20 percent fall in the peso's real value in dollars sufficed to restore trade balance, and the accompanying bulge in inflation subsided. Mexico repaid its bailout loans.

In 1997, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury responded to Asia's currency crises in the same way that central banks and governments had responded to the gold crises of the 1930s. They diagnosed Asia as a victim of the "Latin American disease" and prescribed the usual medicine. Yet, prior to 1997, the Asian tigers appeared to be model economies by IMF criteria. They were generally running budget surpluses, and money growth was moderate. Inflation rates were low, and saving rates high. Some countries, notably South Korea, had incurred large volumes of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mostly short-term foreign debt. Unlike Mexico's dollar-guaranteed debts, these were almost all private debts. As the IMF noted, these countries were running trade deficits. But, unlike Mexico, they were not importing for consumption. It is quite legitimate for developing economies to borrow abroad for investments at home, though some of South Korea's recent investments apparently were ill-advised prestige projects in heavy industry, land, and real estate. The key problem was misallocation of private credit, not governmental profligacy.

The heavy private indebtedness of Asian countries clearly aggravated their situation. Once the central bank commits itself to sell hard currency for local currency on demand, its international reserves become hostage to repayment of private foreign debts. Commitment to a fixed exchange rate relieves local borrowers and foreign creditors of risk. The borrowers do take some risk only if the central bank lets the price of foreign currency rise as debtors bid for it in order to repay loans.

The IMF–U.S. package has been criticized for bailing out South Korean banks and industries indiscriminately. Some deserve to be rescued by public funds or mergers. Owners of others should be permitted to take a bath. The worst injustices and worst precedents occur when foreign lenders are guaranteed to get all their money back; having made risky investments in search of profits, they should not be immune to losses. Converting all debts into government liabilities, as some foreign banks have demanded of South Korea in return for lengthening maturities, is another bad precedent. However, some degree of "moral hazard" is inevitable in any system of insurance. That is not a reason for abolishing "lenders of last resort" within nations or between nations. It is a reason for designing bailouts with care.

The IMF–U.S. explanation of the currency crises emphasizes long-standing fundamental defects of economic structure—anti-competitive and corrupt alliances among oligopolistic businessmen, bankers, and politicians. However objectionable this "crony capitalism"may be, it is nothing new. It could hardly have been the main cause of the 1997 financial crisis.

A more likely cause is that Japan's prolonged recession weakened the major export markets of its neighbors. Their trade deficits are counterparts of Japan's surpluses. Yen depreciation, along with China's devaluation in 1994, further contributed to overvaluation of Asian currencies, especially those tied too inflexibly to the dollar. Once foreign lenders suspected that these countries' exchange rates were not sustainable, they dumped them. Adding insult to injury, Japanese banks were among the first to pull out. The creditors' panic, accentuated by the dismal prospects of economies under IMF surveillance, depressed exchange rates much further than necessary to correct their basic overvaluations.

The spectacular growth of the Asian tigers in recent decades was not a mirage. It was based on combining an educated labor force, high saving and rapid capital accumulation, modern technology, and resourceful entrepreneurship—fundamentals which still bode well for the future, and in which, incidentally, East Asia surpasses Latin America.

The Asian tigers do need structural reforms: continuous full disclosure of the size of central-bank reserves and of bank balance sheets and non-performing loans; orderly bankruptcy procedures; substitution of objective risk analyses and arm's-length credit allocations for political favoritism and for government guarantees of private loans; and adequacy of bank capital by international standards. Most importantly, local banks must be forbidden to be net debtors in hard currency.

But these problems do not justify forcing these economies into deep recession, which is bound to be especially painful for the poor, dependent as they are on maintenance of public-health and education expenditures, plus other safety nets. Nor will such a prescription restore the confidence of investors, foreign or domestic.

Finally, the IMF–U.S. doctors insist that these Asian governments open their doors wider to international financial transactions. This is a particularly inopportune time to urge further globalization. Encouraging inflows when exchange rates and local asset values are so depressed creates the image and the reality of arranging bargain-basement deals for foreigners, thus undermining the faith of many residents of these nations in the intentions of the international lenders, public and private. Anyway, entry of foreign capital should not be further eased before domestic banking and financial reforms are in place. That would only attract inflows of nervous funds ready to move out when interest-rate differentials and/or devaluation expectations change, funds of the type that contributed so heavily to the present crisis. To avoid attracting hot money, a Chile-type tax or special deposit could be required of inflows. In the longer run, an internationally negotiated tax on currency transactions might deserve consideration.

Some critics of the IMF's bailouts want to abolish the IMF. Free-market ideologues have faith that completely liberalized international financial markets will handle all shocks optimally, if only governments and international institutions will stay out of the way. No convincing evidence or logic supports this faith. Currencies are not market institutions, and cannot be. Critics from the opposite side regard the IMF as an instrument serving multinational capitalism at the expense of ordinary people throughout the world. We believe that the world needs an IMF, just as nations need central banks, and that the IMF needs loans of hard currencies from its major members. The lesson of current events is that the IMF should stick to its original mission, saving its members from disasters due to short-term illiquidity. The World Bank and other international lenders are better suited to handle long-run structural and developmental issues.

JAMES TOBIN, Sterling Professor of Economics Emeritus, received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1981. GUSTAV RANIS is the Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics and director of the Yale Center for International and Area Studies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How Suharto keeps the opposition at bay.

No contest

By Margot Cohen

Bombarded for years by their government's Orwellian slogans and acronyms, Indonesians have coined a sardonic acronym of their own: ABS. It stands for "Asal Bapak Senang," or "As Long as Father is Happy." And it refers to the multitude of Indonesian father figures, from President Suharto all the way down to the local village chief, who must be flattered (in Suharto's case) and bribed (in the case of other officials) under the corrupt patronage system over which Suharto has presided for the past three decades.

Now, however, with Indonesia's economy in free-fall, ABS has taken on a new meaning: "Asal Bukan Suharto" or "Anything But Suharto." The new slogan signals widespread dissatisfaction with the authoritarian state and the economic devastation that has occurred in recent weeks. Lately, that discontent has boiled over in rioting against ethnic Chinese shop owners, who are being made the scapegoats for shortages and rising prices. But, as battle cries go, "Anything But Suharto" is a curious one—it's hardly a constructive call to action. Rather, the slogan underscores the central problem of the Indonesian opposition: the lack of a viable candidate to take Suharto's place. So, despite his growing unpopularity, it is virtually certain that the 76-year-old president will secure yet another five-year term when a national assembly convenes in March to anoint a president and vice president.

Why, in a nation of 202 million people, is it so difficult for a single credible opposition figure to emerge? Why is the opposition that does exist in such a sorry state? The answer is that pro-democracy activists must battle not just Suharto, but more than three decades of fear that Suharto's rule has embedded in Indonesian society.

This fear has its roots in Suharto's "floating mass" policy, a central feature of his rule. According to the policy, Indonesians are supposed to "float above" politics, devoting their energies to the nation's development goals. Military surveillance and repressive laws reinforce the policy. Police often withhold permits for public gatherings, even puppet shows. Student activism, historically a wellspring of Indonesian opposition movements, has been severely curtailed ever since a round of student uprisings in the 1970s. Student governing bodies are now tightly controlled by university rectors, and students must refrain from political activity on campus.

Suharto also moved to depoliticize Islam—the religion of more than 87 percent of the populace. The more repressive tactics employed during the early years of his regime gave way to a strategy of co-optation during the early 1990s. The Suharto government poured millions of rupiah into building new mosques and Islamic boarding schools and granted Muslim clerics precious opportunities to preach to civil servants nationwide. The government also won points by setting up an Islamic bank and overseeing an association of Muslim intellectuals, aiming to improve the welfare of the faithful.

Suharto has forbidden political parties from organizing at the local level, other than during the brief campaign periods that precede parliamentary elections once every five years. In between elections, however, the ruling Golkar Party maintains a constant presence through its bureaucrats stationed throughout this far-flung archipelago. When campaign time rolls around, Golkar takes credit for every road, bridge, and school in the country.

This leaves Indonesia's two smaller parties—the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the United Development Party (PPP)—at a clear disadvantage. Pressured to achieve "consensus" with the ruling party in passing laws through parliament, the PDI and the PPP are not considered opposition parties at all. Over the years, politicians from these parties have proved just as susceptible to corruption and co-optation as any Golkar stalwart. After all, they serve at the pleasure of party bosses, not voters. And the party bosses serve at the pleasure of Suharto.

Although villagers across Indonesia, assisted by local nongovernmental organizations, have been locked in land disputes with business groups and local officials since the mid-1980s, Suharto's policy for the most part seemed to be working. Then, in July 1996, the placidity of the floating mass was challenged. Suharto engineered the removal of Megawati Sukarnoputri as chairman of the PDI Party, which had threatened to become more critical of the regime. Megawati is the daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, who lost power in 1966 but is still revered by his countrymen for liberating Indonesia from Dutch colonialism. Megawati loyalists responded to her ouster by occupying the PDI headquarters and holding open-air rallies calling for political reform. Such brazen resistance was destined to be crushed. And, on July 27, the military dispatched a group of thugs to take over the PDI headquarters.

That violent raid set off a massive riot in the nation's capital, and it aroused impoverished Indonesians throughout the country. Sympathy swelled for Megawati, who seemed to embody the powerlessness many common people felt in their own lives. Middle-class professionals, however, were more ambivalent. Some had been moved to contribute cash or foodstuffs to the Megawati forces as a quiet symbol of their own dissatisfaction with Suharto. But, once the riot subsided, it was back to business as usual. With prosperity dependent on the ruling elite, the middle class remained aloof from efforts to challenge the regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It took the escalating economic crisis to finally bring the floating mass down to earth. From November to January, as the rupiah plummeted, middle-class professionals suddenly realized they had everything to lose. Some Muslim groups vented fresh discontent. Students, sensing the regime's momentary confusion, redoubled their organizing efforts. And the local press, long hounded by state censors, seized the moment to publicize calls for sweeping reform. For pro-democracy activists accustomed to widespread public apathy, these are exciting times. Indonesians are treated to unprecedented shows of protest on an almost weekly basis. Just last month, 19 members of the government-run Indonesian Institute of Sciences announced that Suharto was no longer fit to rule.

Still, prospects for united opposition are murky at best. No matter how disaffected members of the middle class may be—and no matter how energetic the expanding crop of student activists—their choices remain severely limited. They could throw their support behind Megawati, who still commands the adoration of millions and has declared herself a candidate for president. But, aside from communing with the ghost of her father, she shows little inclination to tap the best and the brightest Indonesian minds to formulate a serious platform. In any event, many analysts believe she squandered political momentum by backing down immediately after the July 27 incident.

Looking toward eventual presidential succession, some middle-class professionals are rushing to support Emil Salim, an American-trained economist and former environment minister who has just announced his willingness to run for vice president. He's pro-democracy and pro-free market. But he lacks allies in the military, and his tardy announcement of his political intentions leaves him with little hope of success.

A more outspoken figure to watch is Amien Rais, chairman of Muhammadiyah, a nationwide Muslim group that claims 25 million members. During the early 1990s, Amien seemed willing to nestle under the government's wing, assuming a prominent role in the Muslim intellectuals' association. However, Amien fell out of favor after criticizing Indonesia's mining policies and was forced to resign. He is now campaigning against corruption, collusion, and nepotism, and he has watched his popularity soar, particularly among Muslim students. Yet even Amien seems to have doubts about how far his proposed presidential candidacy can go: he told one Jakarta gathering that Suharto would probably retain power in March. Furthermore, pro-democracy activists still question Amien's independence from the regime. And, while he now declares himself willing to work across religious and ethnic lines, not long ago he was complaining that minority Christians and Chinese held too much economic and political power.

SUHARTO BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Amien's faltering campaign illustrates a broader truth about Islam in Indonesia. Some outsiders wonder whether the country may be fertile ground for a Philippine-style People Power movement. But if the Catholic Church in the Philippines played a critical role in uniting the opposition against Ferdinand Marcos, the Muslim community remains too co-opted and too divided to become a focal point of resistance against Suharto. For instance, the Muslim-oriented PPP Party has already endorsed Suharto, even though many local chapters fervently wish for change. Other Muslim leaders are drawing closer to the military, which still appears loyal to Suharto.

Is time running out for the opposition? Some activists have already given up on the March deadline and are looking to the spring, when Indonesia is expected to be hit with even higher prices and broader layoffs. Unless the government or the opposition comes up with some creative solutions, more riots loom. And that could prompt wary Wall Street fund managers to invent yet another acronym to describe the country: ABS, "Anything But Stable."

MARGOT COHEN is a journalist based in Jakarta.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why Japan's woes should worry America, too.

SETTING SUN

By Sebastian Mallaby

Back in the 1980s, Americans brooded that the Japanese juggernaut was driving Western manufacturers to the wall and that Japanese speculators were snapping up most of the world's prestigious real estate. By the 1990s, those dark fears of "Japan Inc." had given way to the smug conviction that the Japanese had botched it and that America—banzai!—would finally get a chance to reassert its economic preeminence. Now, there's a new consensus emerging on Japan. This view holds that, although the old competitor is indeed a mess, this does not actually serve America's interests after all. If *Schadenfreude* has dominated Western views of Japan these past few years, the new attitude might be described as *Schadenangst.*

The seed of this angst was planted long ago, but it has blossomed into a vast and thorny tree thanks to the financial chaos in the rest of East Asia. Ever since the 1980s, Americans have badgered Japan to stop exporting so much and to fuel its economy instead by selling more to Japanese consumers. Since the Asian crisis broke, officials in Washington have pressed this argument even more anxiously because they fear that a massive new wave of exports is about to be unleashed by the devaluation of East Asia's currencies. Higher Japanese consumption, once seen as an antidote only to Japan's damnably cheap exports, is now presented as a remedy for half a continent of low-cost competitors.

This is naturally a desperate hope, and not just because even Japan's rich economy is too small to swallow the bulk of the coming Asian export wave. It is desperate because today's Japan, unlike that of a decade ago, is no longer strong enough to be helpful. Back in 1985, a buoyant Japan agreed to allow the yen to rise, which it duly did—from ¥250 to the dollar at the start of that year to ¥100 or so a decade later. This time around, far from helping to absorb East Asian exports by supporting a further appreciation of the yen, a hard-pressed Japan is likely to do the opposite. Japan's economy has grown at a rate of barely more than one percent per year since 1992; this year there may be no growth at all. Since early July, when Asia's troubles became obvious, the yen–dollar rate has fallen from 114 to 126. Some moneymen in Tokyo talk of a further slide in the yen driving another round of currency devaluation among its shell-shocked neighbors. In other words, Japan's yen policy is more likely to make things worse for U.S. interests than better.

The same can be said of Japan's fiscal policy. Back in the 1980s, American officials used to lecture the Japanese about their budget surplus, imploring them to run the sort of good, healthy deficits that fuel consumer demand and suck in imports. Once their economy slowed down, the Japanese complied: the old budget surpluses have been replaced by a whopping deficit equivalent to 5.4 percent of GDP—by far the highest of any G-7 country. Now, the United States would like Japan to expand its deficit still further so as to boost demand for Asian goods. At a speech in Washington on February 12, Deputy Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers reaffirmed the administration's line: "Substantial, early additional fiscal action is critically important, not just for Japan, but for the region as a whole."

Unfortunately, the Japanese are not cooperating. This month, Japan's government bowed sufficiently to announce a new spending package, but it promises to add a mere one trillion yen of demand to the economy compared with the 21-trillion-yen boost delivered in two emergency packages in 1995. Having spent the better part of this decade following America's advice to expand their deficit, the Japanese now feel they can go no further. Their population is graying much faster than America's, heralding a fiscal headache early in the next century that will make America's entitlement problem look like a minor inconvenience.

Nor are Japan's capital flows likely to ease the Asian crisis. During the 1980s, when Americans fretted about the invasion of Japanese goods, they could at least console themselves that Japan was also sending a flood of capital their way, enabling Ronald Reagan's massive deficit to be financed painlessly. It would be extremely convenient if Japan repeated this favor now by stepping up its capital exports to Asia. A steady stream of yen would shore up the region's exchange rates, reducing that coming tide of Asian exports. Unfortunately, Japan's banks have lost so much money through reckless lending, in Asia and at home, that they are in no mood to dispense new cash. Instead, the banks are having to

SEBASTIAN MALLABY is *The Economist*'s Washington bureau chief and author of its "Lexington" column.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

call in existing loans to plug the holes in their balance sheets. Far from supporting Asia's currencies with fresh capital, therefore, Japan's financial sector is likely to push down the region's currencies. And, once again, far from being the solution to Asia's woes, Japan is part of the problem.

So, in geoeconomic circles in the West, the old mix of pity and pleasure at Japan's distress is gone, displaced by a new brew of pity and anxiety. In a way, this should come as no surprise, for the switch from *Schadenfreude* to *Schadenangst* pervades American foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union was greeted at first with delight, but the emergence of crazy nationalists and loose nukes soon made the post-Soviet mess seem menacing. Similarly, Americans are understandably pleased when the arrogant French are humbled by double-digit unemployment, even though at other times America needs a strong France to help out with crises such as Bosnia or Iraq. The shift to *Schadenangst* on Japan illustrates the dilemma of the world's only superpower: jealous of its preeminence, it is nonetheless fearful of the chaos wrought by the failed states of the world and needful of sturdy allies.

At the same time, the new vision of Japan has implications for Asia that stretch far beyond the current economic crisis. Until very recently, Japan would never have been regarded as the nation that failed to help Asia in its time of need, let alone the villain that intensified the crisis. On the contrary, Japan had long been viewed by the rest of Asia as an inspiration. Its miraculous postwar growth stood as proof that a poor Asian country could catch up with the patronizing West in the space of a single generation. And Japan heartened devotees of the misty alternative to Western liberalism known as the "Asian Way," for it seemed to have surpassed the industrial achievements of America without succumbing to American individualism.

Other Asian nations did their best to emulate Japan's example. The South Koreans imported Japan's statist industrial policy wholesale. Communist officials—in Beijing, Hanoi, and even Ulan Bator—played host in recent years to Japanese executives and technocrats, who arrived in teams to preach the splendors of their country's economic model. But, now that this model has proved fallible, the old reverence for it has evaporated. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad may have drawn inspiration for his 1980s "Look East" campaign from Japan's success, but this month his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, had the temerity to declare that Japan could best help Asia by deregulating its economy.

Anwar is right. Asia's old role model is clearly due for some remodeling. But how exactly can it be fixed? For more than half a decade, Japan's economy has been laced with every fertilizer that official wisdom knows: rock-bottom interest rates, a massive fiscal boost, a currency depreciation to stimulate exports. Yet none of this has worked. The reason is that Japan faces something much more serious than an ordinary cyclical downturn. Japan's problems are rooted within the basic organization of its economic system.

To understand what's wrong with this system, consider one contrast between America and Japan. America's capital markets allocate money to whichever firm seems likely to earn the best return, after adjusting for risk. Japan's financiers, by contrast, have until now aimed simply to provide capital to friends in almost unlimited quantities. Banks lent to firms with which they had established relationships; stock investors bought shares and held them for the long term without ever dreaming of trading them for shares in other companies that seemed to promise higher profits. Often, a bank cemented its relationship with a manufacturer by buying a large block of its shares, and the manufacturer would return the favor. This assured that the bank would lend copiously to the manufacturer almost irrespective of how well it did. Nobody in the system shouted: "Make profits!"

As a result, Japan Inc. generated remarkably low profits, even during the high-growth years. Between 1971 and 1980, for example, firms quoted on the Tokyo stock exchange earned just a one-half percent return on equity per year. During the mid-1990s, Japan's listed firms collectively earned a return of about 2.5 percent, compared to around 15 percent in America. This fact explains many noted features of the Japanese model. Excused of the need to earn profits, Japanese firms were free to pursue other goals: to chase market share and to pamper employees with the promise of lifetime employment. So long as the economy hummed along, this was fine: the ambitious market-chasing investments paid off because demand for just about everything was expanding all the time, and the lifelong employees always had something to do because growth made it easy for companies to branch into new areas. The financiers were happy, too, since growth ensured that even profit-indifferent firms would earn the minimal return needed to pay interest on bank loans.

The danger of this arrangement became clear, however, as the fast growth stopped. Again, this is no mere cyclical phenomenon. The more Japan's economy has caught up with the West, the more it has slowed: during the 1970s, the government aimed for growth of six percent a year; during the 1980s, it aimed for four percent a year; now, any growth at all is welcome. Without fast growth, unwise investments lose money fast, making it increasingly hard for firms to honor the lifetime employment promise. As a result, unemployment has risen to a four-decade high of 3.5 percent, and it is likely to rise more.

Just as it is growing hard to protect lifetime employment, so are many firms having trouble repaying their bankers. During the 1980s, they had invested in marginally profitable projects, knowing that marginal profits were quite enough to meet debt-service obligations. Because of this disregard for profit margins, the economic slowdown plunged many firms into the red, leaving them unable to pay interest. This led to a huge buildup of bad debt: Japanese banks have accumulated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some $600 billion in problem loans, twice as much as American banks during the S&L crisis. Since October, a handful of middling banks have gone under. The rest are now foreclosing on delinquent borrowers with the result that, last year, Japan's bankruptcies increased by 75 percent over 1996. As firms go down, unemployment goes up; this scares consumers into saving more lest they too lose their jobs and this fall in consumption sends more firms into bankruptcy. Unless this vicious circle can be broken by the government's new bailout scheme, it threatens to stifle growth in Japan for the rest of this century.

And it threatens more than that: It is also likely to undermine the qualities that Asians once admired in Japanese society. Many of Japan's non-Western qualities—its lack of individualism, its emphasis on the cohesion of the group—were lodged in the country's stable firms. Managers were promoted, predictably, according to their age; nobody earned a superstar salary, but then nobody was fired, either. In the future, Japan's hard-pressed firms will be unable to afford this. Many are already offering merit pay to instill a more competitive spirit among their employees. Most already know that they cannot go on paying workers for doing nothing. In the past, Japan's captains of industry specialized in lectures on the Japanese concept of *wa*, or harmony. Nowadays, they are more inclined to lecture on the bottom line. Corporate Japan is growing steadily more Western.

If Japan's economy is to recover, this Westernization must go on. As even once-admiring Asians now can see, Japan needs to deregulate the inefficient bits of its economy, like retailing and trucking, and it needs to shake up its financiers so that in the future they will have the wit to demand that firms make profits. This has already started to take place with remarkable results. The deregulation of retailing has made possible a few American successes, such as Starbucks and the Gap; the deregulation of finance has given U.S. banks a chance to overcome Tokyo's regulated clubbiness. Japanese consumers, scared that their country's banks are all unsound, are shifting their savings to Citibank; Merrill Lynch recently became the biggest player on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

So it seems that, after all, America will gain something from Japan's weakness. Yet it would be unwise to count on this, for the lesson of the past decade is that *Schadenfreude* can be fleeting. Although anyone can see that Japan must deregulate in order to regain its health, deregulation is by no means certain. The short-term cost is terrifying: competitive pressure will force unemployment to levels that most Japanese find deathly shocking. In one estimate, deregulation in the trucking, distribution, and financial sectors alone would cost 4.6 million jobs, pushing unemployment from its current 3.5 percent to 6.7 percent. It is by no means certain that Japan has the stomach for this. It may prefer to muddle along, its economy sinking slowly in the mire, in which case the current *Schadenangst* will be redoubled. •

Will economic crisis bring democracy to Asia?

AFTER THE TSUNAMI

By Daniel A. Bell

Until the East Asian miracle went up in a cloud of smoke, most East Asian specialists and comparative political scientists were optimistic about the prospects for democracy in the region. That's because nearly everyone subscribed to the "modernization thesis" first proposed by Stanford University Professor Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959. According to this thesis, economic development produces a new urban middle class—professionals, entrepreneurs, managers, and so on—motivated to challenge authoritarian rule. As Harold Crouch and James Morely put it in their widely cited 1993 book, at higher levels of economic growth, "we should expect the economy then to have become too complex for the state to manage alone. We should also expect that at least some of the new social classes would have become too large and politically conscious to be willing any longer to defer to the judgments of the bureaucracy or to be excluded from the political process. An important threshold should be crossed, the internal balance of power should tip, and authoritarian rule should give way to a democratic transformation."

Democratization in the rapidly developing countries of South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan seemed to lend support to this hypothesis. Where the model clearly did

DANIEL A. BELL teaches political philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. He is the author of the forthcoming *East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in Asia.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not fit, as in authoritarian Singapore and Indonesia, political scientists reasoned that it was merely a matter of time before liberal democracy would blossom. Eventually the middle classes would realize that they needed to push for democracy in order to secure access to a fair share of an ever-growing pie. A more romantic strain of thought also informed such analyses: In a 1995 book entitled *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia*, Clark Neher and Ross Marlay wrote, "The winds of change in this new era of democratization have touched Southeast Asia, particularly those states in which modernization has widened people's horizons and encouraged them to ask for greater liberty."

On the face of it, the Asian financial crisis would seem to have introduced new grounds for pessimism. The middle classes have been the first to bear the brunt of currency depreciations and stock-market collapses. (The full impact on ordinary workers will be felt later this year.) The first group to protest the International Monetary Fund's austerity package for Korea was a group of stock brokers who feared for their jobs. The major casualty (so far) in Hong Kong has been Peregrine Investments Holdings, one of the largest investment banks in Asia. Imported goods have become too expensive for all but the super rich: sales of imported cars, once a staple product for the Thai middle class, have dropped by nearly 40 percent in Bangkok. The Malaysian government, which had been planning to spur its next technological upgrade by developing its own version of Silicon Valley, instead launched the new year by calling on its citizens to grow cauliflower in their gardens so they wouldn't need to import the vegetable from abroad. Thousands of university students from Asia have abandoned study plans in the United States. (Among them is a former student of mine from the National University of Singapore, who may be forced to delay his Ph.D. at Berkeley.) Asian tourists have become a rare sight in London and New York. Some members of the middle classes have even been reduced to a hand-to-mouth existence: the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that two Indonesian businessmen in suits and ties traded blows over a container of cooking oil in an upmarket bulk-purchase store. The newly impoverished middle classes, in short, now seem to have other things to worry about besides freedom and democracy. Modernization theorists may have to look outside Asia to invest their hopes.

But what if the modernization theorists had been wrong about Asia all along? Modernization theory has been challenged by another, more "pessimistic" view—developed in a 1995 book entitled *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*, which I coauthored with three other academics. We argue that there is little basis to the claim that the middle classes are the bearers of political liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region. This revisionist standpoint developed partly in response to the experience of Southeast Asian states since the 1980s, which seemed to grow more repressive as they attained new levels of prosperity. Singapore's brief flirtation with liberalization—a period local wits refer to as the country's "Prague spring"—came to an abrupt end with the sacking of opposition member Chee Soon Juan from his university post in 1993. During this same period, both Indonesia and Malaysia developed into increasingly centralized one-party states. More surprisingly, perhaps, the middle classes seemed to generally support the consolidation of authoritarian rule. In Singapore, the pro-democracy opposition groups derived most of their support from the lower classes. In Malaysia, the burgeoning middle class actively supported an increasingly authoritarian and interventionist state. The prospering middle class in Indonesia also seemed firmly on the side of the status quo.

What explains the political passivity of the Asian middle classes in economic boom times? Partly, they had been kept in check by fear. Economically successful Asian states have not ruled by means of systematic terror. Instead, the right dose of "big sticks," as Singapore's president Lee Kuan Yew put it, has been sufficient: "You don't have to use it often. Use it once, twice, against big people. The rest will take notice." Another factor has been an education system that encourages rote learning and cramming for exams. Dominant, nonliberal cultural values such as deference to ruling elites may also have played a role. The most important factor, however, has been the prevalence of a state-led approach to economic development in East and Southeast Asia. The middle classes were the main beneficiaries of state economic paternalism, which gave them a strong stake in the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. The Malaysian middle class, for example, tends to be employed either in the state bureaucracy or in businesses with links to the ruling political party. One might expect academics to be more independent, but that is often not the case: in the past few years, several heads of departments at the National University of Singapore have also been members of parliament for the ruling party, and, not surprisingly, professors tend to be rewarded on grounds unrelated to academic merit. (The plaque on the desk of the head of the department of political science best expresses the dominant philosophy: "An ounce of loyalty is worth more than a pound of cleverness.")

This is not to deny that real democratization—in the sense of free and fair competitive elections for political rulers—has occurred in some East Asian states. But, typically speaking, the middle classes have not been at the forefront of movements for political change. In Taiwan, most pro-democracy street demonstrators during the late 1980s came from the working classes. (Taxi drivers were especially prominent.) In Korea, according to Seoul National University Professor Sangjin Han, university students drew on the Confucian tradition of respect for intellectual elites and played the crucial role of establishing a society-wide commitment to democracy. The urban middle classes only took to the streets in June 1987, when continued military rule threatened to bring on social chaos shortly before the 1988

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Olympic Games. And *The New York Times* noted that the middle-class demonstrators "took to the streets to demand democracy [but] they also chanted 'order,'" which suggests that the desire for "greater liberty" may not have been the primary motivation.

Given the middle class's current economic troubles, the question is whether the pessimists of Asia should now become optimists. After all, the relatively impoverished middle classes may now have an incentive to question the old authoritarian ways and may seem set to finally adopt their "proper" role as the agents of political liberalization. Of course, this assumes that the authorities are held responsible for the financial crisis and that there is a better alternative in sight. And there is much variation on that count within the Asia-Pacific region.

Let us begin with the three worst-hit countries that have had to seek IMF help. In Korea, the Kim Young Sam administration was widely viewed as having contributed to the problem of corporate debt. Government officials and bureaucrats had pressured banks to make questionable loans to the country's largest enterprises (*chaebol*), and the financial crisis made it obvious that the cozy relationship between government and big business needed to be changed. In this case, a ready alternative was available in the person of Kim Dae Jung, a former political dissident who had criticized the economic dominance of the *chaebol* in past presidential campaigns. Though Kim had been written off as a has-been by most political analysts, he narrowly edged out the "establishment candidate" in last December's presidential elections partly due to increased support from the middle classes. Kim's victory may serve the function of consolidating the democratic system in Korea, especially if he does a credible job of steering his nation through its worst economic crisis in decades.

In Thailand, the government of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (an armed forces commander during the 1980s) was widely held responsible for having contributed to the country's economic crisis by condoning corruption, injecting politics into economic management, and failing to overhaul the troubled financial sector. As a consequence, he was forced to support the country's new constitution, which was designed to eradicate corruption and money politics. (It is interesting to note, however, that constitutional reformers in Thailand did not take all their cues from the ideals of Western liberal democracies: one provision prevents citizens without university degrees from running for the legislature.) But, as Thailand's economy continued to head downward, it became clear that constitutional changes would not be enough to satisfy the urban middle classes. In this case, an alternative was also available: the Democratic Party, headed by Chuan Leekpai, which narrowly lost the last elections. Several hundred white-collar workers led demonstrations in Bangkok, and shortly thereafter Chavalit resigned and ceded power to a coalition government headed by Leekpai. The economy has gone from bad to worse, however, and it is not inconceivable that the middle class will lose faith in the democratic process.

The middle class is more divided in Indonesia, currently the epicenter of the Asian storm. The country is ruled by President Suharto, a former general who took power during an anti-Communist coup in 1965 that left more than a half million dead (primarily members of the Chinese minority). Indonesia is one of the world's most corrupt countries, and it is well-known that the family of President Suharto has swept up most of the country's lucrative businesses into its own government-protected monopolies (some of which are to be dismantled in accordance with the latest IMF demands). Thus, a group of academics recently urged the nation to elect a new president, adding that the reform measures backed by the IMF would not work "because the crisis is the result of the greed of a small group of people close to the power holders." The problem, however, is that there is no credible alternative from the point of view of most local businessmen and international investors. This explains why Indonesia's financial crisis suddenly worsened when concerns about Suharto's health emerged last December. Suharto does face pressure to nominate a credible successor, but this can be done without strengthening the (practically nonexistent) democratic system. And, since it is widely expected that social unrest will take a turn for the worse, the military is not likely to relax its grip on power in the foreseeable future.

Hong Kong and Singapore have recently been hit by the region's economic turmoil, but there is no obvious reason to expect that this will benefit pro-democracy forces. Few seem to blame the government for Hong Kong's economic downturn: according to the latest poll, satisfaction with Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has been steadily rising since last June. The reason is that Hong Kong is widely perceived to be the victim of the regional currency crisis in Southeast Asia, which puts pressure on the Hong Kong dollar. As a result, goes the common view, the government is stuck between a rock and a hard place: either it removes the local currency's peg to the U.S. dollar, which could trigger widespread capital flight, or it defends the peg with high interest rates, which hurts the property sector and the stock market. Furthermore, though an alternative to the ruling regime is available in the form of the Democratic Party and its allies, the Democrats have traditionally received most of their support from the lower classes. Of course, some educated professionals did support the Democrats, but this was driven primarily by fear about Hong Kong's civil liberties following the transition to Chinese sovereignty. And the one piece of good news in Hong Kong is that the mainland's Communist government has (so far) taken a hands-off approach to Hong Kong's internal affairs. In short, it does not look like the middle class is about to lead a democratic revolution in Hong Kong.

The situation seems to be even more bleak for democrats in Singapore. Even the government's critics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seem to recognize that it has done a relatively good job of managing the economy. The country has prided itself on being the East Asian home of no-nonsense financial regulation, and it seemed to offer a safe haven for investors. But Singapore's economy suddenly took a turn for the worse last December when neighboring Indonesia, one of its big Asian trading partners, seemed to be spinning out of control. The worry that anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia might endanger Singapore's security also has contributed to the panic. However, it seems unlikely that the middle classes will blame the government for these developments. Moreover, there is no credible opposition capable of challenging the ruling party, since several prominent opposition figures have recently been forced into exile through various tactics in the government's bag of dirty tricks (interrogation by the Internal Security Department, libel suits for defamation of government officials, harassment by taxation authorities, and so on).

There is, however, one argument for democracy that may be relevant even in those nations where governments are not likely to be held responsible for economic troubles. Democracy can counter the human inclination to put personal goals first at the expense of the public interest; this, in turn, can lead to a broader sense of public-spiritedness. John Stuart Mill famously described "the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided in case of conflicting claims by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good.... He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit."

Conversely, Mill adds, the "subjects" of an authoritarian regime would lack trust in their fellows, have no interest in public affairs, and certainly have no inclination to sacrifice their own "private" interests for the sake of the public good: "Let a person have nothing to do for his country, and he will not care for it." Even a "good despotism" which manages the collective interests of the people cannot counter the tendency toward selfishness since it cannot provide the opportunity for people to cooperate and to discover common interests that may otherwise have gone unnoticed. There may not be "positive oppression by officers of the state," but "the intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material interests, and when these are provided for, to the amusement and ornamentation, of private life."

Alexis de Tocqueville was more cynical, pointing out that despotic rulers actually have an interest in fostering the blind pursuit of material interests: "Love of gain, a fondness for business careers, the desire to get rich at all costs, a craving for material comfort and easy living quickly become ruling passions under a despotic government.... It is in the nature of despotism that it should foster such desires and propagate their havoc. Lowering as they do the national morale, they are despotism's safeguard since they divert men's attention from public affairs."

In the contemporary world, Singapore and Hong Kong best fit this description of "good" despotic regimes. Their governments are relatively "clean," and they have provided the social conditions for the enrichment of their peoples. The flip side, however, is that Singaporeans and Hong Kongers are often described by social critics as "apathetic," "materialistic," and "alienated." The Singaporean journalist Cherian George indirectly holds the government responsible for the sorry state of affairs in his country: one could hardly blame people for ignoring their political obligations, he says, "when they hear so many cautionary tales: of Singaporeans whose careers came to a premature end after they voiced dissent; of critics who found themselves under investigation; of individuals who were detained without trial or even though they seemed not to pose any real threat; of tapped phones and opened letters. The moral of these stories: In Singapore, it's better to mind your own business, make money, and leave politics to the politicians."

In Hong Kong, the new administration does not (so far) resort to scare tactics, but it is fixing the rules for this May's legislative elections to ensure that the Democrats will not get a majority of the seats (for example, by slashing the number of eligible voters for "functional constituencies" from 2.7 million to 186,000). Not surprisingly, these elections have been greeted with widespread apathy, and the government's recent costly attempt to drum up interest through a door-to-door voter registration campaign has failed to ignite interest.

Political apathy may not be a serious problem in economic boom times, but the situation may change when governments can no longer deliver material benefits and social peace. Hong Kong has been facing a serious brain drain during the last decade or so, although things were beginning to improve once it became clear that the Chinese Communist Party was not intent on killing the goose that lays golden eggs. It is less well-known that Singapore has had a similar problem. According to a poll taken last fall—before the Asian financial crisis had hit Singapore—40 percent of young people surveyed said that they were prepared to consider emigration. An earlier survey by a government think tank found that "the better educated, those with high incomes, those educated in the English stream, and the politically alienated" were especially prone to consider leaving the country for greener pastures.

It is almost certain that the brain drain will get much worse during the next two or three years. The Singaporean government had been dealing with this problem by recruiting more talent from abroad, but this strategy may no longer be effective in times of economic hardship. The only other solution is to give people a greater say in political affairs so that they will be more motivated to stick with their "fellow citizens" in the dark days ahead. •

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Bear could hardly walk. Then, in just a few days, he was his old self again."

SUSAN LLOYD, BEAR'S OWNER
MARLBOROUGH, CONNECTICUT



As a certified therapy dog, Bear has a very important job. Each week, he dispenses good cheer and affection when he visits nursing homes, like the one at Whitney Center in Hamden, Connecticut.

But when he developed arthritis—the same ailment that troubles many of his human friends—his weekly rounds were nearly curtailed.

Luckily for Bear, human disease isn't the only area for which Pfizer searches for cures. Thanks to a treatment made possible by research in veterinary medicine, he was soon up and running again.

And judging from the people who look forward to seeing him, Bear isn't the only one who's feeling better.

Pfizer

We're part of the cure.

www.pfizer.com
AOL keyword: pfizer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & The Arts

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

One Day in 1923

Last week a film that was a free adaptation of a famous novel, *Great Expectations*; this week a film that clings close to a famous novel, **Mrs. Dalloway** (First Look).

That intelligent and inquiring English actress, Eileen Atkins, has been working on Virginia Woolf projects for almost ten years. First, Atkins did a one-woman adaptation of *A Room of One's Own*, which she played in London and New York and on tour, an inviting and lucid performance. Then Atkins made a theater piece, not exactly a play, out of the correspondence of Woolf and her lover, Vita Sackville-West. In New York, Atkins played Virginia, and Vanessa Redgrave played Vita; and though the piece showed its lack of dramatic core, the skill and charm of the two performers made it a treat.

Atkins persists. Now she has made a screenplay of *Mrs. Dalloway* for Redgrave. Clearly Atkins recognized the problems in adapting this shimmery novel, but, alas, recognizing them is not enough. Those problems still obtrude.

Woolf's novel might be seen as a (much smaller) parallel to Joyce's *Ulysses*. By closely following one day in the life of one quite ordinary woman, the book includes a social tapestry, a political index, a theological position, and something of the history that had produced all these elements. Woolf knew Joyce's work (about which she had decidedly mixed feelings, especially because of Joyce's candor); but "stream of consciousness" technique was in the air at the time, and she might well have done what she did if Joyce had never existed.

That technique works wonderfully well in the novel; but it is not a comfortable film mode. The story deals with one June day in the London of 1923, from morning to the evening when Clarissa Dalloway gives a party in her house. She is wealthy and reticently elegant, the middle-aged wife of an M.P., a woman whose life is plainly pleasant and vacuous. Through her day of party preparations, several other stories wind. A former suitor of hers, Peter Walsh, returns after a long stay in India. He visits Clarissa, is still in some way affected by her, yet tells her of a current amorous involvement. And there is the story of a young man, a severely shell-shocked veteran of the Great War (as it was prematurely called), who has a devoted Italian wife. His story connects with Mrs. Dalloway because the physician who so signally fails to help him is a guest at her party that evening.

To accommodate the background of these and other encounters, Atkins has devised some flashback scenes, derived from Woolf. Also, those scenes serve the usual purpose of the past juxtaposed with the present, a pathos so inevitable that it hardly needs to be mentioned. When we see the young Peter asking the young Clarissa to marry him and thus break out of her cosseted life, when we see her opt instead for the quite conventional young Richard Dalloway, we understand how Clarissa's upbringing has crimped the possibilities for her life. She was reared to be a quite conventional lady, and that is what she has become.

This flashing-back is pretty to look at, and it flexes the narrative, but it works against the unification of the piece; and unification of the whole was patently what Woolf was after. Her prose makes the novel a holistic work even when the narrative shifts from one strand to another. This is impossible in the film, where the shifts are exactly that, breaks from the centrality of Mrs. Dalloway's day.

A further disjuncture. Woolf's prose transmutes ordinary experience. One instance: when Big Ben strikes, she writes: "The leaden circles dissolved in the air." In the film we simply hear the bells. In a sense Woolf might just as well not have written as she did. Any of us can hear bells; only Woolf could have thus transfigured the sound, and the film cheats us of her.

This is not remotely to argue a fixed superiority of literature over film, but it is to suggest that some novels resist adaptation to the core of their beings. Further, it suggests that an actress-writer can fall so much in love with a fine novel that she overlooks her own experience and knowledge. (For a quite contrary example, see Emma Thompson's screenplay of *Sense and Sensibility*.)

And, unfortunately, that is not all. Most of Mrs. Dalloway's activity during that June day is inner—things that she thinks and feels. Atkins knew this, of course, and tried to enrich the outer, visible woman with some voice-over quota-

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Amistad. *Steven Spielberg, with cinematographer Janusz Kaminski, gives enveloping texture to this account of a slave revolt in 1839. Historically compressed but dramatically cogent. (Reviewed 12/22/97)* **Ma Vie en Rose.** *In Belgium a small boy wants to dress and behave like a girl. His impulse, quite simple to him, leads to complications. The ending is too neat, but there's plenty of perception and empathy. (1/26/98)* **The Sweet Hereafter.** *An understated yet complex account of what happens in a small town after a school bus accident kills most of its children. Ian Holm is outstanding as a lawyer who comes to help. (12/8/97)* **Wag the Dog.** *Political satire about a president's sexual entanglements. Current White House problems are not exactly the same, but, once again, life is striving to keep up with art. (2/2/98)*—**SK**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions from her thoughts. But those few quotations never have, could not have, the wholeness of the contrapuntal feeling in the book, the sense that the woman whom the world sees has a more interesting, invisible self constantly attending her. And since Mrs. Dalloway is largely banal in her utterances, her dialogue is mostly tedious slivers of politesse: "Delighted that you could come," "How lovely to see you," and so on.

This condition puts a dreadful burden on Vanessa Redgrave. She has rarely had a role that demanded less of (let us please use the term) her genius. She moves through Mrs. Dalloway's house and the London streets like a great, beautiful ship sailing on urban seas, and when she speaks, she makes as much as she decently can of her clumps of standard chatter. If the role weren't in the hands of an actress who is being underused, it would be intolerable. But even Redgrave can't make Mrs. Dalloway, in this form, a fascinating woman.

Her clothes, designed by Judy Pepperdine, are unostentatiously lovely, especially the hats. In the prewar flashback scenes, the clothes bespeak their period cleverly. And in those clothes, the performances of the young Clarissa and Peter and Richard are vividly ... young. As the older Peter, Michael Kitchen carries nicely an air of regret plus hope.

But the most demanding performance, a demand well met, is by Rupert Graves as the unbalanced war veteran. This man's presence in both novel and film is obviously meant to give us a glimpse of the horror in the world through which Mrs. Dalloway has floated. Graves has to deal with abrupt swirls of mood and reality, and he does it movingly.

The director was Marleen Gorris, the Dutch woman whose last film of the five she has made, *Antonia's Line*, was smoothly fulfilled. (Incidentally, Gorris did an M.A. at an English university, and she has some feeling for the country.) In her hands we can be sure that the feminist aspects of Woolf's work will not be slighted. More, Gorris understands the story, as, in the truest sense, a woman's work. The handicaps that she could not overcome are the implacable ones of the screenplay. •

Jed Perl on Art

Bring in the Amateurs

Museum people are feeling cheerfully bewildered this season. Attendance figures are climbing, and nobody really understands why this is happening, and everybody seems to agree that there is no end in sight. It's impossible to be surprised by the attention paid to the Gianni Versace retrospective at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, an infomercial for art-and-fashion synergy. But there can still be some amazement at the general interest inspired by an event such as the show of drawings by Filippino Lippi and his fifteenth-century contemporaries, which has attracted reasonable numbers at the Met. By now, museum visitors may be willing to have a look at anything. More than a generation after museumgoing became a hot national pastime, the children of the people who stood on line for hours at the Met in 1961 to see the museum's $2.3 million painting, Rembrandt's *Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer*, are taking their children, and that says something impressive about the diffusion of culture.

But the museum can also mask a darker side of the current scene. When I talk to artists and dealers in contemporary art, I find them often reporting a steady erosion in the number of people who are following recent developments in art with any curiosity or avidity. The museum audience may be exploding, but even the minuscule percentage of that audience that you might expect to be seeking out the best new work (which is by no means the most visible contemporary art) appears to be dwindling into nothing. Museum officials are in seventh heaven, and artists and dealers are in a quiet panic. The audience that really matters to art may be evaporating—and, when you consider the skyrocketing attendance figures at the museums, the contrast can seem truly bizarre.

Many people will want to argue that the museumgoing and the gallerygoing audiences are inevitably going to be as different as night and day. If you look at history, however, you will see that for more than 100 years the taste of the museumgoer has been shaped by the visionary reach of the gallerygoer. Artists



FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE
A BRILLIANT EXPLORATION OF THE DARK SIDE OF HUMAN INGENUITY AND IMAGINATION

NATIONAL BOOK AWARD-WINNING AUTHOR OF *THE BANQUET YEARS*
ROGER SHATTUCK
"Splendid."—*The New York Times*
"Profound questions animate this learned and illuminating book...the most ambitious and important book of Shattuck's career. Its scope is enormous."
—*Christian Science Monitor*
IN PAPERBACK AT BOOKSTORES EVERYWHERE
Harvest Books
HARCOURT BRACE & COMPANY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such as Degas, Renoir, and Monet—the subjects of exhibitions that have packed American museums this season—were originally supported by precisely the kind of small, intensely engaged audience that many artists fear is extinct. Ironically enough, the blockbuster shows of Impressionist work that have dominated museums this summer and fall have a lot to tell us about how painters once managed, in the face of indifference and even hostility, to reinvent the expressive possibilities of paint and renew taste. In the catalogue of "The Private Collection of Edgar Degas," which was at the Metropolitan this fall, Ann Dumas writes about a breed of men who in the nineteenth century were described as *amateurs*, and who seem to have provided a support system for artists—by rejecting consensus thinking, by trusting their own responses.

The whole subject of nineteenth-century taste is immensely complicated. Present-day scholars, confronted by an art market that is always repackaging the cutting edge, are perhaps too inclined to focus on the various ways in which artistic experimentation affects the bottom line. Ann Dumas is surely correct in pointing out that by the time the Impressionists were making big money in the last decades of the nineteenth century, there was a powerful aura of nostalgia around the very idea of the *amateur*, who could be seen as the battered symbol of a vanished golden age. Dumas is mostly interested in the wealthier *amateurs*, the ones who built great collections, and she has interesting things to say about how their taste related to that of Degas. Still, if there was a generation of *amateurs* who were, as the painter Jacques-Émile Blanche wrote in 1919, "crushed by the stampede of irresponsible American millionaires or the new industrial aristocracy from Germany and Russia," there was also a spirit to the *amateurs* that had nothing to do with the vagaries of the market. That spirit lived on deep into the twentieth century.

The *amateur* is a make-up-my-own-mind kind of person. Some *amateurs* were aristocrats, and some were primarily focused on the glories of the past; but the independent-mindedness that was their most essential trait was one of the grand expressions of the soaring confidence of middle-class culture. I would define the type broadly. I see its beginnings in the generation that supported Watteau's astonishingly informal style in the early eighteenth century. And long after Degas's friends had passed away, there appeared Peggy Guggenheim and Betty Parsons, *amateurs* who went professional and opened the galleries in New York which gave the Abstract Expressionists their first significant public presence. *Amateurs* probably still exist here and there, as isolated figures, but I think everybody will agree that their sense of shared purpose has not flourished in recent decades. Economic downsizing and shaken middle-class confidence have played a part, for they have left even people who are still doing just fine with a sense that artistic experience is too risky, too unstable, to absorb a person's attention. The sophisticated public views art as one more product of a rampant consumer culture. They know that caring too much could be seen as terribly uncool, and they are inclined to leave the decisions about contemporary art to the experts (whose services are yet another high-end consumer product). People still want to look at art, but they don't want to make up their minds for themselves, to take a leap into the unknown. They are content with Andy Warhol's quick-fix model, according to which avant-gardism and blockbusterism are more or less the same thing.

Courtesy The Metropolitan Museum of Art

AFTER THE BATH, 1896, BY EDGAR DEGAS

Our biggest problem is that blockbusterdom has become *the* art world model, a model to which there no longer appears to be the kind of countervailing principle that elitism or avant-gardism or a combination of the two has produced for the past several hundred years. There is no longer a small but vocal audience that resists the trumped-up ebullience of Robert Rauschenberg's Guggenheim retrospective or the prepackaged scandal of "Sensation," the show of young British artists that was at the Royal Academy in London this fall. For English critics, "Sensation," which set the latest in porno-kitsch styles amid the fuddy-duddy galleries of the Royal Academy, became a face-off in a hall of mirrors. Whatever you said was just more fodder for an advance-guard-meets-rear-guard happening that had been masterminded by Charles Saatchi, the advertising mogul from whose collection all the work was drawn. When the most extreme adversarial airs fit so neatly into a p.r. campaign, you can't wonder why even the audience that knows better is going to be too demoralized to go out and look for an alternative. Many artists believe that they are now confronting the ultimate nightmare—which also happens to be the nightmare that the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists confronted. What if an artist makes a breakthrough and there is no one who responds? What if there are a few people who get the point, but nobody in the wider world cares how they feel?

This season, museumgoers were afforded a rare insight into the mysteries of independent taste when they visited the Metropolitan's exhibition of "The Private Collection of Edgar Degas." Degas was a wealthy man who could indulge on a vast scale the collector's mania that many artists can only express by accumulating the tiniest fragments. Yet the mixture of old and new work that Degas put together, mostly between 1890 and 1904, gave a good sense of the kind of creative tradition-building that always absorbs artists and the *amateurs* who closely follow their evolving views. In the catalogue of the show, Ann Dumas observes that Degas's collection of works by his contemporaries and by earlier artists "was not widely known: outside his circle of friends, dealers, and collectors, few knew of its existence." Might it be more accurate to say that Degas's collection was known to everybody who needed to know it, to the small group of artists and *amateurs* who were trying to rethink the history of art in the light of what was going on right there and then?

By joining an impressive group of works by Ingres, that exemplar of aca-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demic standards, with paintings by Manet, Cassatt, Gauguin, Cézanne, Van Gogh, and himself, Degas was suggesting an artistic genealogy that broke the stranglehold of official taste. He was showing how the insiders saw the history, and it turned out to be a history in which El Greco became a precursor of Cézanne, in which Ingres and Delacroix, far from being the classic-versus-romantic adversaries that their supporters imagined them to be, were joined in their sense of color and line as expressing an artist's free-flowing feeling for the power of style.

In Degas's collection we see style less tethered to subject matter than heretofore. We see style becoming the transparent expression of artistic personality. It took time for that idea to take hold. It is gestating in Degas's collection, and the mix can become quite complicated, as when Daumier's graphic hyperbole seems to move naturalism one step closer to abstraction. And eventually, in the advancing decades of the twentieth century, as Manet, Cézanne, and Gauguin turned out to be almost universally beloved artists, these innovations became the status quo.

By now the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists are box office gold, and American museumgoers are deep into a run of shows of their work that is going to extend into the spring and beyond. Many of these are fascinating exhibitions, in which particular aspects of an artist's career are meticulously dissected. Museums are to be applauded for supporting some adventuresome scholarship, though of course everybody knows that administrators wouldn't give a damn if they weren't sure of the public's support. "Renoir's Portraits: Impressions of an Age" is currently at the Kimbell in Fort Worth, after stops in Ottawa and Chicago. "Monet and the Mediterranean" was at the Kimbell last summer and went on to the Brooklyn Museum, where it posted the largest attendance the museum had seen, at least since the Van Gogh retrospective in 1971. At the Metropolitan, "The Private Collection of Edgar Degas" has just closed, but "Degas and the Little Dancer" has opened at the Joslyn Art Museum in Omaha, and the National Gallery, which will mount "Degas at the Races" in April, is also presenting "Manet, Monet and the Gare Saint-Lazare" (which is currently in Paris) later in the spring, as well as a major Van Gogh retrospective in the fall.

In truth, museumgoers have been pulled up a bit short by some of these shows, because they present aspects of Degas, Monet, and Renoir that can be

ART SCENES *Galleries, Exhibits, and Events*

Antique Navajo and Mexican Textiles Andrew Nagen Gallery. P.O. Box 1306, Corrales, NM 87048, 505-898-5285. By appointment, please. Since 1976 we have specialized in the sale, purchase and appraisal of classic, transitional and regional textiles from all the Southwestern Native American and Hispanic cultures. We supply or request photos for purchase, sale or approval. No catalog.

Beacon Hill Fine Art 980 Madison Avenue, NYC, 10021, 212-734-3636, Tuesday through Saturday 10-6, Monday by appointment. *The Saltwater World of Reynolds Beal.* The colorful impressionistic work of Reynolds Beal fascinates collectors of marine, landscape and topographical subjects. Beal was a student of William Merritt Chase; this American master's influence is evident in Beal's early work. This exhibition focuses on the artist's American subjects from the 1890s through the 1940s, and features his flamboyant, vibrant style and broken brushwork, unique in American Impressionism. Catalog available. Through March 21.

Salander-O'Reilly Galleries 20 East 79th Street, NYC, 10021, 212-879-6606. Monday through Saturday, 9:30-5:30. *Giambologna: Sculptor.* This is the first United States exhibition of sculpture by the great Italian Mannerist master, Giambologna (1529-1608). This exhibition explores the artist's distinctive style and compositions with over sixty-six statues in marble, terra-cotta and bronze. His work completes an important historical link between Michelangelo and Bernini. A fully illustrated catalog with text by Charles Avery will be available at the gallery. March 6 - April 4. *Jedd Novatt: Sculpture.* New works in steel. April 7 - 25: *Larry Poons: Paintings.* New paintings. April 7 - 25.

Swann Galleries 104 East 25th Street, NYC, 212-254-4710. Monday through Friday, 10-6; previews Saturdays prior to auctions, 10-4. AUCTIONS: February 26: *Printed and Manuscript African-Americana*; also with works of art and artifacts. March 5: *Maps and Decorative Graphics*; maps of the Americas; ornithological and botanical prints, plus other natural history subjects; a wide selection of Bodmer's American Indian portraits. March 12: the *Paul Hammer Library*; featuring 15th-19th century Bibles in many languages, and an assortment of early printed books including dictionaries, and Hebraica and Judaica. March 19: *Performing Arts*; a potpourri of dance, music and opera, theater, movie, magic and vaudeville. April 6: *19th & 20th Century Photographs*; includes Cunningham, Brancusi, Arbus, and Eisenstaedt. Please write or call for preview hours, quarterly newsletter with full auction schedule, and to purchase catalogs. Now accepting consignments for autumn auctions.

Art Scenes is a regular advertising service of *The New Republic* featuring art news and announcements. For further information or space reservations, please **contact** Jennifer Barrett at 202-331-7494. **Mail** your listing to: *Art Scenes, The New Republic*, 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Or **fax** the listing to 202-223-0566.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

difficult to jibe with the blithe spirits of pop Impressionist legend. What we are seeing this season are the Impressionists of the *amateurs*. These painters experience confusions and uncertainties; they explore blind alleys and sometimes they move rather slowly. "Monet and the Mediterranean," which focused on several cycles of paintings that Monet did in the South of France and Italy in 1884, 1888, and 1908, was a disappointment for many museumgoers, who came expecting a breezier side of this most famous Impressionist of all.

The show emphasized Monet's doggedness. Over and over again he attacked the same exceedingly pretty but not necessarily compelling motif: the small Italian seaside town of Bordighera, or the fort of Antibes. Joachim Pissarro (a great-grandson of the artist), who organized the show and wrote its impressive catalogue, focused on Monet's nose-to-the-grindstone determination. The show didn't have a seductive pace, yet if you lingered over Monet's considerations and reconsiderations of a motif, you could begin to grasp his enormous difficulties in clearing out all his preconceptions about how nature looked. And only after Monet had wiped the slate clean did he surge forward, into the miraculous purple-and-blue meltdown of the views of the Palazzo Contarini in Venice.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, painting had become such a popular vehicle for conventionalized emotions that even the most independent-minded artist could have a tough time getting back to some bedrock kind of feeling. Finally, Monet and Renoir not only found new ways to saturate the entire surface of a painting with a heady exhilaration, but lived to see that saturation become a new kind of kitsch. Still, their extraordinary commercial success ought not blind us to the gambles that they had taken in their work. Monet found his own truth by maintaining an absolute skepticism about all artistic conventions. While working in Venice, Pissarro tells us, he "apparently only went to one museum (presumably the Accademia), and only with reluctance did he accompany his wife to a Venetian church—on the condition that they not stay too long!" His close friend Renoir had almost the exact opposite approach; for him the lessons of the masters became a virtual obsession, so that he would sometimes bend to tradition with a perverse wilfullness. In the 1880s, this supreme master of the feathery, watercolory brushstroke spent years attempting to achieve an Ingresque hardness. It was as if all choices had to be considered—no, embraced—before Renoir could be sure of who he was.

The artist we see in "Renoir's Portraits" takes a zigzag course. Sometimes his work is labored and conventional, at other times almost arbitrary. And then, all of a sudden, he will come through with something so miraculously light and true and deft that you can't believe he experienced a single conflict in his life. There is the whirling couple in *Dance at Bougival*, one of a series of indelible visions of late-nineteenth-century bohemian youth in all their sunstruck, live-for-today glory that Renoir painted in the 1880s. And later there are the portraits in which he recaptures—and in certain instances maybe even transcends—Titian. Among the works in this show, I'm thinking in particular of the two portraits of Ambroise Vollard, one in which the dealer plays the supreme *amateur*, examining a small sculpture by Maillol (1908), and one in which he wears a toreador costume (1917). And then there is the portrait of the actress Tilla Durieux (1914). Durieux had the lush, golden looks that Renoir adored, and a radiant artistic intelligence that earned her starring roles in early productions of Shaw, Wilde, Hofmannsthal, Gorky, and Wedekind. She inspired what is probably the greatest of all portraits of an indomitable theatrical spirit. A half century later, Durieux recalled that Renoir had said to her that "I didn't want to paint any more portraits, but I'm glad that I agreed to do yours. I've made some progress, don't you think?"

Renoir's late style, with its massive figures and deep, saturated colors, can strike contemporary viewers as overwrought, but it should be pointed out that both Matisse and Picasso saw in the aging Impressionist's Renaissance recapitulations a very modern kind of density and weight. And if Renoir was only able to express the full force of the painterly tradition after going through a serious consideration of the anti-painterly possibility, then perhaps the opening galleries of "The Private Collection of Edgar Degas," with their classic-versus-romantic drama, are not so strange after all. Degas wanted to present those apparently opposing impulses through the work of Ingres and Delacroix as braided-together themes, as linked elements in the nineteenth century's increasing focus on style as abstract value and the ultimate expression of artistic personality.

Those first several galleries full of works by Ingres and Delacroix, so densely packed with small, often relatively unfamiliar preparatory studies, were the most thrilling in this wonderful show; they told you much of what you needed to know to understand Renoir's portrait of Durieux (which is in the Met's collection). Degas had thought of leaving his own collection intact, as a museum that would essentially focus on nineteenth-century art, and in the Metropolitan exhibit you could feel the logic of his planned presentation. As the show unfolded, and you realized that Daumier's roiling forms echoed Delacroix's rhythmic self-assurance, and that a magnificent diptych of women bathing by Utamaro was positively Ingresque, you began to enter into Degas's mysteriously cyclical vision of tradition.

Degas was a traditionalist with radical ambitions. Come to think of it, that is probably the only kind of artist worth being at any time in history, and surely today. Degas was radicalizing the past when he grounded his account of the new French painting in Ingres, a Director of the French Academy in Rome, whose triumphantly idiosyncratic society portraits and nudes were produced almost in spite of his own reverence for an ossified brand of traditional thinking. This approach of Degas's, which assumes that you will only see the path to the future when you have discovered a new perspective on your ancestors, remains more controversial than many visitors to the Metropolitan could possibly have imagined. Ultimately, the artistic revolutions that Degas and his generation ushered in were subsumed in the Dadaist maelstrom, and left many artists and historians believing that the past is nothing but a doormat. And now, painters who want to look back don't find the past ossified so much as evaporated. They are left with the overwhelming job of resurrecting tradition before they can begin to reshape it or rebel against it.

Everybody knows that each successive artistic revolution spawns its own academy, but now we are confronting know-nothing academies, and their know-nothing assumptions have become so ingrained that many people actually mistake them for artistic ideas. When taste has sunk to this level of confusion, artists can't really reform it. They have to walk away from it and start again. Perhaps contemporary artists are only confronting an ever-deeper version of the crisis that led Degas to dream up his museum. In that case, they would do well to join forces with the *amateurs*, as Degas did a hundred years ago. *Amateurs* have always been the people whom you call in when the professionals have failed. But where are the *amateurs*? That is what contemporary artists want to know. •

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Art in the Air

BY ANNE HOLLANDER

Impressionism: Reflections and Perceptions by Meyer Schapiro

(George Braziller, 359 pp., $50)

This fifth volume of Meyer Schapiro's *Selected Papers* is the second book to be published since his death, at 91, in the early spring of 1996. Schapiro had begun preparing a book of his writings on Impressionism during the last two years of his life, while he was still working on the galleys of his *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society*, which appeared shortly before he died. By then he had already chosen the illustrations for this volume, and he had incorporated most of his pertinent later observations into his original Pattin Lectures on Impressionism, delivered at Indiana University in 1961. Many earlier thoughts found their place in this last book, too, since Schapiro had been writing and lecturing about Impressionism since 1928. All along he kept every note and alternative text and added to them, and everything was steadily reorganized again and again by Lillian Milgram, his wife and Lady of Perpetual Help, who also presided over the final production of this posthumous volume. The Pattin Lectures, perhaps a summation when they were given, only provided a new starting point for the ceaseless forward and backward scan of Schapiro's view of the Impressionist enterprise.

The result (ably edited by James Thompson) offers essays of unparalleled freshness and mobility, rich, warm, and light as fine cashmere, all the more pleasurable since the subject has been so heavily conned in the harsh light of present-day interests. As a speaker, one of Schapiro's secrets was to make you feel smarter and wiser than you were, by sharing his thoughts in a manner so simple and fluid that you felt you were thinking them, shifting from central to peripheral points and back, considering the idea from all angles almost simultaneously, encompassing and possessing the subject by means of a sort of delicious and effortless dance. Impressionism seems to make the perfect quarry for this benign kind of chase, this gradual gathering of the topic into a shimmering net of modern reference, historical learning, insight, sympathy, and the play of a wide, glad eye.

Impressionism is itself elusive and shifty. Even the list of its practitioners, its temporal scope, the meaning of the term, are indefinite, like the boundaries of form in the actual works; and the aim of this hunt is not to seize and fix, but to pose questions, to seek light, to open up connecting paths. The theme of freedom is central in Schapiro's study of this group of painters. He invokes it constantly, with respect to their subjects and their objectives, their physical relation to the paint and the surface. He finds a further exhilarating liberty in the huge reverberations of their work, seeing the whole wide-ranging future of modern art unleashed by those first six or eight emancipators.

Schapiro is careful to state repeatedly that he does not mean liberation from the importance of subject-matter to painting, which many have attributed to them. Instead he sees freedom in the connection between the Impressionists' new use of color and stroke and the new life of Paris and its environs that they elucidated. The Impressionists' subjects, far from being arbitrary phenomena serving as pretexts for painterly exercise, were what Schapiro calls "favored texts of perception," to which they returned again and again. Themes were consistent, always illustrating a new escape from old constraints of vision, belief, and behavior—old constraints on artistic conception and practice, and on everyday urban or suburban custom at the same time.

These painters offered not just people in the park, but a new way of painting people in the park that suggested a new way the public and the painters might be feeling, a change in what art and life were now like. Society was more liberal, people were having more kinds of encounters with one another, Paris and the suburbs were more connected, nature and culture were less and less perceived to be absolutely opposed. The city seemed more amiable, the country more accessible. Sunday was no longer a day of

THE TEMPTATION

Edgar Tolson and the Genesis of Twentieth-Century Folk Art

JULIA S. ARDERY

"Indispensable for anyone seeking to understand the emerging field of contemporary self-taught art and its underlying sociopolitical dynamics."—Tom Patterson, author of *Reclamation and Transformation*

"A welcome addition to the still all-too-slim library of thoughtful studies on key contemporary folk artists, among whom Tolson looms."—Lynda Roscoe Hartigan, Smithsonian Institution



Approx. 416 pp., 7 x 10, 10 color illus., 77 b&w illus. $45 cloth / $19.95 paper
Available at bookstores in April

A MEASURE OF PERFECTION

Phrenology and the Fine Arts in America

CHARLES COLBERT

"Deeply researched, continuously engaging. . . . Colbert makes a clear and convincing case that phrenology is central to an understanding of the development of American art in the nineteenth century. . . . [and] casts light on other aspects of American culture, including literature and social reform."—David S. Reynolds, City University of New York

464 pp., 137 illus. $55 cloth / $24.95 paper
Cultural Studies of the United States

at bookstores or by toll-free order

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

Chapel Hill
Phone (800) 848-6224
Fax (800) 272-6817
http://sunsite.unc.edu/uncpress/

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ritual gloom but of spontaneous renewal, which need not mean escape from town, but maybe local pleasure at a café or a show. Accordingly, certain French painters were breaking away from careful classical forms and self-conscious traditional themes, offering instead the reflection of a new perceived value in direct experience.

Schapiro points out that all this had to be a Parisian phenomenon. Since 1789, the population of Paris had repeatedly confirmed the sense of itself as a unit with a collective consciousness. Only the self-aware Parisian crowd (unlike that in Rome, London, or New York) collectively felt itself free, no longer subject to state or church and "jealous for its liberties," as Schapiro says. By the 1870s these liberties had come to include the modern freedom to indulge in steady random flow and informal mingling without an urgent goal. Schapiro contrasts Daumier's single-minded crowds all rushing one way with Impressionist waves of multidirectional throng on the quais and boulevards. Parisians were now favoring casual outdoor clustering, says Schapiro. Picnics were *à la mode*, and the chic new "gracelessness" of manners they called for—munching in shirtsleeves on hand-held drumsticks, maybe even disrobing—was rendered by Monet and others in paintings where, he says, "the paint provided the elegance." Schapiro further perceives such celebrations of freedom in paint and behavior as looking forward to Gauguin's Tahitians and Matisse's dancers.

The Impressionists' new take on the link between art and life basically elevated a new freedom of vision, a freshly inebriating sense of sight as the mark of modernity. These painters celebrated the untameable look of things, which never stays still, is free to all, and can offer everybody the sense of a universal vitality in any phenomenon. They gave to situations in the street or square, or to out-of-town trees, boats, and water, a new mobile universe to inhabit, a glittering, unified world of infinite possibility directly realized in a piercing visual joy. Thus a small church, set on a rise with nearby trees and receding hills, could be caught in a fluid net of brushstrokes that shaped them only with contrasting touches of vibrant color, applied according to the fluctuating intensity of an eager visual lust. (Forget piety, community, sublimity.) This optical eagerness might also assimilate a rural scene to an urban one or vice-versa: the same convergent paths and intermittent structures, man-made or not, would share in the same fierce visibility. The variably colored surface would be like the air, pulsating with shifts of light and emotional tone. The optical sensation and the emotional flavor of the "impression" would be painted as if to imitate their vibrant fleeting state, with its built-in shifts of attention.

Schapiro finds a background for this new sense of nourishment through the eye in the literature of the epoch and earlier, in the imaginative writings of Gautier, Maupassant, and Fromentin. These and other writers often registered the potent visual impact of scenes and surroundings as it fed the soul directly, not as it evoked associative memory and fantasy, piety, and historical awareness. Romantic and Academic artists had been painting nature as if the sight of it were meant only for such evocations, and the artist's whole task was to temper the raw look of the world with painterly harmony, applying ideal beauty or divinity, morality or anecdote as appropriate.

So had most painters for thousands of years. It was writers, says Schapiro—offering striking examples from antiquity and the Middle Ages, as well as the nineteenth century—who always knew how to record with brilliance the tonic effect of acute optical experience, which is the whole world's natural birthright. Opposing the pious idea that artists teach people how to see, Schapiro finds people naturally very good at it, and painters in fact rather slow in catching up with writers' truthfulness in dealing with the delights of eyesight.

But Schapiro's study of Impressionism dwells less on the disjunction of this school of painting from earlier ones than on its connection to them. As if he were one of them, he shows how Impressionist painters took strength from studying the work of the past, a strength that guaranteed the value of the originality they bequeathed to future painters. Schapiro shows how Renoir's *Moulin de la Galette* and *Luncheon of the Boating Party* were each constructed like a Rubens or a Veronese, and then loosened up to allow the molecular surface of Impressionist paint to create the quality of spontaneous visual impact and random interior movement. The result gives a richer satisfaction for its unnoticeable debt to past compositional strategies. He remarks on the filiation linking Corot—the classically-trained, romantic-minded teacher of Boudin, the painter of beaches and big skies—and Monet, Boudin's pupil, to whom he introduced *plein-air* painting. Then he compares Corot and Monet, showing both the similarities and the differences. He proves that the development of Impressionist principles, just like those of modern poetry, depended on a most attentive and effectively larcenous rejection of earlier ones.

The universal community of artists is a natural theme for Schapiro because he was a member of it. He drew and painted all his life, ever since he had been the one child in the evening art class given at the Hebrew Educational Society Settlement House in Brownsville, where his family settled after immigrating from Lithuania in 1907. Schapiro's wide-ranging study of art history was made essentially from the artist's point of view, his study of individual works undertaken as if from inside an artist's skin. Understanding of the kinship among artists allowed Schapiro to discuss the individual differences of any two historically-divided painters' works in the minutest terms—the application of individual brushstrokes, the subtlety of tiny compositional choices that affect surface flavor, the exact means by which the effect of distance or closeness is obtained, the technical moves that remain forever independent of anything else. Schapiro was significantly responsible for the recent study of art history that takes society as art's prime mover, since he searched for significant elements in the social ambience of artistic careers, and saw influences affecting the artist's hand and mind of which the artist himself might have been unaware; but his purest gift and greatest virtue was his artist's heart and eye.

Most painters do in fact stare with competitive attention at how Velázquez did it, never mind what the king and the court had to do with it. It would seem that artists have always stared the same way, whenever works from other places and times have been available to them. We find Gentile Bellini copying a Persian miniature, Rembrandt copying another Persian miniature, Rubens copying Titian, Degas copying David, all getting in tune with old secrets and solutions and feeling out a way to use them. Schapiro assumed the existence of this primal solidarity and reciprocity among artists, the view that all artists have always known they were contenders in the same game and members of the same club, despite alien politics, unfamiliar religions, or widely differing conditions of cultural servitude. He could thus permit the modernity of the antique to appear, and make the crumbling Romanesque sculptures come to instant life.

It is not surprising that Schapiro's New School lectures in New York (1936-52) were attended by many more painters and writers than art historians. Schapiro was almost alone in being able to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appreciate and to interpret the work of the artists of that period, both Europeans and those of the emergent New York School, and also being able to integrate them into the history of modern Western art—that unbroken history that he specialized in describing, the one with its feet in the Middle Ages. The notes for these essays on Impressionism contain no evidence that Schapiro studied the work of his contemporary professional art historians, with the idea of entering into any dialogue with them. His sources are the critics contemporary with Impressionism, along with the writers and thinkers of every kind who flourished at the period, or led up to it, or came in its wake, or foreshadowed it in antiquity.

Exquisitely learned, gifted, and imaginative in many areas since early youth, Schapiro made his own estimate of how the work of scientists, architects, and politicians, not to speak of poets, novelists, and composers, interacted with works of painting or sculpture. He sought and found his own set of connections between the role of the world in art and the unaccountable power of art in the world. While considering the genesis of any painting as if he were the painter, he never failed to take on the whole texture of living, the political climate, currents in the common will, the aesthetic flavors of the time.

Having taught himself German (via Yiddish), and having absorbed the great works of Alois Riegl, Wilhelm Vöge, and Emile Mâle as a student at Columbia, and having written a brilliant dissertation on the twelfth-century Romanesque abbey of Moissac after five years of research on site, Schapiro became a lecturer at Columbia, then assistant, associate, and full professor, then University Professor and eventually Emeritus Professor in 1973, having relentlessly gone his own way in the same place starting in 1928. He allied himself with no fixed theory of art or scheme of thought, offering his own perceptions, discoveries, and convictions, speaking ex tempore out of his crowded head. He probably didn't read the art historians who flourished during the middle of his career, and they couldn't read him, since he did not publish books and his essays often appeared in recondite and out-of-the-way places. When his collected essays were successively published after 1977, recent scholars patently came under his influence; but he probably never read their works either. He was always a solitary prophet, a distinct shape against the New York skyline.

These essays on Impressionism are probably the first to deal with the way photography and railways, to take two examples, informed and invigorated the consciousness of these painters of the late nineteenth century, along with current theories of color and light, of social improvement and political freedom, of psychology and human behavior, to say nothing of fresh departures in poetry and music, fiction and theater. Schapiro was the first to find all vital contemporary matters woven somewhere into the Impressionist net of colored strokes, even while knowing that any given picture is true only to its immediate "impression"—visual, certainly, but also psychological, personal, and unique.

The picture is always about the moment, charged as that is with overlapping inner feelings, surrounding cultural forces, and the look of the light on the snow. But for the first time, the picture is now manifestly a field of paint, laden with differing thicknesses of pigment, differing densities and directions of stroke, differing colors and intensities of color. The strokes represent the complexity of the "impression," and they harmonize to convey its totality; but they simultaneously convey their own harmony, just as did the rhythmic, sinuously composed lines of the sculptured Romanesque epiphanies. In the old miraculous scene, or the new suburban site, painted strokes and carved lines lead their abstract life, offering their own integrated satisfactions to the thirsty eye.

Now in paperback...



Pearl S. Buck
A Cultural Biography
Peter Conn

"[T]his brilliantly conceived biography steers a sympathetic yet intelligently balanced course, revealing in fascinating detail the gripping life story of a compelling woman."
— **Publishers Weekly**

"A fascinating book and one that is, for all its scholarly apparatus and methodical presentation of data, as much of a page turner as anything Buck ever wrote..."
— **The New York Times Book Review**

"Conn examines almost every piece of work Buck ever wrote and explains why it's important today....[he] has gone far beyond merely touting Buck's literary merits to portray a consistent, believable and immensely fascinating woman. This is biography at its best: informative and entertaining....Conn has done an amazing amount of research....a compelling biography, a must-read for people interested in China, the publishing world, awe-inspiring women, the struggles of people of color, or, the day-to-day dramas of human life."
— **The Los Angeles Times**

"At last! A fascinating biography of Pearl S. Buck, vividly written, vigorously researched...This is a wonderful book — nuanced, textured, surprising; a gripping, stunning read."
— **Blanche Wiesen Cook, author of *Eleanor Roosevelt***

63989-1 Paperback $17.95

Available in bookstores or from
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
40 West 20th St., N.Y., NY 10011-4211.
Call toll-free 800-872-7423.
MasterCard/VISA accepted.
Prices subject to change.
Web site: http://www.cup.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What was most new in the Impressionists' version was the freedom of individual expressiveness that their works deliberately embodied. No two painters were alike; their application of the paint was like their handwriting (and here Schapiro characteristically inserts the fact that handwriting analysis was invented just at the Impressionist moment by J.-H. Michon, in 1872). No two paintings were alike, either, varying in the exact fleeting moment of action they registered and in the nature of the painterly mosaic it was registered in; and no two areas of one painting were alike, since the character of the surface would change according to the painter's shifting responses.

Schapiro extends the varieties of Impressionist individuality to include Cézanne, Manet, and Degas, whose spirit, strokes, and subjects came to differ so much from those of Monet, Sisley, or Pissarro. He points out that horse-racing and ballet had aristocratic associations suitable to Degas's upper-class status and mentality; but that Degas's view of any dancer or jockey was the same as his view of any laundress or orchestra-member. Schapiro finds Degas identifying with all of them as fellow-artists, workers whose precarious job, like the Impressionist painter's, is to carry off a successful performance. Whether Degas shows them relaxing or preparing, as he does bathing prostitutes (more performers), or paints a laundress making collars crisp, a cellist drawing his bow, or a *modiste* making a hat-ribbon sit well, he sees each playing the role of minister to the general elegance, each supporting, just like himself, the high aesthetic standard of Parisian life. Schapiro says that Degas never saw them as Daumier did, examples of oppressed humanity slaving for the ease of others. Manet painted the rag-pickers and Caillebotte the floor-scrapers and Pissarro the house-painter, says Schapiro, in the same spirit of fellowship with the work of the hands, which is the real effort painters make.

No more than the coal-heaver should the painter be thought a visionary. In reality, his hands are solving hard problems in a difficult material, struggling just like the milliner's to get the right effect. Schapiro talks about Monet's ecstatic images of trains entering and leaving railway stations: "They show the most passionate, impulsive streaking, scribbling, cross-hatching and hatching of strokes that in concert evoke the original exciting phenomenon.... That fury of the brush was a personal reflex.... The abrupt rhythms and the vehemence of the brush expressed a vital personal reaction, besides imaging keenly observed features of the site." He watches Monet seeing the railroad as a human environment continuous with nature, something wonderful added to street life and country life, part of the lyrical celebration of modernity.

Then Schapiro links these paintings to the literary moment: "Every touch possessed an uncanny rightness and power of suggestion, as in the best French writing of the time, in which the evocative word or phrase or the rhythm of a verse or sentence was so often a discovery, an outcome of the will to realize in language the qualities of unique, unnameable sensation." Thus Impressionist painters, like the contemporary writers reinventing the language, sought to make the paint realize their personal responses with all their nuances, to suggest that painterly discovery was simultaneous with visual discovery, and to make the process as vividly apparent as the chosen scene. There were no precedents for doing this; that was the idea. There could be no formula, for freedom from formula had been declared.

Always at the painter's elbow, Schapiro reminds us that arriving at this direct spontaneous effect meant slow methodical work, most of it trial and error. Impressionists made countless new versions of the whole and the part, constant experiments in color combination, contrast, and juxtaposition, in size of stroke and choice of hue, so as to create all relations between dimness and luminosity, repose and motion, opacity and transparency, and, of course, all effect of "fury of the brush." A clear blue might convincingly appear to shade one side of a white sleeve in large strokes, but only if they were unevenly interspersed with smaller strokes of green and tiny flecks of red and yellow, to catch reflected light from the white, itself sunstruck by short strokes of paler yellow rendered still more dazzling with purple speckles; all to tell the eye that there is no light and shade, only changes of color. Nor are sea and sky separate elements; they are both woven out of variably dim gray streaks, with rose and mauve flecks of different sizes making a cool glow appear to hover over a cooler sheen.

The flickering surface became a complete material composition on its own, confected with the same slow care once put into a tapestry by many patient hands, but now meant to suggest one painter's volatile soul, clear eye, and pliant wrist joined in quick activity on the actual site. This effect would further convey that the painter was pointing nothing out for the viewer's good; he was sharing the bright moment with a fellow spectator on whom he placed no burdens at all. Ostensive delineation and modelling of form were abandoned on purpose to realize this idea, so that only the dense or sparse flecks of color, made of unbelievably life-inducing paint, had the authority to conjure the image. And that wasn't all. Whether for smooth living faces or rough open country, for dirty walls or fine clothes, fast trains or dead trees, old fences or young dancers, shrubbery or rubbish, all flecks had equal status. The mutable texture of paint on canvas became the only matter there was.

And from this, Schapiro points out, came all the later authority of paint alone to create images in this century. Such total authority was lacking in pictures by Turner and many others who had wrought in sketchy strokes before. In the chapter called "Impressionism in History," Schapiro shows how El Greco (he doesn't mention Grünewald) or Turner, Constable, or Delacroix, or even Corot the forerunner, created magnificent atmospheric effects with a quivering screen of painted touches, even to the point of generating proto-mini-Impressionist works in parts of their pictures; yet they could never wholly abandon shadow and outline, the comely arrangement of objects, the application of episode, allusion, association, and all the rest, or think of yielding the entire surface to a web of strokes with a sovereign, organic life.

Which painters were true Impressionists? Monet is the arch-example, the real thing, never wavering from the original conception throughout his long career, continually proving its further freedoms and its limitless range as it filled the changing needs of his art. He is the only one to whom Schapiro devotes an entire chapter. Cézanne, Manet, and Degas are all there to show the extreme scope and flexibility of the new mode of painting and the vast differences among its practitioners; Renoir is another standard example, but always less impassioned and imaginative than Monet. Sisley and Pissarro limited themselves to landscape and showed smaller development; Van Gogh, Toulouse-Lautrec, and Gauguin, Seurat and Signac, are part of a later stage, what Schapiro calls the reaction, during which, in the case of Seurat, the initial free play of the principle was harnessed in a formula at last. Delineation, shading, story all returned; but they would never be the same again.

Schapiro compares Monet not only to his predecessor Corot but also to Cézanne his contemporary, and early Monet to late Monet, using the same scene

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

See, Hear & Identify 505 Birds by Video

"A skillful mix of video and stills that will delight and inform." --*New York Times*
"A fine investment and an important addition to printed bird guides." --*Philadelphia Inquirer*
"Enthusiastically recommended...The best videos for the identification of American birds." --*Library Journal*

Audubon Society's VideoGuide to Birds of North America contains bird sights and sounds on five videocassettes for simple and accurate identification of each of 505 species that breed in North America. Moving pictures show each bird's markings, in its natural habitat, with bird calls and sounds that complement informative narration and stunning visuals.
Whether you're an expert birder or simply enjoy identifying the birds that gather at your backyard feeder, the *Audubon Society's VideoGuides* promise hours of pleasure.

Volume I: 116 species of loons, ducks, pelicans, hawks, vultures, falcons, game birds and others. 94 minutes.
Volume II: 105 species of water birds, including herons, egrets, cranes, terns, alcids and others. 78 minutes.
Volume III: 77 species of doves, cuckoos, owls, hummingbirds, swifts, woodpeckers, others. 61 minutes.
Volume IV (Songbirds I): 98 species of flycatchers, larks, nuthatches, creepers, wrens, thrushes, waxwings, shrikes, thrashers, vireos, others. 75 minutes. **Volume V (Songbirds II):** 109 species of warblers, orioles and blackbirds, tanagers, grosbeaks, finches, buntings and sparrows, and others. 89 minutes


"Impressive, informative and moving." --Los Angeles Times
"Learned yet entertaining." --Philadelphia Inquirer
"Victorious. Grade: A" --Entertainment Weekly
SMITHSONIAN'S GREAT BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR
$29.95 ea.
$139.95 set of 7

Great Battles of the Civil War

The Critically Acclaimed New Video Series from the Smithsonian

A visually stunning provocative new video series puts you on the battlefield for a sweeping look at the military, political and social history of the Civil War. Had there been television news then it would have looked like this, with the added benefit of modern analysis and production techniques. The seven-volume, nine-hour series is narrated by Richard Dreyfuss, with readings by Charlton Heston, Burt Reynolds, Ossie Davis and others, and on-camera appearances by Chief Historical Advisor Dr. James M. McPherson and other distinguished historians from West Point, Annapolis, VMI and the Citadel. Comprehensive and compelling, Smithsonian's Great Battles is a *must* for history buffs, students or anyone interested in learning about the US.

Volume I--Ft. *Sumter* * First Manassas * Ft. Donelson * Ironclads and the Navies * Shiloh. 60 minutes **Volume II**--The Battles of New Orleans and the Mississippi River * Shenandoah Valley * Second Manassas. 67 minutes **Volume III**--Antietam * Corinth * Perryville * Fredericksburg * First Drive on Vicksburg. 69 minutes **Volume IV**--Stones River * Chancellorsville * Brandy Station * Gettysburg. 76 minutes. **Volume V**--Sieges of Vicksburg and Charleston * Chickamauga *Chatanooga and *Lookout* Mountain. 84 minutes **Volume VI**--New Market * The Wilderness and Spotsylvania * Cold Harbor * Battle of the Crater * Mobile Bay * Battles for Atlanta. 95 minutes **Volume VII**--Destruction of CSS Alabama * Cedar Creek * Franklin * Fort Fisher * Siege of Petersburg * Bentonville * Appomattox. 86 minutes

New Butterfly Videos



Audubon Society's Butterflies for Beginners is an easy-to-follow, informative introduction to the butterfly's biology and lifecycle, with up-close looks and identification tips for 33 of the most common and wide-ranging North American species. 64 minutes

Audubon Society's Butterfly Gardening is a comprehensive video introduction to 25 of the best commercially-available butterfly attracting plants, with profiles of 60 of the classic North American garden butterflies that frequent them. 92 minutes

CONTENTS
Butterflies for Beginners:
• Butterfly Biology and Lifecycle • Butterfly Gallery--33 North American butterfly species • Raising Butterflies from Caterpillars • A Note about Butterfly Collecting
Butterfly Gardening:
• Gardening for Butterflies Basics • Plant Gallery--25 common garden plants • Butterfly Gallery--60 classic North American butterflies • Raising Butterflies in your Garden

PLAY THE LITTLE LEAGUE WAY!



"★★★★...Excellent!" --*Los Angeles Times*
"A Four-bagger!" --*New Orleans Times-Picayune*

"The best! The Little Leaguers homer!" --*New York Daily News*

Fun, easy-to-follow instruction in hitting, bunting, baserunning and fielding all the defensive position will help youngsters learn to play--on their own or with friends. Use the video at home, the book in the field at practice.

Either alone or together, *Little League's Official How-to Play Baseball Video* and *Book* are easy enough for beginners, yet in-depth enough to help even the hottest young stars shine more brightly. And they make great gifts for any season. (Ages 7-14)

CALL NOW TO ORDER:
24 Hrs. 7 days Visa, MC, AMEX
$5 S&H/order. Add NY, MI, TN tax where applicable
1-800-876-0091
OR MAIL ORDER TO: **MASTERVISION/New Republic**
PO Box 51790 Livonia, MI 48151

AUDUBON SOCIETY'S VIDEOGUIDE TO BIRDS
Volume I $29.95 Volume III $29.95 Volume V $29.95
Volume II $29.95 Volume IV $29.95
Special offer! 5-Volume Set ! Only $139.95

SMITHSONIAN'S GREAT BATTLES VIDEOS
Volume I $29.95 Volume IV $29.95 Volume VI $29.95
Volume II $29.95 Volume V $29.95 Volume VII $29.95
Volume III $29.95
Special offer! 7-Volume Set ! Only $139.95

AUDUBON SOCIETY'S BUTTERFLY VIDEOS
Butterflies for Beginners $19.25
Butterfly Gardening $24.95

LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL VIDEO/BOOK
Little League Video $19.25
Little League Video & Book $29.95

Please add $5.00 S&H per order. Visa, MC, Amex accepted, or include check or money order (no cash please).
Add NY, MI, NC sales tax if applicable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

painted first in 1871 and then in 1904. He shows Monet more and more seeking "fusion," a gracious increase of harmony among all parts of the canvas, while Cézanne always urges "drama," a harsh opposition among contending forces inside the picture; he finds Corot forever distancing the viewer while Monet includes or engulfs him. Such comparisons are always accomplished through detailed attention to individual works, that passionate attention Schapiro never failed to pay to the delicate, vital, dynamic particulars of the object itself. He never stopped feeling that individual human freedom truly lives there, deep inside works of art, however mortal it becomes among human institutions.

ANNE HOLLANDER is the author of, among other books, *Moving Pictures* (Knopf).

Models, principles, and the future of democracy in Asia.

What Korea Teaches

BY ROBERT KAGAN

I.

At the dawn of this century, Henry Adams, dazzled and humbled by "the acceleration of history," by the advances in science that were transforming his age, predicted that "every American who lived into the year 2000 would know how to control unlimited power. He would think in complexities unimaginable to an earlier mind. He would deal with problems altogether beyond the range of earlier society." Today we flatter ourselves that Adams was right. Our particular conceit as we enter the twenty-first century is that we know how things work. About new issues, such as the machinations of international financial markets and the revolutionary effect of computer technologies, and about old ones, such as questions of politics and international conflict, we tend to believe that, with enough information and the right methods, these can be measured, mapped, and manipulated. This is still the age of the social sciences, and we are particularly enamored of models. We have models for everything—for how economies grow, for how nations democratize, for how wars start. The Enlightenment dream of mastering nature and the complex interactions of mankind has been realized. Mr. Adams, meet Messrs. Rubin, Greenspan, and Camdessus.

Or so we would like to imagine. But sometimes our confidence in our knowledge is matched only by the disorientation that overwhelms us when what we know one year turns out to be wrong the next. Last year, the common wisdom held that the twenty-first century would be the "Asian century." Last month, the director of the International Monetary Fund warned that the most salient issue of the next century would be the Asian financial crisis. Our trusty models turn out to be almost comically useless. They have proven unable to predict or to explain the most consequential events of our time, whether it is the collapse of Soviet communism or of Asian economies. They are like the flamingo mallets and the hedgehog balls of Alice's croquet game, which unfurl and pad away from us just when we feel confident enough to use them.

Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History
by Bruce Cumings
(Norton, 527 pp., $35)

The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History
by Don Oberdorfer
(Addison Wesley, 472 pp., $30)

For more than a decade we were told that the "Asian model" of "guided capitalism," in which the state intervened heavily and strategically to support and to steer industry in the most promising directions, was probably superior to the American model, according to which the national economy unfolded without clear direction or sense of national strategy. Apostles of the Asian model, such as James Fallows and Chalmers Johnson, took evident pleasure in the way the Asian miracle, which seemed to depend on the limitation of individual freedoms in favor of the collective interest, pointed up the deficiencies of the American system. Rather than look for ways to remake other cultures in their own image, Fallows chided, "Western societies should first concentrate on whether and how to remake themselves." Many Americans, and their political leaders, took these warnings to heart and supported various forms of what was once known as "industrial policy."

For Samuel P. Huntington, the stunning success of the Asian model was the central pillar upholding the dubious thesis of *The Clash of Civilizations*, that the West was in decline relative to the rising power of the "Sinic" civilization of East Asia. Confidently projecting Asian growth rates in a straight line into the future, Huntington predicted that by 2020 Asia would contain "four of the five largest and seven of the ten largest economies," and would account for more than 40 percent of the world's economic output. And this astounding growth would have enormous geopolitical, cultural, and ideological ramifications—all of them bad from the standpoint of American power and Western principles. It would mean an ineluctable shift in the balance of international power away from an American-dominated West and toward a China-dominated East. It would mean that the "liberal" model of political and economic development—which assumed that economic growth had to be accompanied by political liberalization—could be challenged and even replaced by a new model, represented by the capitalist authoritarianism of China or Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore. "The mounting self-confidence of East Asia," Huntington argued, had given rise "to an emerging Asian universalism comparable to that which has been characteristic of the West."

Those fashionable theories had some important things in common: a tendency to deny the universality of such "Western" ideals as freedom, individual rights, and democracy; economicism, or the tendency to view political and social matters as determined by economic matters; and a tendency to dismiss as futile, arrogant, and undesirable any attempt by the United States to try to shape the direction of history.

ROBERT KAGAN is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For many years South Korea served as a showcase for these notions. In the 1970s it was among the first of the Asian "miracles," an improbable economic success story that convinced many in the East and the West that extensive government involvement in guiding and subsidizing industries—the so-called "Asian model"—was a sound and even a critical ingredient for achieving rapid economic growth in developing nations. For three decades South Korea's GDP grew at an average rate of nine percent a year, despite periods of economic failure in the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Fulfilling the dream of General Park Chung Hee, who ruled South Korea with an increasingly strong hand from 1961 to 1979, South Korea became one of the world's leading exporters of steel, cement, electronics, automobiles, and ships. It managed to produce internationally-known brand names such as Daewoo, Samsung, and Hyundai. By the mid-'90s, South Korea boasted the eleventh largest economy in the world. It was a featured exhibit in the World Bank's publication, *The East Asian Miracle*. And nobody expected the miracle to end, in Korea or in any of the other exemplars of the Asian model. As recently as last fall, the International Monetary Fund declared the South Korean economy sound as a bell.

That was last year's wisdom. This year we know that the Korean model contained a flaw at birth, a flaw that was destined to bring the economy down in the absence of radical corrective surgery. It seems that precisely what made the South Korean economy great in the early stage of its economic development—state-directed lending at subsidized interest rates to favored industries undertaking high-risk ventures—is what most contributed to its collapse. "Suddenly it is clear," *The Washington Post* reported in December, that South Korea's huge conglomerates, the *chaebol*, "had run amok, relentlessly seeking bigger market shares and borrowing money without regard to profits, cash flow or potential failure." Suddenly, that is, they were doing what they had always been doing, ever since the 1970s. And suddenly this was a big mistake.

Now we know better. We know that the keys to economic success in the modern, globalized world are greater "transparency," better-regulated lending practices, and more market-driven investment, which is to say, less corruption, less cronyism, less backroom dealing between government and business, less "guided capitalism." We know this, of course, with as much confidence as we knew that the old Korean model was invincible. In newspapers and in journals around the world, commentators now note, as if it has always been perfectly obvious, that the *chaebol* system was all along riding for a fall, that the cozy relationship between government and industry had to be broken up, that what the South Korean economic system needed was more—would you believe it?—democracy. The model is dead, long live the model.

Several weeks ago, South Korea's president-elect Kim Dae Jung declared that "if we had true democracy in Korea, then the collusive intimacy between business and government and corruption would not have been as great here." (For Kim, of course, this was not instant wisdom. It was not necessary for the scales to drop from this former dissident's eyes.) He even had the temerity to claim that South Korea's current problems were the result of a long tradition of placing economic development ahead of democracy. And he made a direct attack on those "leaders of Asian society [who] have been saying that military dictatorship was the way and democracy was not good for their nations."

Asian leaders have not been the only ones making such arguments, of course. Until recently, South Korea's utility as a model for economic development was matched only by the rather remarkable extent to which it seemed to illustrate the most popular theory of political development: call it the not-ready-for-prime-time theory of democratic development. Since South Korea had grown wealthy under Park's authoritarian regime, and had become democratic only after it became wealthy, many observers assumed that this sequence was not accidental. South Korea had passed through predictable and appropriate stages of development, and each of these stages was necessary for building the present happy outcome.

In South Korea, the authoritarian stage was necessary for two reasons: because it provided a period of stability and the firm *dirigisme* that made an economic take-off possible; and because, in the absence of that economic take-off the Korean people, lacking the strong middle class upon which successful democracies are presumed to rest, were not "ready" to sustain a popular form of government. Indeed, according to this general theory, if democracy had come to South Korea before economic development, it would have been premature, unstable, chaotic, unproductive. It would have been an "illiberal" democracy, and therefore a dangerous democracy. In this evolutionary view of political and economic development, nations are a little like people. They need to crawl before they can walk.



Three Uses of the Knife
On the Nature and Purpose of Drama
David Mamet

In three tightly woven essays of characteristic force and resonance, Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright, screenwriter, poet, essayist, and director David Mamet celebrates the necessity of drama in our own attempts to make sense of ourselves and our world.

"In *Three Uses of the Knife* David Mamet adds yet another segment to a body of work that puts him among the great writers of this or any other time." —Joe Mantegna

96 pages • $19.95, cloth
The Columbia Lectures on American Culture

Some Necessary Angels
Essays on Writing and Politics
Jay Parini

Poet, novelist, and critic Jay Parini presents his best work from the past twenty years on topics ranging from baseball to Frost, from Emerson to the culture of creative writing. For aspiring writers, ***Some Necessary Angels*** provides an illuminating glimpse into the workshop of a distinguished novelist and critic. For readers who share Parini's love of language, it is an invigorating expression of faith.

288 pages • $24.95, cloth

The Selected Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson
Joel Myerson, Editor

"An expertly selected and edited collection that includes some of Emerson's best letter writings. Highly accessible, it will become one of the volumes to which both the general reader and the scholar will turn to first for information on Emerson and New England literary culture." —David M. Robinson, author of *Emerson and the Conduct of Life*

480 pages • $35.00, cloth

Columbia University Press
www.columbia.edu/cu/cup

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The sunnier side of this theory was that once a nation like South Korea did achieve a certain level of economic growth, it would be almost impossible for it *not* to become democratic. The most prominent spokesman for this have-a-nice-day economicism is Thomas L. Friedman. It was also the view of many conservatives both during and after the Cold War, who argued that capitalism was not only a necessary condition for democracy but also a sufficient condition. Political scientists today believe that they can demonstrate a direct link between a nation's average income levels and its form of government. Writing in *The National Interest* in 1996, Henry Rowen noted that "the transition to stable democracy correlates with mean incomes between $5,000 and $6,000, and becomes impregnable at the $7,000 level." On the basis of such calculations, Rowen predicted that China would be a democracy by 2015, for that was when China's per capita GNP could be projected, given current growth rates, to cross the magic threshold. Or rather, that was the date as of the 1996 projections, before last year's Asian economic collapse forced so many recalculations and invited speculations about many different possible Asian futures. Now, presumably, China's emergence as a full-blown democracy will have to wait until 2019 or so.

This developmental model has also another important use. It serves as a weapon in the debate over American policy toward such Asian dictatorships as China and Indonesia. To those who have recommended that the United States use economic sanctions or other forms of pressure on these countries to compel a change in governance, the proponents of the "Korean model" have responded that, on the contrary, such intervention would only interrupt the natural evolution toward democracy. If you want freer governments in China or Indonesia, you need only to increase trade and thereby hasten the day when economic growth compels those nations to shed their authoritarian fins and gills, which no longer serve any useful purpose, and leave the water of dictatorship for the land of democracy. Eventually, growing wealth in the hands of an increasing number of people will naturally create the conditions for democracy. It will, in fact, necessitate democracy. After all, look at South Korea.

II.

Well, let's look at South Korea. Did it evolve from traditional authoritarianism to modern democracy, as a consequence of economic growth? Did Korea's authoritarian governments prior to the late 1980s serve their teleological purpose of providing the stability to allow economic growth to proceed, a stability that would have been absent had democracy emerged too soon? And was it this economic growth, producing the necessary social conditions, such as a middle class, that finally compelled South Korea's traditional rulers to give up their hold on the political system and let democracy flower?

Two new books help to answer these questions. In *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, Bruce Cumings, one of the last of the red-hot revisionist historians, has written a lively, contrarian, occasionally dyspeptic account of Korean history that ought to shake up some conventional thinking about the Korean "model." Don Oberdorfer, the retired reporter for *The Washington Post*, has written *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, a less contentious but highly informative account of the past fifty years. Both books are well worth reading for the background to South Korea's current crisis, and for what it may portend in a part of the world where the United States has repeatedly, if unexpectedly, found itself entangled.

Reading Cumings's and Oberdorfer's accounts of the last half-century in Korean history, one is hard-pressed to find evidence that things unfolded in the smooth, organic evolution suggested by the popular models of development. Both the Korean economy and the course of Korean politics were shaped less by the broad, impersonal forces of economic growth or social and institutional change than by powerful individuals and unpredictable events. As Cumings notes, Korea "presents the Westerner not with a smooth narrative of progress ... but with a fractured, shattered twentieth-century history," a history filled with accidents and miscalculations that defy political science modeling. And then there was that rather large external factor that shaped, often but not always for the better, the course of South Korean life: the United States.

What were the essential ingredients of South Korea's economic success? As Cumings points out, they are not to be found among the usual list of capitalist building blocks. In Korea before the "miracle," there were "no capitalists, no Protestants, no merchants, no money, no market, no resources, no get-up-and-go, ... no discernible history of commerce, foreign trade, or industrial development." Koreans did possess a high level of general education and a long tradition of bureaucratic governance by scholar-officials, which provided a pool of technocrats adept at managing a state-led development program. Average Koreans after World War II applied to most of the problems they encountered, at home and in the American diaspora, a remarkable willingness to work long and hard. But the work ethic that we associate with Koreans today may not always have been a notable national trait. The Japanese, who occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945, considered the Koreans lazy. In Cumings's view, "Confucianism" and other ingrained cultural traits "neither hindered nor helped" the economic progress of South Korea.

Far from being determined by any existing cultural, social, political, or economic preconditions, Korea's economic success came as a consequence of events that were (as the political scientists like to say) exogenous: world wars that had nothing to do with Korea; foreign occupations, first by Japan and then by the United States; a Cold War that divided the country and sparked a civil war in which huge foreign and Korean armies devastated Korean soil and society. In one of history's terrible but familiar ironies, these wars and occupations blazed the trail for South Korea's march to prosperity, by burning away institutional, social, and cultural obstacles that might have slowed or prevented economic growth.

For Koreans, war was a great equalizer and, in its awful way, a great liberator. Before its twentieth-century disasters, Korea was characterized by an indolent aristocracy, the *yangban*, sitting atop an immobile population. After two wars and two foreign occupations, Cumings writes, the aristocracy's "capacity to control the people 'below them,' ... and their continuous tendency to control markets and stifle enterprise, was blasted to smithereens." A people that for centuries had been "frozen in place in rural settings" was suddenly and brutally thrust into a new age of social and spatial mobility. "What the Japanese had begun with their massive shifts of Korean population in 1935-45, what the national division [after World War II] had intensified, the Korean War completed: Koreans of all classes were now thoroughly displaced from their local roots. Everyone was jostled or pushed or thrown bodily out of his or her social niche."

War and occupation not only opened Korean society, it also provided the opportunity and the financial capital to fuel its development. During the long Japanese occupation, and during the American occupation that followed World War II, Koreans made their money almost entirely from the occupiers. Many a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

future tycoon who would later command one of Korea's powerful corporate conglomerates got his start serving the needs of occupying forces. As Cumings points out, these were hardly archetypal capitalist entrepreneurs looking for "the main chance." For the Kim Song-su group, Korea's first *chaebol*, "the main chance had been the Japanese regime and the opportunities that close alliance with it brought." Under the American occupation, Cumings argues, the true "creative enterprise" of South Korea in the 1950s "consisted of sucking the American teat for all it was worth." Chong Chu-yong, the chairman of the Hyundai Corporation, started on his path to billionaire status by carrying supplies to American bases on half-ton trucks. Cho Chong-hun, later to become the head of Korean Airlines, amassed his early fortune through lucrative American transport contracts.

South Korea's economic miracle, in short, could not have occurred without the American occupation and the billions of dollars it brought to a destitute people. After World War II, and even more so after the Korean war, American dollars poured into the Korean economy in an unimaginable deluge. Between 1945 and 1965, $12 billion from the treasury of the United States was transferred to South Korea in the form of aid, and in the 1950s, according to Cumings, this aid accounted for 100 percent of Seoul's budget. By the end of that decade, direct grants from the United States accounted for five-sixths of all South Korea's imports. This does not include the money spent by Americans living in South Korea, or the dollars that flowed in through the underground economy.

Every stratum of the otherwise barren Korean economy was "fertilized," as Cumings puts it, "by the inconceivable amounts of American cash that flowed into the country, down from the presidential mansion, through the bureaucracies civil and military, coursing through the PXs and onto the black market, into the pockets of a horde of people who serviced the foreign presence: drivers, guards, runners, valets, maids, houseboys, black-market operators, money changers, prostitutes, and beggars." In describing the Korean "miracle," analysts usually start from a base of about $100 per capita income in 1960 and marvel at its rise to more than $10,000 over three decades. But Cumings, for good reason, considers the low estimates of South Korea's per capita income in the early decades after World War II "grossly uninformative." After all, according to one estimate that Cummings cites, American aid to South Korea between 1945 and 1976 added up to as much as $600 every year for every Korean.

The Korean economy also benefited, if that word is not too obscene, from the utter devastation meted out during the Korean War. As in Japan during World War II, obsolete industrial plants were destroyed, making room for an otherwise impossible modernization of technology. In both North and South, "the war renovated plant and industry in the flash of phosphorus." According to Cumings, the war and its aftermath also had a big effect on the South Korean character by increasing the size and the influence of the South Korean military, which from the rubble of war emerged as the "strongest, most cohesive, best-organized institution in Korean life." Since just about every Korean male had to go through the military's vigorous form of education and training, Cumings speculates that the military may have provided a "school for industrial discipline" that served the burgeoning industries of postwar Korea well.

Korea's devastation also affected the culture in another important way. The stunning success of South Korean businessmen in the '60s, '70s, and '80s owed much to their unusually high propensity to take risks, a propensity that was born in the desperate circumstances of the wars of the mid-century. As the Harvard business economist Michael E. Porter has pointed out, "everyone had to start from scratch, motivated by a sense of crisis, a lingering resentment of the Japanese, and the feeling that there was nothing to lose. The competitive spirit that has resulted is perhaps the single greatest source of advantage that Korean companies have possessed."

From the Japanese occupation, then, Koreans got "foreign" investment and learned the style of state-directed capitalism that later made the *chaebol* famous, benefiting from what Cumings calls Japan's "developmental" colonialism. From the American occupation, the South Koreans got money-making opportunities and steady flows of financial sustenance and seed capital to see them through the early phases of industrialization. In between, awful wars wiped out stultifying social hierarchies and a flaccid aristocracy, creating mobility, fluidity, and a hard-scrabble style of individual entrepreneurship. Some model!

These were all essential preconditions for the glory years of South Korea's economy under the direction of President Park Chung Hee, who presided over astonishing growth from the 1960s until his assassination in 1979. It was Park who single-handedly created the Korean economic model that we

Inequities

Art from *Durable Inequality*

CHARLES TILLY

Durable Inequality

"Solidifies Charles Tilly's reputation as one of the world's most creative social scientists.... Tilly's original framework clearly reveals and thoroughly explains the similar social processes that create different forms of social inequality."—William Julius Wilson, author of *The Truly Disadvantaged*

$29.95

GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON

The Comparative Imagination

On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements

"A thoughtful corrective to simplistic notions of American exceptionalism."—*Library Journal*

"By using an ever-widening comparative method, Fredrickson is able to illustrate the depth of institutional and intellectual incorporation of racism, and he keeps alive the possibility of moral and political reform."

—Thomas Bender, New York University

$27.50

At bookstores or order 1-800-822-6657

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

www.ucpress.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

know today, ordering the establishment practically overnight of new export industries in steel, electronics, chemicals, shipbuilding, automobiles, and machine tools, and subsidizing them with special low-interest loans in what became known as the "big push."

Still, looking back on Park's success from the perspective of today's economic calamity, one gets the sense of a man—and a nation—on a long winning streak that depended, as such streaks usually do, on a fair amount of luck. At the time, American advisers and economists at the IMF believed that Park's grand plans made no economic sense. The heavy industries that Park wanted Korea to compete in suffered from overcapacity. Korea's domestic market was too small to absorb the new goods he wanted to produce, and there was no demand in the world market for most of these products. The American advisers in their wisdom had always envisioned South Korea as best suited to light industry.

But Park ignored the economists' advice. The reason was that he had his sight on more than economics. A serious country, he believed, engaged in heavy industry. "Steel," he once declared, "is national power." Park's demand for rapid development of a machine-tool industry was especially reckless, but "like Stalin," Park believed (according to Cumings) that "an industrial sovereign did not rely on foreigners for the guts of an industrial base." Thus many risky investment decisions were made by Park chiefly for reasons of national honor and national strategy.

Those decisions wound up scoring huge economic successes. As Cumings writes, "The [Western] economists' estimates of future demand should have been multiplied by the hairs on their legs." Over the course of the 1970s, Korea's steel capacity grew fourteenfold. "Who bought all this steel? Korean shipbuilders who had no factories in 1970, Korean automakers who weren't supposed to be needed by the world market, American manufacturers who bought Korean steel delivered to the Midwest well below the posted price in Pittsburgh or Gary." Although some of the new export industries launched by Park failed, enough of them succeeded to transform the South Korean economy.

It is amusing to read, these days, in *The Economist* that the big problem in the Korean economy these past few years has been the propensity of state-directed banks to throw "free money at the *chaebol*, [which] has allowed the *chaebol* to build recklessly huge factories, and to diversify into businesses in which they have no expertise." This was precisely Park's formula for success. Korean industries had no expertise in shipbuilding when Park thrust them into it, and the machine-tool industry was a wild venture at which he threw enormous quantities of "free money." He just rolled the dice and they kept coming up natural.

Even during the Park years, however, economic success depended to a substantial degree on non-economic factors, such as war. At Lyndon Johnson's request, South Korea contributed some 300,000 troops to the American war in Vietnam and, according to Cumings, received as much as $7.5 million per division in compensation. Between 1965 and 1970, Seoul earned about a billion dollars this way, accounting for between seven and eight percent of its GDP, and for as much as 19 percent of its total foreign earnings. Korean industry also benefited enormously from the war. Vietnam, Cumings writes, "became a frontier for Korean enterprise, as many firms, especially construction companies, got contracts to support the American effort." For several years the war absorbed more than 90 percent of South Korea's steel exports and more than 50 percent of all exports of transportation equipment. "Warfare in East Asia," Cumings notes, "was handmaiden to economic growth."

To note this fact is not to deny Park's achievements nor those of his successors, but it does place them in a larger context. And it raises a number of questions, some of which are especially pertinent now that the Korean "model" has come a cropper. There is the question raised by Kim Dae Jung, for instance, of whether Korea's economy would have been healthier all along had it expanded in a freer political atmosphere. Indeed, the collapse of the Korean economy, coinciding as it did with the third consecutive free election held in South Korea since 1987, provides an opportunity to reflect once more on the complex relationship between economic development and political development.

III.

As with economic development, South Korea has for many years been the model for a host of theories about political development. Since South Korea became democratic in the late 1980s, it has provided a showcase for those who claim that economic growth and industrial and technological modernization lead inexorably to democracy. Since South Korea's most stunning economic growth occurred under authoritarian rule, however, it has also been a useful example for those (most recently Robert D. Kaplan and Fareed Zakaria) who maintain that, at a certain stage in the development of most nations, a "traditional" authoritarian government may be preferable to a "premature" transition to democracy. These theories take as their assumption that some nations are "ready" for democracy and some nations are not.

The problem with applying Korean history to illustrate these theories is that Korean history does not illustrate them. For a start, there was no evolution from a "traditional" authoritarian regime to a more modern style of democracy, for the simple reason that the political system established in South Korea in the late 1940s was not a "traditional" authoritarian regime at all. It was born under a foreign occupation—specifically, an American occupation—and so it was not an organic product of Korean culture. Its institutions were not rooted in Korean soil, nor had acquired over the centuries the Burkean legitimacy so revered by American conservatives. If it is true, as Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote in 1979 in "Dictatorships and Double Standards," that traditional autocracies "worship traditional gods and observe traditional taboos," that they are characterized most by their contentment to leave things in nation and society as they have always been, then there was nothing at all "traditional" about the Republic of Korea. Owing to war and to foreign occupation, little in Korea was as it had been before. Social and economic hierarchies, usually preserved by "traditional" autocracies, had been shaken before Syngman Rhee took power; and they were shattered by the Korean War.

Even in the 1940s, politics in Korea did not follow "traditional" patterns. As Cumings explains, Korea after 1945 already had a "'modern' politics in which charismatic leaders of left and right developed huge mass constituencies." At the birth of the South Korean republic, there was a political opposition, albeit a tepid one, and a National Assembly in which that opposition could express itself. Cumings rarely has a kind word to say about the United States or the governments it supported in South Korea, but he agrees with the CIA's view at the time that the National Assembly, though weak, was "the locus of democratic spirit" in South Korea. Rhee "tolerated a good bit of noisy debate and interpellation." Intolerance, persecution, and torture were aimed at the communists and the left. The more moderate Korean opposition escaped some of the worst horrors of Rhee's semi-authoritarian rule.

Perhaps the biggest flaw in most theories of political development, when applied to Korea, is their omission of the role of the great "exogenous" factor, the United States. That Korea's politics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should have been heavily influenced by an outside power should come as no surprise. Any nation that moved from occupation to war to occupation to war over the course of a few decades could hardly be expected to shape its own political institutions free from outside influence. And Korea, despite its reputation as "the hermit kingdom," was especially susceptible to such influences. "It is a curiosity of Korean politics going back several centuries," Cumings writes, that the *yangban*, though internally strong, was "weak and brittle when faced with external challenge." As a consequence, Korean history has always been characterized by "indigenous stasis and exogenously induced change."

Enter the United States. South Korea was born under the shadow of American power. When the Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15, 1948, General Douglas MacArthur was on the podium. When South Korean elections were held that same year, they were sponsored by the United Nations, which is to say, by the United States. And when South Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee, came to power, the émigré who had spent much of his life in the United States was backed by the mammoth power of Washington.

For most of the first two decades after World War II, the United States handled the politics of South Korea with a predictable blend of ambivalence, confusion, good will, and hypocrisy. For most of this century, Washington viewed Korea almost entirely as a strategic issue, and an ancillary one. Theodore Roosevelt gave Korea over to Japanese colonialism in 1905 with nary a thought, and four decades later Dean Acheson unintentionally made it seem that the United States would not fight to defend it. After the World War II, strategists such as Acheson and George Kennan saw Korea as important only in their effort to restore Japanese strength as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Kennan thought that South Korea should be kept nominally independent until Japan could reestablish its suzerainty there. After the Korean War, Americans seemed to believe that the chief role of the South Korean government was to be protected against a North Korean attack.

American officials understandably put a high premium on stability in South Korea, and therefore they were willing to tolerate some measure of deviance from the democratic forms that they had helped to erect. Reinforcing that toleration was the American-manufactured fiction, not exclusive to Korea, that Washington had to respect the sovereignty of other nations and not meddle in their internal affairs. This was at once noble and hypocritical, idealistic and irresponsible; and it was very American. Only Americans could claim that they did not wish to manipulate the politics of a country in which tens of thousands of American troops were stationed and in which the home country's army was directly under American command. And only Americans could make that claim with a measure of sincerity.

But Koreans were baffled whenever American officials insisted that their hands were tied regarding "internal" Korean matters. Oberdorfer recounts that in 1979, after the military coup by Chun Doo Hwan, a Korean academic asked an American official why the United States did not simply "nullify what General Chun did and kick him out." Why not "teach Koreans a lesson that the United States does not support just anyone"? The American ambassador responded tersely: "Cannot act as a colonial governor." This was nonsense. Koreans knew perfectly well that American officials could act and did act as colonial governors.

In the late 1950s, in fact, the Americans, tiring of Syngman Rhee, began actively pushing South Korea toward a truer version of democracy. The American embassy took an increasingly favorable view of Rhee's opponents in the Democratic Party—the party that eventually produced Kim Dae Jung—even arguing that an opposition electoral victory "would require and hold great potential for the exercise of American influence to effect a basic improvement in government in Korea." When Rhee clung stubbornly to power, and when mass student protests in April 1960 resulted in the killing of over 100 unarmed civilians by Rhee's palace guard, Washington decided that enough was enough. The ambassador and the commander of U.S. forces asked Rhee to resign, and three days later Rhee and his wife were off to Hawaii. The Second Republic established after Rhee's departure was South Korea's first full-fledged democracy. It sported a bicameral legislature, a new and stronger National Assembly, a free press, and, Cumings relates, "sophisticated schemes for building the economy." And the Korean response to this colonial interventionist behavior by the Americans? They laid a wreath at the statue of General MacArthur.

Unfortunately, the Americans were inconsistent in their colonialism. The very next year, when the Korean military and the right wing, fearing a drift to the left and talk of reunification with the North, decided to stage a coup, the Americans

Is it ever wise to improve on perfection?

Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen and still only $39.95*

But read this ad for an even better deal!

Folk wisdom has it that it's seldom wise to fix what isn't broken and to attempt to improve on perfection. It is therefore with some trepidation that we introduce the *Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen, ("son of Fujiyama")* after having sold over 150,000 of the original in the last few years. Many believe that the *Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen*—made in Asia and with a cartridge that is the finest product of German stationery technology—is the most handsome and best-writing pen in the world. Fujiyama 2tm has stunning hi-lacquer gunmetal finish, fine gold-plated accents and snappy clip. It has perfect heft and feel and, of course, just like its predecessor, it writes like a dream. And with its new cushioned *Turbogrip*tm, which lets you write for hours without tiring, this pen has now been brought to the edge of the 21st century.

The most remarkable thing about the *Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen* is its price. We are the exclusive importers and distributors of Fujiyama stationery in the United States and are therefore able to bring you this updated model still at the same old price of just $39.95. But we have an even better deal: ***Buy two for $79.90, and we'll send you a third one, with our compliments—absolutely FREE!*** Discard those tacky ballpoint pens and those clumsy felt tips. Write smoothly and easily, give character and good appearance to your writing. And make a really great buy, an even greater one if you take advantage of our 3-for-2 "better deal". Get with it—get your *Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen(s)* today!

• *The brand-new* Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen *is an object of beauty. Many have called it the "ultimate writing machine." It contains a large German-made ceramic-ball cartridge. It holds lots of ink, enough to write many letters and memos. As an added service, we include two extra refill cartridges with each pen.*

FOR FASTEST SERVICE, ORDER
TOLL FREE (800) 797-7367
24 Hours a Day, 7 Days a Week.

For customer service and wholesale orders please call 415-543-6675. We can apply your company logo to Fujiyama 2tm Pens on minimum quantities of 100 units.

Please give order **#1049D552** for *Fujiyama 2tm Ceramic Pen(s)*. We need daytime phone # for all orders. Add $4.95 standard shipping/insurance charge (plus sales tax for California delivery). You have 30-day refund and one-year warranty. We do not refund shipping charges.

since 1967
haverhills®
185 Berry Street, San Francisco, CA 94107

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retreated helplessly into their non-interventionist pose. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, after blinking at the coup, did manage to put enough pressure on Park Chung Hee to force him to hold repeated elections, one of which he nearly lost to Kim Dae Jung. But in 1972, when Park transformed his partly democratic, partly authoritarian regime into a rigid tyranny, the Americans turned a blind eye again. In the early 1970s South Koreans entered an era of authoritarianism more brutal and complete than any they had known since their liberation from the Japanese. Park declared himself president for life, outlawed his opposition, reconstituted the National Assembly to assure his control, and set the Korean intelligence service, the KCIA, loose on all political opponents, not just suspected communists.

There was nothing natural, "traditional," or inevitable about South Korea's turn to rigid authoritarianism in the early 1970s. It was the consequence of the usual confluence of unrelated events that so often shapes the course of history, combined with the decisions of a single individual with the power to turn desires into deeds, and with the conscious inaction, justified as "realism," of the outside power capable of stopping him.

In 1969, South Korea's economy hit a snag, causing political and union turmoil, and leading to the bankruptcies of some 200 Korean firms by 1971. That year Park had his political near-death experience, when Kim Dae Jung ran neck-and-neck with him in national elections. Those events alone might have persuaded Park to call a halt to democracy, but his decision to impose a strict tyranny may have been shaped even more by developments outside Korea. And chief among them was the rapidly deteriorating strategic position of the United States in East Asia. With the war in Vietnam going badly, the Nixon administration was retrenching, withdrawing, searching for help from such unlikely sources as Communist China, and, in the view of some Asian allies of the United States, like Park, systematically selling out the anti-Communist forces in the region, from Saigon to Taipei. To make matters worse, Nixon announced the withdrawal of a full division of American troops from Korea. As Cumings writes, "a sense of crisis afflicted Seoul within and without, and the regime reacted with a complex mixture of rigid authoritarianism, dramatic change in the political economy [the "big push"], and some quick footwork in foreign policy."

But Park justified his turn to strict authoritarian rule in terms familiar to us today. Long before "Asian values" became fashionable, Park declared that he was establishing "Korean-style democracy." Koreans were a family with collective responsibilities, he claimed—and so he eviscerated the National Assembly so as to permit a more "organic cooperation" among the governing bodies. Most Koreans saw through the rhetoric, and so did the Nixon administration. It took 20 years for such rationalizations of dictatorship to be dignified as high theory by Western scholars and policymakers.

As Oberdorfer records, Nixon's ambassador to Korea, Philip Habib, cabled Washington that Park's measures aimed simply at keeping him in office for at least twelve years without opposition. Park was clearly abandoning the course "which we have been advocating and supporting in Korea for 27 years." The only question was what did Washington intend to do about it. The answer was, nothing. As the State Department cabled Habib, "We agree that [Park's] contemplated measures are unnecessary, and have grave reservations about the course he has embarked upon." But it was "an internal matter.... It is up to him to decide." As then-Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green later told Oberdorfer, the Nixon administration, thoroughly preoccupied by the war in Vietnam, "didn't have time to be bothered." Park could have predicted as much: three weeks before he made his move, Oberdorfer notes, Park had watched closely as Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines declared martial law and overthrew his country's political institutions—to silence in Washington.

As always, it was a little hard to credit American professions of helplessness, what with 40,000 American troops in Korea, many billions of dollars in direct American aid, and an American general in titular command of the Korean military. When Washington really wanted something, it got it. When Henry Kissinger ordered Park to cease his nuclear development program, Park obeyed. In 1973, after the KCIA tortured a professor to death, the CIA station chief said that he could no longer work with the head of the KCIA. The official was fired a week later.

Still, an ever-shifting combination of fear, timidity, laziness, and inattention, especially in the wretched decade of the 1970s, made American officials reluctant to engage themselves consistently and effectively in Korean politics. In justifying their passivity, they hid behind the skirts of non-intervention and, worse still, fell into endorsing the very rationalization Korean dictators used to justify their misrule: that the Korean people were not ready for democracy.

The Carter administration, for all its chatter about human rights, was not very different from the Nixon and Ford administrations in this respect. Waves of student protests, growing political opposition, and persecution by the Park regime of Kim Dae Jung and other dissidents led to ritualistic denunciations by Carter officials; but in Korea, as elsewhere, Carter's devotion to the principle of non-intervention trumped his devotion to human rights. Carter's primary goal in Korea, based on a promise that he made rather flippantly during his presidential campaign, was to withdraw all American forces. (Asked later by Oberdorfer why he thought withdrawal was a good idea, Carter wrote back that "the origin of my position is not clear to me.")

When Park was assassinated in 1979, when the brief political opening that followed was slammed shut by another military coup, when in the following year a popular rebellion in Kwangju was brutally repressed by the Korean army, Carter officials were paralyzed. The conspirators, led by Chun Doo Hwan, knew, as Park had known in 1972, that the Americans were preoccupied, this time with the hostage crisis in Iran. According to Oberdorfer, they also "sensed, correctly, that Washington ... felt under great pressure not to push so hard in Seoul that they created 'another Iran.'" General John Wickham, Carter's commander in Korea, declared in the midst of the Korean crisis that "national security and internal stability surely come before political liberalization"—an observation that could have earned him a Ph.D. from the Harvard government department. In any case, Wickham opined, "I'm not sure democracy the way we understand it is ready for Korea, or the Koreans ready for it."

Seven years after this sagacious judgment, South Koreans took part in the first open elections since Park's crackdown in 1972. The rival opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung split the antigovernment vote in 1987 and handed the election to the military candidate Roh Tae Woo—but the long era of military rule was ending. Kim Young Sam won the next election in 1992. And five years later Kim Dae Jung capped a remarkable career in opposition—a career in which he was run over by a truck, kidnapped, arrested, and almost executed—by being elected President in South Korea's third free election.

IV.

Seven years after the Carter administration pronounced South Koreans "not ready" for elections they were suddenly "ready." What had happened? Had South Korean society undergone some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remarkably swift evolution and "maturation" between 1980 and 1987? Did the rise of a hitherto unknown middle class make dictatorship suddenly unsustainable? Had the many years of dictatorship under Park and Chun provided the necessary period of stability in which liberal juices could ferment and eventually produce this democratic wine?

The common wisdom holds that the answer to all these questions is yes, that South Korea was "ready" for democracy in the late 1980s but not before. And so will Indonesia eventually be "ready," and so will China, if we just give them time in which economic growth and domestic stability can perform their politically transforming (and, for American business, economically bountiful) magic. But again the common wisdom has elevated theory over facts, and broad economic and social trends—the stuff of political science—over events and people, the stuff of history. And again the models have omitted from their calculations that most critical factor in South Korean politics: the United States.

The first place to begin to understand what happened in South Korea in the 1980s is not the Korean economy but the Korean military, the men who took power in the coup that followed Park's assassination. Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, the same generals who brutally crushed the uprising in Kwangju in 1980, proved a good deal less ruthless in their determination to hold power than Park. This was not because they were great believers in the theory that a growing middle class is the midwife of democracy, or because they were carefully watching the mean income levels to determine the moment at which democracy would become "impregnable." They were aware, instead, of the dangers of hanging on to power—dangers, that is, to their own health.

According to Oberdorfer's account, Chun had drawn "a profound lesson from watching the regime of his mentor, President Park, decline, decay, and collapse in a hail of gunfire when its leader stayed on too long." Chun and Roh also shared what had become a nationwide sense of embarrassment at Park's style of rule. Before taking power, Chun told an American visitor that "if I were to become president, I would like the history books to say that I was the first one in Korea to turn over power in a legitimate and constitutional manner." Chun's wife wanted him to be South Korea's George Washington. Once in power, Chun publicly declared that he was committed to establishing in South Korea "a tradition of peaceful transfer of power" and would step down after completing a seven-year term.

Critics greeted Chun's announcement skeptically, and they doubted the sincerity of the elaborate preparations Chun made for his post-presidential life. Cumings, less credulous than Oberdorfer, suggests that Chun's real plan was to set himself up as a power behind the façade of a parliamentary government. In fact, whatever Chun's original intentions may have been, as the date of his departure from office drew nearer he was less and less inclined to retire. As he told reporters, "In a country like ours, it requires a lot more courage to give up power than to grab it."

But Chun's ambivalence offered an opportunity for the United States to steer South Korean politics away from authoritarianism—if the United States was ready to seize it. One would not have expected the Reagan administration to do so. Openly disdainful of Jimmy Carter's campaign for "human rights," in thrall to Jeane Kirkpatrick's highbrow defense of authoritarian allies, and as preoccupied with the threat of communism, Reagan could have been expected to back Chun no matter what he did. Oberdorfer reports that in 1980, when Alexander Haig was asked by a Korean official about Kim Dae Jung, then under arrest and threatened with execution, Haig said the Seoul government should feel free to make any decision it chose about Kim.

But there was another side to Reaganism; and in South Korea, as in the Philippines, Chile, and El Salvador, the Reagan administration confounded the critics and, for that matter, its own ideologists, by acting far more energetically on behalf of democracy than the Carter administration—and far more effectively. As Oberdorfer tells the story, which has never been adequately told before, Reagan officials began early on to box Chun in by praising his "far-sighted" commitments to turning over power, even though they suspected that he would abandon those commitments if given the chance to do so. As the then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz later told Oberdorfer, "Chun Doo Hwan had made a commitment, and we wanted him to realize that the United States expected him to keep it."

The mastermind of the strategy to compel Chun's compliance was Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur, whose speech in February 1987 calling for "a new political framework" in South Korea tolled the death knell for Korean authoritarianism. Sigur called for the "civilianizing" of Korean politics, which meant an

"Lee Edwards has written a fascinating book about the rise of the Heritage Foundation from modest beginnings to a pillar of the conservative movement."

—Milton Friedman

THE POWER OF IDEAS

One cannot begin to understand the modern conservative movement in American politics without knowing the 25-year history of Heritage. As Bill Buckley says, "historian Lee Edwards has caught the special magic of a foundation ...[which has] become the dominant think tank in America."



The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Suite 520C
Washington, D.C. 20002-4999

SPECIAL OFFER

THE POWER OF IDEAS: THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION AT 25 YEARS, is a $29.95, 360-page hardcover book published by Jameson Books and available in bookstores—or you can order direct today, for $19.95 postage paid and **save $10.00.**
This "Special offer" expires soon.
Call: 800-544-4843
Fax coupon to: 202-543-9647
Email to: pubs@heritage.com
Mail this coupon to: The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Suite 520C, Washington, D.C. 20002-4999.

Enclosed is my check for $_____

Please charge my ❑ VISA ❑ Mastercard

No._____

Signature _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State ___ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

end to military rule. Reagan and his aides, prompted by Richard Holbrooke and other Carter officials, even saved Kim Dae Jung's life, bartering it for a state dinner for Chun early in Reagan's first term. That turned out to have more than symbolic value. It was the opening move in a new American policy that ultimately brought down Korean dictatorship.

World events also conspired to weaken authoritarian rule in South Korea, though some of those events, too, were shaped by Washington. By the mid-1980s, democracy had come to a number of countries in Latin America; it was stirring in parts of Eastern Europe; and it was beginning to reshape the politics of Asia, once thought to be impervious to democratic governance. In 1986, as the end of Chun's seven-year term was approaching, the Marcos regime in the Philippines was toppled by a combination of "people power" and the American demand that Marcos respect the results of the elections it had forced him to hold. Events in the Philippines rippled northward to Korea. There was, to use the poli-sci term, a "demonstration effect." Just as the Nixon administration's acquiescence to Marcos's imposition of authoritarian rule in 1972 had emboldened Park to do the same, so in 1986 the American-backed democratic revolution in the Philippines emboldened opposition leaders in Korea and gave Chun and his clique a strong sense that they were not on the right side of history. As one Chun loyalist told an American official in the midst of the crisis, "There's a fever going on and that fever is democracy. And we cannot turn it back."

In truth, they could have turned it back; except that the Reagan administration acted to prevent them. In 1987, when Chun made it clear that he intended to hand power over to Roh Tae Woo without a free election, thus extending military rule for another seven years at least, massive demonstrations erupted throughout the country. South Korean history was repeating itself. Faced with another uprising, this time even more widespread than the Kwangju disaster in 1980, Chun took the usual steps to put it down by force. He drafted an order to the military to prepare to deploy troops on campuses and in cities throughout South Korea. He prepared an emergency decree dissolving the opposition political parties and establishing military courts to deal with dissidents.

The pattern was by now thoroughly familiar. But this time the United States stepped in, demonstrating what Koreans had always known: that American influence was decisive in Korea if American leaders chose to wield it. Reagan sent a letter to Chun calling upon him to honor his promises for a peaceful transition to democracy. Then, in a meeting with Chun, Ambassador James Lilley, a hard-nosed former CIA official, "went beyond the gentle language of the Reagan letter to warn that intervention by the [Korean] military would stretch the [U.S.-Korean] alliance in dangerous fashion." Lilley's threats, backed by the U.S. military commander, broke Chun's will. An hour after Lilley's meeting with the Korean general, the mobilization order and emergency decree were suspended. Ten days later, General Roh Tae Woo announced direct presidential elections for December 1987, promising an open campaign, amnesties for political prisoners, including Kim Dae Jung, freedom of the press, and guarantees of basic human rights. "By the end of 1987," Oberdorfer writes, "South Korea had taken a new road from which there was no turning back."

It is hard to read Oberdorfer's account of events in 1987 and still believe that the critical factor in Korea's transition to democratic government was the Korean economy. The Korean middle class, after all, was not very different in size or political significance when it succumbed rather quietly to dictatorship in 1980 than when it refused to succumb in 1987. In the end, it was not the existence of a middle class that made the difference, it was the decision by some members of what Oberdorfer calls "usually conservative middle-class Koreans" to go into the streets—and the equally important decision by Korea's military leaders not to slaughter them when they did. Those decisions were shaped chiefly by non-economic factors, such as events in the Philippines, the anticipated American response, and the less tangible but no less significant feeling among a broad cross-section of Koreans, also within the leadership itself, that they had had enough of brutal military rule. Even so, had the United States reacted in 1987 the way it did in 1980 and in 1972, we might still be talking about an authoritarian South Korea, instead of watching Kim Dae Jung take the presidential sash. The point is simple enough. Economic prosperity and a growing middle class may help to sustain a democracy, but they do not create one. What creates a democracy is a moral will, in individuals and in societies, backed by the power to implement it—in this case, the power of the United States.

What of the assertion that an authoritarian phase was necessary in South Korea to provide a period of stability for economic growth to take off? This is even less persuasive, for the very simple reason that South Korea's authoritarian regimes did not provide much stability. As Cumings points out, "every Korean republic until the one elected in 1992, under Kim Young Sam, began or ended in massive uprisings or military coups." Park's Third Republic began with a coup and ended with Park's murder at the hands of his own intelligence chief. Chun's regime "began and ended with popular rebellions that shook the foundations of the system." One could just as easily argue, as Cumings does, "that South Korea has had one of the most unstable political systems in the world."

Writing from his prison cell on the day before his release at the end of 1982, Kim Dae Jung implored God to "grant that democracy can take root firmly in this country, so the happiness of the people and stability of the nation can be achieved." Democracy alone, he wrote, "is the road for the people of the Republic of Korea to feel purposeful and proud." He was expressing universal values in Korean words. And the current crisis is now in his hands. It may well be that Korean democracy provides more stability than Korean tyranny.

There is no Korean model. There is only Korean history, and it was a history shaped by individuals, by combinations of causes too complicated to predict or to control, by accidents, by wars, and by American intervention. This historical truth is unsettling for American policymakers and policy intellectuals. To understand this history is to feel the burden of responsibility. Models, by contrast, are far more comforting than history, even if they fail to capture and to explain reality, especially the 50-year-old reality of American global influence. (The universal demonstration effect of America's existence, you might call it.) Models also absolve us of responsibility. They do not call for sacrifices. They encourage us to drift along and let events take their predictable and inevitable course.

One wonders whether we will ever come to realize how enervating the escape from responsibility can be, politically, morally, and spiritually; whether we will ever recognize that our nation's ability to do some good now and then is a rare gift, and that this gift benefits the giver as well as the recipient. "Realism," and its cousin economicism, has no room for such sentiments. But perhaps we can put ourselves less in thrall to the pseudo-science of politics at the end of this most bloodied and scientific of centuries. "Although modern man has produced a dazzling array of scientific achievements

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and professional accomplishments," Kim Dae Jung wrote in 1981, "in terms of reflections on truth and happiness in life, he is as dim as a candle before the sun." Modern scientists, "including political scientists, economists, and sociologists, have not been able to offer any meaningful solutions to our problems." That is the observation of a man who may fairly claim to have been a victim of the models of Western science. Perhaps we, too, can be guided in the next century by something a bit closer to faith—faith in the few fundamental principles that our nation embodies, not least that all peoples are "ready" for freedom and for the only form of government that can reliably provide it. That faith has served us well in the past. It has undergirded all of our most successful foreign policies, from Truman to Reagan. Faith and foreign policy? Maybe even in this life. •

Making the Grade

By Henry Rosovsky

Jefferson's Children: Education and the Promise of American Culture by Leon Botstein

(Doubleday, 232 pp., $21.95)

There may be a few exceptions, but these days one associates the pronouncements of college and university presidents most of all with the quality of caution. Caution can be a virtue, but it tends to produce clichés and provoke somnolence. A day does not go by on C-SPAN without assorted university heads proclaiming that they must lead with passion and honesty, that they must honor merit while encouraging diversity ... blah, blah, blah. It is practically the job description of a university president to avoid the expression of a controversial view. Today's educational leaders are CEOs talking CEO talk. They are divorced from their product and focused on issues of managerial efficiency.

Can one blame them? Have they completely run out of ideas? Not entirely. The functional equivalents of Wall Street analysts are hard at work rating all institutions in all markets, and being a maverick does not maintain the "share price": attractiveness to applicants, parents, donors, and—in the case of public universities—state legislators. The best example—and the worst influence—are the dominant annual rating issues of *U.S. News and World Report*. Who would have ever believed that serious colleges and universities (including professional schools and hospitals) would—virtually without questioning the shoddy methodology and the crass commercialism—consciously fight to gain a few places on a meaningless list? Many institutions of higher education have been reduced to what schoolteachers call "teaching to test," only these tests are designed to sell magazines.

Enter Leon Botstein. Since 1975, he has led Bard College with panache: raising academic quality, jousting on *Firing Line*, attracting large donors. Caution is not a significant aspect of his character, as demonstrated by his new book. It is a book in the sense of being 200-plus pages printed between hard covers. More accurately, it is a one-sided conversation—a monologue, a tirade, a long fireside chat—in which Botstein discourses on issues more or less related to education, with most attention paid to secondary education. His main messages are: abandon nostalgia about our schools ("...the dominant myth of the 1990s has been the conclusion that we must restore American schools to a level of quality and standard that they have lost"); our culture is afflicted with a pervasive and unjustified pessimism about the present and the future, and that affects the attitude of young people toward their own education; we need a radical redesign of the American high school, by accomplishing much more while cutting the time students spend in secondary school by two years. There is also a chapter—it is my least favorite—featuring "Twenty-Four Maxims" for better parenting. (Reflect on the exercise of authority, connect children to adults through reading, and so on.) A final chapter on colleges stresses the virtues of smaller institutions: a little propaganda for Bard, I guess.

All of these themes and ideas are presented without footnotes, with sweeping and debatable generalizations, and with some fascinating digressions. The ques-

PUT YOUR FAITH IN STANLEY KAUFFMANN.

If Kauffmann reviewed it, we probably have it. **Rent or buy** hard-to-find videos by mail from our library of over 3,500 titles, including ***L'America, In the Company of Men, Irma Vep, Kiss Me Guido, A Mongolian Tale, Mrs. Brown, The Pillow Book, Pixote, Shall We Dance*** and ***Three Lives and Only One Death.***

Choose among foreign films, limited releases, independents, documentaries and classics. It's simple and inexpensive.

Recommended by Roger Ebert as "... an idea whose time has come." Phone or write for free information and list of films.

1-800-258-3456
P.O. Box 2032, Scranton, PA 18501
www.homefilmfestival.com

Home Film Festival®

Doctoral Degrees

Accredited, 1-2 yrs.; 1 mo. Residency — BUSINESS, EDUCATION, GOV'T., INT. RELATIONS, PSYCH., RELIGION, SOCIAL WORK, HEALTH SERVICES.

Write: Berne University, PO Box 1080, Wolfeboro Falls, NH 03896. Call: (603) 569-8648; Fax: (603) 569-4052. e-mail: berne@berne.edu

SEIZED CARS FROM $175.

Porsches, Cadillacs, Chevys, BMW's, Corvettes. Also Jeeps, 4WD's.

Your Area. Call Toll Free, 1-800-218-9000, Ext. A-4377 for current listings.

GOVERNMENT FORECLOSED HOMES FROM

pennies on $1. Delinquent Tax, Repo's, REO's. Your Area.

Call Toll Free: 1-800-218-9000 Ext. H-4377 for current listings

FREE CASH GRANTS!

College. Scholarships. Business. Medical bills. Never Repay.

Toll Free: 1-800-218-9000 Ext. G-4377



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Gods Leaving

That they carry away, with them,
vision—this isn't the worst of
the gods leaving: it's that they take

only half. There comes the hour
when—having lain long and favored
at the dark crossroads of Gift

and Desire; having as pliant
swans bested all arrows, no less
at ease with that wreckage than

with the glamour we have learned
to call pain given up to, until
wanted, a dream—we see it

was only, ever, our own bodies
by hands only our strong own
taken here, and here, down, ours

the mouths stalled at *Oh*, the eyes
clearing, enough to read or imagine
a reading for the shadows cast

to nobody's surprise by trees
theatrically there, shifting: *Don't*
do this, don't do this—always,

someone is too late.... At
that hour, because the gods aren't
indifferent, we rise into what,

already, is the new life—flat,
general, "never for such as
ourselves"—and it seems, at first,

just the old one: rain, the fact
of rain, so ordinary, stepping
into it, I did not think to cry out.

CARL PHILLIPS

tionable generalizations include: that the 1980s saw "the final flight of American manufacturing overseas"; that "educational television is an oxymoron, much like corporate philanthropy"; that "although wealth determines where one lives and therefore one's school district and high school ... all Americans, rich or poor, attend much the same kind of high school"; or that "American colleges are noted for their vulgarity in terms of extracurricular social life." Perhaps the most interesting digression is a meditation on the adverbial and nonadverbial use of "hopefully," where we read that "the change from 'I hope' to 'hopefully' is a sign of the disavowal of responsibility ... a sign of the extent to which we have lost hope and live in a culture of pessimism." I am tempted to ask Botstein for his analysis of the ubiquitous split infinitive: a sign of alienation?

Despite its lack of documentation and its chatty tone, this is a book that deserves the attention of all who are interested in American education. The reason is that Botstein is mostly right; and even when he is wrong, he manages to be stimulating. (And again, it is a pleasure to read the unafraid and straightforward opinions of an intelligent and erudite person who is the head of an institution, of *any* institution.) Botstein's attack on nostalgia and pessimism is especially persuasive. For reasons that are somewhat mysterious, nothing brings out nostalgia more than education. The colleges of yesteryear were Edens, in which boys and girls sat at the feet of Socratic masters and emerged liberally educated ... at tuitions of a few hundred dollars a year! And let us not forget those wonderful public schools of New York City before and immediately after World War II, in which the typical graduate was Daniel Bell or Irving Kristol. All this, of course, is sentimental claptrap. The memories are never accurate; and more important, the problems faced by schools at all levels have changed enormously.

As Botstein writes, "our schools, while not that bad considering the circumstances they face, are still not as good as they ought to be." His most radical and most interesting pages are about "Replacing the American High School." High schools were created for an America that existed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he says, and they have not adapted well to change. A hundred years ago, these schools accommodated prepubescent children in the 15- to 18-year-old age range. Today, as a result of physiological and social changes, this same age group consists of young adults—and that is where the problems just begin.

Our high schools are simply incapable of capturing the imagination of young adults. The curricula and the methods of teaching have made high schools the "wasted years" of today. Young adults or adolescents have filled the intellectual vacuum by substituting a devotion to popular culture; and that is *not* a desirable form of secondary education. This problem is especially severe in the United States because the ideal of the common school still has some meaning. Compared to Europeans or Japanese, we do little tracking or segregating by intellectual ability or energy. Instead, "the population is segmented by age-group.... The best are influenced by the weakest." As a result, almost no adolescents can escape the negative influences associated with the atmosphere prevailing in high schools. And students who have wasted their adolescence in a failing high school system pose a major problem to colleges and universities. Educational deficiencies embodied in these graduates cannot be remedied at the tertiary level. It is too late; their intellectual capacities are permanently impaired.

What is to be done? We have to reinvent both primary and secondary education, though Botstein does not have much to say about the former. Primary years would run from kindergarten through sixth; secondary schooling would consist of grades seven through ten, at which point the student becomes eligible for a high school diploma; and alternative forms of education would be offered for the discarded and wasteful grades eleven and twelve. For this system to have the desired outcome—recapturing the thirst for knowledge by adolescents—it will be necessary to treat 13- and 14-year-olds more like college students are treated at schools such as Bard: seminars, small classes, intense intellectual engagement, and a lot of positive feedback.

Botstein even supplies a list of what high school students should know on completion of tenth grade, that is, at graduation: a demonstrable command of written and spoken English; American history and an understanding of the Constitution; geography; world history; some statistics and probability; biology; an introduction to non-Western culture; some economics, with an emphasis on its international dimensions; a foreign language; and finally, some exposure to the visual and performing arts. All that, at the age of 16! What next? Some would immediately start college. Others might enter the job market or some form of national service, if such were available. And some would enter vocational programs.

This utopian vision is very attractive, at least to me. High schools might cease to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be warehouses for the unmotivated. Too many students already go to college because alternatives are lacking, and Botstein's analysis proposes other options. Higher education would also benefit by getting—on average—younger, better prepared, and more motivated students. But do these proposals go beyond a utopian vision? Botstein has very little to say about the truly formidable issues that face our system of primary and secondary education.

What obstacles are created by local control and financing? What about the absence of national standards? How many of these ideas apply to schools in our urban ghettos where the daily problems of maintaining discipline overwhelm all other considerations? What about the economic and professional standing of teachers who are expected to lead seminars and provide positive reinforcement? (Botstein suggests that teachers be exempted from federal income tax—the very definition of a political nonstarter.) What ordinary high school will be able to assemble teachers capable of offering the suggested curriculum? Lastly, if college is not capable of repairing earlier educational defects, is it not possible that high school and perhaps even primary school is also too late? Perhaps our society should assign maximum resources to the preschool years, when intellectual habits are first formed.

Still, where would we be without uplifting visions? Right where we are today, making little progress in a setting remarkably devoid of inspiration. Some of the proposals for the so-called abolished high school are quite practical. Shifting some of what is now college work to high schools already occurs in the best private and public schools, and this trend needs as much expansion as practicable. Many authorities already recognize the need to strengthen vocational education. Starting higher education well before the age of 18 is also desirable.

"Higher Ed" would benefit by having more presidents cut in the Botstein pattern, thinking and speaking uninhibitedly about our entire system of education. One of the oddities of our present condition is that the quality gap between primary and secondary education, on the one hand, and higher education on the other, is larger than anywhere in the world. (That is *my* unfootnoted sweeping generalization.) The broad consequences of this national dilemma have not seriously engaged the leaders of American higher education: their concerns tend to be much more parochial. The directions that Botstein has suggested are worth discussion and debate. Many of us are waiting to hear the voices of certain other college presidents.

HENRY ROSOVSKY is Geyser University Professor emeritus at Harvard University.

TRB *continued from page 6*

to demobilize numerous divisions and to reduce the number of weapons assigned to the remaining ones. The U.N. inspectors have also been able to locate and destroy a considerable number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction: 40,000 chemical weapons, more than 100,000 gallons of chemical-weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, and 30 warheads fitted for chemical and biological weapons. Saddam is hardly likely to retaliate against an American attack with chemical and biological weapons; his preferred targets for chemical warfare are helpless victims like the Kurds or the Shiites. If he were to launch missiles at Israel, retaliation surely would be swift.

Despite the decrepitude of Iraq, there is, as Edmund Burke observed, a lot of ruin in a country. Sanctions and bombing may cripple Saddam militarily, but the U.S. needs to go even further. A first step to driving him out of power might be the policy that the Bush administration shunned: dismemberment. The U.S. has already created no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq. As Berger noted in a February 13 speech at the National Press Club, "Our Air Force ... [is] severely reducing the threat Iraq poses to the Gulf countries and Turkey." The Clinton administration might consider extending the no-fly zone to all of Iraq as well as sending troops into the southern and northern regions of Iraq to install a provisional government. One of the worst mistakes that the Bush and Clinton administrations made was to betray the Kurds and Shiites in the north and south. The critics who warn about the innocent Iraqi lives that would be lost in a bombing campaign never mention the slaughter of the Shiites which took place precisely because U.S. passivity abandoned them to Saddam. The U.S. should also begin transferring troops from Saudi Arabia, where they are hostage to Muslim terrorists who have already killed 19 Americans at Khobar Towers, and place them in Kuwait itself. It might take up to a year to strangle Saddam, but it would not require a massive ground offensive.

President Clinton and his advisers will have a ready answer: The allies would protest. But this is the same excuse that the administration invoked during the Bosnian crisis in the early years of its first term. Or are the president's advisers using French, Russian, and Chinese opposition to bombing as a smoke screen? At a minimum, an attack on Iraq's politico-military infrastructure can damage the regime and compel Saddam to accept U.N. inspections. The bull sessions must come to an end.

JACOB HEILBRUNN

FREE CATALOG
Classic Music Furniture
If you love music, our new catalog of fine hardwood music furniture will delight you. Music stands, sheet music cabinets, players' seating, instrument stands, and more.
Alden Lee Company, Inc.
For FREE catalog call 1-800-324-5200
Dept: NRP810 1215 Chrysler Dr, Menlo Park, CA 94025

"Lincoln Speaks" Letters, Speeches, Essays
A limited collector's edition anthology.
Special printing limited to 1000 numbered copies.
$19.95 includes postage, handling, and our full guarantee. We will refund your full purchase price by return mail if you are unsatisfied for any reason. $19.95 payable to: Mediability, 1810 Summit Pointe Way, Atlanta, GA 30329, ph 404 320-0303

NEW AUTHORS
PUBLISH YOUR WORK
All subjects considered:
Fiction, Biography, Poetry, Religion, Childrens;
AUTHORS WORLDWIDE INVITED.
Write or send your manuscript to:
MINERVA PRESS
2 OLD BROMPTON ROAD • LONDON SW7 3DQ, ENGLAND

Publish Your Book
75-year tradition of quality. Subsidy book publisher offers publishing services for books of all types. For *Author's Guide* write or call Dorrance — NR, 643 Smithfield, Pittsburgh, PA 15222 or 1-800-695-9599.

If you question the accuracy of the Bible's story of Jesus and you enjoy historical detective work, you'll appreciate Jack Hannah's analysis of two newly unearthed ancient documents about Jesus. It argues convincingly for their sayings' being ipsissimis verbis of Jesus, which invalidate the Bible's claims and indicate that Jesus favored Epicurean philosophy. This reverses Jesus from being in line with the idealism of a Platonic-Stoic-Jewish world view to being a realist rejecting Providence, creationism, and much else that idealists associate with the Divine. Hannah provides complete text of the sources, chronologically ordered and explained.
YOU WILL NOT TASTE DEATH
JESUS AND EPICUREANISM
321pp. pbk. $12 postpaid
mail check to Frank Publishing
1816 Springmill Road
Mansfield, OH 44903-8907

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SARAJEVO DIARIST

If pigs could fly

SIGNED AT A MILITARY BASE IN Ohio, the peace agreement that ended the war in Bosnia is now known to everyone here as "Dayton." So imagine my surprise when, after more than two years of monitoring the pact's implementation on behalf of the International Crisis Group (ICG), I discovered that Dayton is a pigsty in the former military barracks where I had once been held hostage. A far-fetched metaphor? Let me explain. In 1992, five other correspondents and I were detained for a night in the military barracks at Lukavica, a Serb-dominated suburb of Sarajevo. Now, the same barracks have been turned into a refugee center called Hotel Dayton. Those Serbs from Sarajevo, who fled the city when it was placed under the control of the Bosniak, i.e., Muslim-dominated government and who either cannot or will not return home, live here, on the territory of the Serbian Republika Srpska. Dragana, a resident, told me she has no doubts that living in Dayton was the right solution for her family: her daughter will not be learning Islamic nonsense at school, and she can still eat her pork chops, which are banned under Muslim dietary rules. Other Serbian refugees from Sarajevo like pork, too, so they've set up a modest pigsty in the yard of Dayton. Here, they breed pigs not only for themselves but also for their former Serbian neighbors who were courageous enough to stay in Sarajevo but not courageous (or stupid) enough to raise pigs in the shadow of a minaret.

THE PROBLEM ARISES OF HOW TO get the pig bred by Dragana to Miodrag, her former neighbor who lives a 20-minute car ride away on the Bosniak side of the interethnic divide, but whom she has to call on an international phone line. Miodrag's car has Bosniak license plates, and getting caught with Bosniak license plates in the Republika Srpska is a very bad idea, almost as bad as being caught (dead or alive) transporting a pig (dead or alive) in the trunk of one's car around Sarajevo. Enter my best friend Chris, a British public school graduate with a golden heart, who understands that a peckish Sarajevan Serb may turn sour about Dayton. Schlepping chopped pigs across ethnic borders isn't exactly the job description of an ICG political analyst, and Chris was "not too chuffed"—that's British for not too pleased. But ICG cars have foreign license plates, so he did a good deed and transported the pig. Now we have a standing invitation from Miodrag for pork chops *à la islamique*.

INCIDENTALLY, AS OF LAST WEEK, foreign plates are not such a unique advantage anymore. The international supervisor for Bosnia, Carlos Westendorp of Spain, is forcing the three ethnic groups here to adopt new all-Bosnian neutral license plates. "Neutral" is easier said than done in the Balkans. Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs had a hard time giving up their baroque license plates, which were laden with nationalistic symbolism. Linguistic advice was necessary to choose the six letters for the license plates that are written and read the same in both the Latin and the Cyrillic alphabets. Then, a Croat computer specialist was employed to design a program that would select at random the license plates—three (Arabic!) digits, a letter, and three more Arabic digits—so that nationalist mathematicians would not immediately know if the driver was *naš* (ours) or not *naš*. Finally, careful technical control was imposed on the reflection coefficient of the paint used by the producers in Serb-controlled Banja Luka (in the Republika Srpska) and Sarajevo (in the Bosniak–Croat Federation), lest one ethnic group's plates outshine another's.



LICENSE PLATES ARE ONLY ONE OF the multiethnic trappings that Westendorp is imposing on the disputatious locals. Take the flag. It was done in such a rush that, the next day, the Sarajevan state television station opened with the news that it is impossible to say which side of the flag should be attached to the pole. The design is a yellow triangle on a blue background with—how very European—eight stars on one side. Some see it as symbolizing the ethnic troika of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (never mind Jews and others); others think it is a schematic representation of the geographic form of Bosnia. Sarajevans immediately came up with an explanation of the colors: blue mixed with yellow yields green, the color of Islam. The flag is *naš*.

TO APPRECIATE WESTENDORP'S new Bosnian currency, you need a Ph.D. in Balkan literature and the ethnic pedigrees of local writers. The interim coupons will depict 13 different writers on seven banknotes in two ethnic versions. The mathematical discrepancy (I am not joking) is due to the fact that one writer is a Muslim who took a Serbian wife and settled in Belgrade, so he is claimed as *naš* by two entities and will figure prominently on both the "five convertible [German] marks" coupon bills that have text in the Cyrillic alphabet first, as well as those that have the Latin alphabet first.

NOW IT'S TIME TO FIND A NEW national anthem. Some Mozart pieces and Beethoven's Ninth are apparently being considered. Probably more appropriate would be "Don't Let it Come to War," an '80s hit sung by a band from Novi Sad in Yugoslavia, Djordje Balašević. Two nights last week, Balašević, a scruffy, unshaven Serb in a black sweater with pulled-up sleeves, did more for interethnic unity in Sarajevo than the international supervisor had done during the previous two years. Balašević conquered the city of Sarajevo as Radovan Karadžić's army never could. He sang "We Are All Guilty" and had thousands of Sarajevan teenagers screaming with joy, even though they had been told during four years of war that only Serbs were guilty. Balašević commands the same celebrity status all over the former Yugoslavia. The last man to get standing ovations in the capitals of Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia alike was Marshal Josip Broz Tito. "I am a stranger from here," said Balašević, but "I am *naš*."

BALAŠEVIĆ MANAGED TO CONVERT 14,000 people in ten hours of singing. But he warned them that "you cannot undo the war with two concerts." True, and there is a lot of undoing to do in the former Yugoslavia. Take the new film *The Peacemaker*. My friend Mort in Washington was invited to the National Security Council's private screening of the picture and says the audience there applauded when the NSC agent saved New York from a Serbian nationalist with an atomic bomb in his backpack. In Belgrade, where I saw it, the audience cheered when the Serb was on the verge of nuking Manhattan. You see, for these Belgraders, the nationalist villain was *naš*. Reactions to the British movie *Welcome to Sarajevo*, now playing in Belgrade, are similar: when the face of the indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić comes on screen, the audience cheers. It goes to show that, even though a semblance of peace has descended, former Yugoslavs are still behaving like swine toward one another. So perhaps saying that Dayton is a pigsty in a former barracks is an adequate metaphor after all.

ANNA HUSARSKA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Giambologna

[1529–1608]

Hercules Slaying the Lernaean Hydra, late 16th century. Bronze, 15⅜ inches high

Giambologna: Sculptor

March 6 to April 4

This exhibition, the first in the Americas devoted to the work of Giambologna, will be accompanied by an illustrated catalogue with an essay by Charles Avery

Proceeds from the sale of the exhibition catalogue will benefit The Frick Collection Acquisition Fund

Salander-O'Reilly Galleries

20 East 79 Street New York, NY 10021 Tel (212) 879-6606 Fax (212) 744-0655

Monday-Saturday 9:30 to 5:30

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Enjoy Black Label Responsibly

Johnnie Walker® Black Label® Blended Scotch Whisky, Imported 12 Year Old. 40% Alc./Vol. (80 Proof) ©1997 Schieffelin & Somerset Co., New York, N.Y.

IN A CRASS AND INSINCERE WORLD

SOMETHING THAT ISN'T.

WELCOME TO CIVILIZATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED